City of Lima v. Stepleton

• Decision Date: 23 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–28.,1–13–28.
• Parties: City of LIMA, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Theodore T. STEPLETON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

5 N.E.3d 721

City of LIMA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Theodore T. STEPLETON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–28.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Third District, Allen County.

Dec. 23, 2013.

Michelle L. Baumeister, Lima, for Appellant.

Tammie K. Hursh, for Appellee.

ROGERS, J.

{¶ 1} Defendant–Appellant, Theodore Stepleton, appeals the judgment of the Lima Municipal Court convicting him of failure to confine a vicious dog and fining him $50.00. On appeal, Stepleton argues that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to dismiss the criminal complaint due to lack of proper service; (2) denying him an opportunity to rebut the evidence suggesting that the subject dog was vicious in an administrative hearing; (3) ruling that the City of Lima's vicious dog ordinance does not conflict with the Revised Code's treatment of vicious dogs; (4) finding that the subject dog was “vicious” under the City's ordinance; and (5) purportedly ignoring the Revised Code's treatment of vicious dogs when performing its home rule analysis. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 2} On November 19, 2012, a criminal complaint was filed in Lima Municipal Court charging Stepleton with one count of failure to confine a vicious dog in violation of Lima City Ordinance (“LCO”) 618.125(D), a minor misdemeanor. The complaint arose from an incident on November 16, 2012 in which Stepleton allegedly failed to keep his dog confined on his property. At the November 30, 2012 arraignment hearing, Stepleton pleaded not guilty to the count charged in the complaint.

{¶ 3} On January 3, 2013, Stepleton moved to dismiss the criminal complaint. The basis for the motion was the alleged lack of sufficient process and the purported conflict between LCO 618.125(D) and the Revised Code, which rendered the ordinance unconstitutional. On that same day, Stepleton requested a hearing to rebut evidence suggesting that his dog was “vicious.”

{¶ 4} On January 14, 2013, the magistrate granted Stepleton's request for a hearing regarding the dog's status as “vicious.” In granting the request, the magistrate “order[ed] a hearing date be set to hear evidence as to the proper designation of [Stepleton's] dog * * *. The hearing date shall precede any date for the trial [in this matter].” (Docket No. 10). However, there is no indication in the record before us that the hearing was either scheduled for a specific date or actually held.

{¶ 5} On March 1, 2013, the City filed its response to Stepleton's motion and request.

{¶ 6} On March 18, 2013, the magistrate issued a decision denying Stepleton's motionto dismiss. It found that LCO 618.175(D) was not in conflict with the Revised Code and was therefore constitutional under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. Stepleton filed objections to the magistrate's decision on March 26, 2013. The trial court, however, overruled Stepleton's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision.¹

{¶ 7} On April 30, 2013, Stepleton withdrew his not guilty plea and instead entered a no contest plea to the criminal complaint.² On May 3, 2013, the magistrate issued a decision journalizing Stepleton's conviction and his $50.00 fine. The magistrate's decision also included a separate section, signed by the trial court, indicating that it was the trial court's judgment to adopt the magistrate's decision as its own.

{¶ 8} Stepleton timely appealed the trial court's judgment, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.

Assignment of Error No. I

MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY NOT DISMISSING [THE] CASE DUE TO IMPROPER SERVICE, AS REQUIRED UNDER STATE LAW.

Assignment of Error No. II

MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE (ACCORDING TO LOCAL ORDINANCE) THAT THE DOG IN QUESTION IS VICIOUS WITHOUT AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING, AS REQUIRED BY STATE LAW (THUS, AUTOMATICALLY SUBJECTING APPELLANT TO EXTRA REQUIREMENTS BEFORE ANY HEARING).

Assignment of Error No. III

MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT LIMA'S LOCAL DOG ORDINANCE IS NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE NEW OHIO REVISED CODE STATUTES WHICH REDEFINES [SIC] A VICIOUS/DANGEROUS/NUISANCE DOG AND WHICH REQUIRES [SIC] AN OPPORTUNITY FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING BEFORE THE OWNER IS CHARGED WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

Assignment of Error No. IV

MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY NOT DISMISSING THE CASE BASED ON LIMA ORDINANCE WHICH IS UNCLEAR, ASSUMING THE DOG IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DEEMED VICIOUS, NEEDS TO BE CONTAINED ON ONE'S PROPERTY.

Assignment of Error No. V

MUNICIPAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT HOME RULE ALLOWS THE CITY OF LIMA TO IGNORE THE NEW OHIO REVISED STATUTES.

{¶ 9} Due to the nature of the assignments of error, we elect to address them out of order and to discuss the third and fifth assignments together and the first, second, and fourth assignments of error together.

Assignments of Error Nos. III & V

{¶ 10} In his third and fifth assignments of error, Stepleton essentially argues that his conviction should be reversed because LCO 618.125(D) is unconstitutional under the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, Stepleton asserts that LCO 618.125(D) conflicts with certain provisions of R.C. Chapter 955. As such, he claims that the trial court erred in applying LCO 618.125(D). We agree.

Presumption of Constitutionality

{¶ 11} All legislative enactments, including ordinances enacted by a municipality, are entitled to a “strong presumption” of constitutionality. Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 69, 71, 458 N.E.2d 852 (1984); accord City of Columbus v. Kim, 118 Ohio St.3d 93, 2008-Ohio-1817, 886 N.E.2d 217, ¶ 18;City of Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24 (1920), paragraph one of the syllabus. We grant such deference to legislative enactments because “the local legislative body is familiar with local conditions and is therefore better able than the courts to determine the character and degree of regulation required.” Albrecht at 71, 458 N.E.2d 852. Due to this presumption, the party challenging an ordinance has the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the law is unconstitutional. Hilton v. City of Toledo, 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 396, 405 N.E.2d 1047 (1980). Moreover, when considering the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, we are called to “liberally construe [it] to save it from constitutional infirmities.” State v. Robinson, 44 Ohio App.3d 128, 130, 541 N.E.2d 1092 (12th Dist.1989). However, in applying our liberal construction, we are not permitted to “simply rewrite laws in order to render them constitutional.” Id.

Home Rule Under the Ohio Constitution

{¶ 12} The Ohio Constitution provides municipalities with “the exclusive power to govern themselves, as well as additional power to enact local health and safety measures not in conflict with the general law * * *.” Am. Fin. Servs. Assn. v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 170, 2006-Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776, ¶ 26;see also Cleveland Tel. Co. v. City of Cleveland, 98 Ohio St. 358, 380–81, 121 N.E. 701 (1918) (describing the general contours of the authority granted to municipalities under the Home Rule Amendment). This authorization for municipalities is contained in Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, which provide as follows:

Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all power of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary, and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.

When considering the language of Section 3 of Article XVIII, it is important to note that “[t]he words ‘as not in conflict with general laws' * * * modify the words ‘local police, sanitary and other similar regulations' but do not modify the words ‘powers of local self-government.’ ” Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of Parma, 55 Ohio St.3d 101, 103, 564 N.E.2d 425 (1990). As such, Section 3 “preserve[s] the supremacy of the [S]tate in matters of ‘police, sanitary and other similar regulations' while granting municipalities sovereignty in matters of local self-government, limited by other constitutional provisions.” City of Canton v. Whitman, 44 Ohio St.2d 62, 65, 337 N.E.2d 766 (1975).

{¶ 13} Soon after the Home Rule Amendment's adoption in 1912, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that “[t]he object of the home rule amendment was to permit municipalities to use [their] intimateknowledge and determine for themselves in the exercise of all powers of local self-government how * * * local affairs should be conducted.” Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 385, 124 N.E. 212 (1919). The Court has continually identified this principle as the basic purpose of the Home Rule Amendment. See, e.g., N. Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. City of Parma, 61 Ohio St.2d 375, 379, 402 N.E.2d 519 (1980) (“The purpose of the Home Rule Amendments was to put the conduct of municipal affairs in the hands of those who know the needs of the community best, to-wit, the people of the city.”).

{¶ 14} Based on the expansive language of the Home Rule Amendment, reviewing courts have previously recognized that the amendment “grants a significant degree of sovereignty” to municipalities. City of Tiffin v. McEwen, 130 Ohio App.3d 527, 531, 720 N.E.2d 587 (3d Dist.1998). Further, because of the important policy goals served by the Home Rule Amendment and the autonomy it secures for municipal citizens, we must be “sensitive to the home rule authority of municipalities.” The Payphone Assn. of Ohio v. City of Cleveland, 146 Ohio App.3d 319, 328, 766 N.E.2d 167 (8th Dist.2001). As a result, the general laws of the State and the challenged ordinance should be harmonized as much as the language allows. N. Ohio Patrolmen at 377, 402 N.E.2d 519. Nevertheless, we must also recognize that municipalities' home rule authority “is not absolute.” Tiffin at 531, 720 N.E.2d 587;accord Weir v. Rimmelin, 15 Ohio St.3d 55, 56, 472 N.E.2d 341 (1984) (“The Home Rule Amendment to the...