City of Kansas City v. Scarritt

• Decision Date: 18 March 1895
• Citation: 30 S.W. 111,127 Mo. 642
• Parties: CITY OF KANSAS CITY v. SCARRITT et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

30 S.W. 111

127 Mo. 642

CITY OF KANSAS CITY v. SCARRITT et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March 18, 1895.

SPECIAL LAWS — GOVERNMENT OF CITIES — CLASSIFICATION.

Act April 1, 1893, empowering every city organized under Const. art. 9, § 16, to establish a system of parks and boulevards, providing the methods for condemning land therefor, and declaring that the act shall take effect, "any provisions in the charter of any such city to the contrary notwithstanding," violates Const. art. 9, § 16, providing that "any city having a population of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government," and that such charter may be amended by the vote of the qualified electors of such city, "and not otherwise," and also Const. art. 9, § 7, providing that the general assembly shall provide for the classification of cities and towns, but that "the number of such classes shall not exceed four," it appearing that the assembly had previously created four classes. 29 S. W. 845, affirmed.

On motion for rehearing. Denied.

For former opinion, see 29 S. W. 845.

PER CURIAM.

It is claimed in the motion for rehearing that the decision rendered is not in harmony with some prior judgments of the court. The importance of the question involved in the case justifies a short statement of our views as to the effect of the earlier decisions. In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle (1884) 85 Mo. 64, an act regulating the registration of voters and the conduct of elections in cities of over 100,000 population was held valid, and applicable to the city of St. Louis, although it overrode charter provisions of different import. In State ex rel. Ziegenhein v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (1893) 117 Mo. 1, 22 S. W. 910, provisions of a law (general throughout the state) regulating the mode of assessment of railroads for purposes of taxation were held paramount to the terms of the charter of St. Louis. The subject of the statutes construed in those cases authorized the legislature to deal with them in a very different manner from topics of purely internal municipal government. "Legislation which is necessary or appropriate to carry into effect a positive command of the organic law, or is required or directly contemplated by its terms, cannot justly be held either special or local, within the true intent and meaning of the constitution." Kenefick v. City of St. Louis (Mo. Sup.; 1895) 29 S. W. 838. That proposition had been already substantially recognized in State v. Hughes (1891) 104 Mo. 459, 16 S. W. 489; in State v. Yancy (Mo. Sup.; 1894) 27 S. W. 380, and in State v. Higgins (Mo. Sup.; 1894) 28 S. W. 638. The act construed in the Hoblitzelle Case was plainly called for by the constitutional command in regard to the registration of voters in large cities. Const. art. 8, § 5. The act construed in Ziegenhein's Case regulated the mode of assessment and collection of revenue necessary for the state. By the separation of the city and county of St. Louis, the city was placed in a dual relation to the state government. It became invested with certain powers which in other parts of Missouri are exerted by county officers, as well as with the usual municipal powers for internal government. Under the terms of the constitution, the city was required to "collect the state revenue and perform all other functions in relation to the state in the same manner as if it were a county." Article 9, § 23. It is plain that a general statute regulating the assessment and collection of revenue, if found to be intended to apply to the whole state, should be construed by the courts as so applicable. That was the ruling made with reference to the statute discussed in the Ziegenhein Case. The same rule then maintained touching the repeal of local laws in St. Louis had been previously declared in State v. Bennett (1890) 102 Mo. 356, 14 S. W. 865, in dealing with a statute governing procedure in criminal causes. As was pointed ont in Kenefick's Case (Mo. Sup.; in the first division) 29 S. W. 838, all such topics are within range of the constitutional power of the...