City of Landrum v. Sarratt
Decision Date | 18 November 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 3569.,3569. |
Citation | 572 S.E.2d 476,352 S.C. 139 |
Parties | CITY OF LANDRUM, Appellant, v. Michael James SARRATT, Respondent. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Harold Lloyd Howard, of Landrum, for Appellant.
Ricky Keith Harris, of Spartanburg, for Respondent.
Michael J. Sarratt was charged with public disorderly conduct. Sarratt waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial. The municipal judge convicted Sarratt and ordered him to pay a fine of $112 or serve 20 days imprisonment. Sarratt appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the conviction. The City of Landrum appeals. We reverse.
Sarratt was arrested for yelling profanities at Franklin Keith Hembree and his mother, June Hembree, as they left the Landrum Municipal Court and walked across the municipal parking lot. Franklin testified Sarratt called him a crack head, loudly yelled profanities, and called his mother a "bitch." June testified Sarratt called her names and used the "f" word.
Whether the circuit court erred in reversing Sarratt's conviction, finding that although Sarratt used profanity in a public place, profane language alone is insufficient to constitute a violation of the public disorderly conduct statute.
State v. Henderson, 347 S.C. 455, 457, 556 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ct.App.2001) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, Mar. 22, 2002.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-530 provides:
Any person who shall (a) be found on any highway or at any public place or public gathering in a grossly intoxicated condition or otherwise conducting himself in a disorderly or boisterous manner, (b) use obscene or profane language on any highway or at any public place or gathering or in hearing distance of any schoolhouse or church ... shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not more than thirty days.
S.C.Code Ann. § 16-17-530 (1985). The circuit court found that "profane language alone cannot constitute a violation of the public disorderly conduct statute in light of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Rather, the circuit court found that profane language must be accompanied by fighting words or other behavior such as gross intoxication.
The First Amendment prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech. U.S. Const. amend. I; S.C. Const. art. I, § 2. There are, however, certain classes of speech that are not afforded the protection of the First Amendment. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942).
One such class of speech, fighting words, is defined as words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Id. at 572, 62 S.Ct. 766. Fighting words must be inherently likely to induce the ordinary person to react violently. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). The fact that words are vulgar or offensive is not alone sufficient to classify them as fighting words, thereby removing them from the protection provided by the First Amendment. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972) ( ); In re Louise C., 197 Ariz. 84, 3 P.3d 1004, 1005-07 (Ct.App.1999) ( ); Ware v. City & County of Denver, 182 Colo. 177, 511 P.2d 475, 475-76 (1973) ( ); Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41, 42-46 (1976) ( ); City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 811 (N.D.1991) ( ).
However, the determination of whether profane words constitute fighting words depends upon the circumstances surrounding their utterance. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Some of the factors to consider in determining if profanity constitutes fighting words are the presence of bystanders, the accompaniment of other aggressive behavior, and whether the words are repeatedly uttered. See State v. Szymkiewicz, 237 Conn. 613, 678 A.2d 473, 475-79 (1996) ( ); State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 10 P.3d 1285, 1287-89 (2000) ( ); State v. James M., 111 N.M. 473, 806 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 (1990) ( ); In re S.J.N-K., 647 N.W.2d 707, 709-12 (S.D.2002) ( ). Whether a communication constitutes fighting words also "depends in large part on the addressee of the communications." Aviva O. Wertheimer, The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L.Rev. 793, 813 (1994). In Cohen, the defendant's display of the words "F— the Draft" on the back of his jacket were determined not fighting words. 403 U.S. at 20-22,91 S.Ct. 1780. The court determined "[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on [Cohen's] jacket as a direct personal insult." Id. at 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780. The court explained that fighting words must be directed at someone in particular. Id.
In State v. Perkins, our supreme court concluded a conviction under section 16-17-530 required more than raised voices. 306 S.C. 353, 355, 412 S.E.2d 385, 386 (1991). Without fighting words, the defendants in Perkins could not be convicted. Id. Likewise, in State v. Pittman, this court stated if a defendant's "only disorderly behavior had been to use profanity,... he could not be arrested for public disorderly conduct." 342 S.C. 545, 548, 537 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Ct.App.2000). Both of these cases, however, involved law enforcement personnel on the receiving end of the verbal abuse. See Perkins, 306 S.C. at 354, 412 S.E.2d at 386 (sheriffs department employee); Pittman, 342 S.C. at 546, 537 S.E.2d at 564 (sheriff's department officer). The Perkins court, relying on City of Houston v. Hill, noted the narrow application of the fighting words exception in cases involving words addressed to a police officer. Perkins, 306 S.C. at 354-55, 412 S.E.2d at 386. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987) ( ).
More recently, this court affirmed the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on his charge of disorderly conduct in violation of section 16-17-530. State v. LaCoste, 347 S.C. 153, 163-64, 553 S.E.2d 464, 470 (Ct.App. 2001),cert. granted, Feb. 25, 2002. LaCoste threw up his arms in a hostile manner and yelled obscenities at a police officer, insisting he would not comply with the officer's demands. After his arrest, LaCoste repeatedly shouted obscenities, challenging the officer, and taunting the officer and another officer regarding their lack of success in bringing him under control. This court found there was sufficient evidence to enable the trial court to deny LaCoste's motion for directed verdict. Id.
Because I disagree with the majority that the evidence supports the finding that the statements uttered by Sarratt constitute fighting words, I respectfully dissent.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the power of states to punish fighting words under carefully drawn statutes which do not infringe upon protected forms of speech. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1107, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). The Court defines fighting...
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