City of Lincoln v. Cnty. of Placer
| Decision Date | 03 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-00087-KJM-AC |
| Parties | City of Lincoln, Plaintiff and Counter Defendant, v. County of Placer, et al., Defendant and Counter Claimant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
The City of Lincoln and the surrounding county, the County of Placer, disagree about who is responsible for cleaning up and monitoring the groundwater near the old landfill that both once used. The County moves for summary judgment. As explained in this order, disputes about the County's liability cannot be resolved before trial, so the County is not entitled to summary judgment. But if the City ultimately proves its claims at trial, the court will equitably allocate the costs as the County argues it must. The thus denies in part and grants in part the County's motions for summary judgment.
Two other ancillary motions about the County's affirmative defenses are pending as well. The court denies the County's request for leave to assert new immunities at this late stage and grants the City's request to strike those new allegations of immunity from the County's answer.
Several disputes about what evidence the court should consider are best resolved at the outset. The judges in this district including the undersigned, have often cautioned litigants against terse and reflexive evidentiary objections at summary judgment, especially when the objector is the moving party. See, e.g., Lindell v. Synthes USA, 155 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2016); U.S. E.E.O.C. v Placer ARC, 114 F.Supp.3d 1048, 1052-53 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1126 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The court encourages counsel to review these orders to avoid unnecessary and unpersuasive objections in the future.
Generally, the admissibility of evidence at summary judgment is governed by different rules and different motivations than at trial. At summary judgment, Rule 56 allows objections to evidence when “the material cited . . . cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). As this language suggests, at summary judgment, the propriety of evidence depends not on its form, but on its content. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001). The party asking the court to consider evidence bears the burden to prove that it could be presented in admissible form. See Pfingston v. Ronan Eng'g Co., 284 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). If the opposing party objects, the proponent must direct the court to “authenticating documents, deposition testimony bearing on attribution, hearsay exceptions and exemptions, or other evidentiary principles under which the evidence in question could be deemed admissible ....” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 385-86 (9th Cir. 2010). But if evidence falls short of the “formalities of Rule 56,” a district court may nonetheless exercise its discretion “to be somewhat lenient.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993).
This standard makes some evidentiary objections a poor fit for summary judgment. That is true first and foremost of form objections and objections based on relevance, vagueness and speculation. To the extent these objections attack the content of evidence rather than its form, they duplicate Rule 56 itself. Courts disregard irrelevant, indecipherable or speculative evidence, see, e.g., Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1119, and Rule 56 does not permit litigants to oppose summary judgment on the basis of vague assertions or speculation, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). Likewise, an objection that testimony is argumentative or mischaracterizes the record either calls for a credibility determination unsuited for summary judgment or would better be directed at the underlying evidence itself. See, e.g., Stonefire Grill, Inc. v. FGF Brands, Inc., 987 F.Supp.2d 1023, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2013). Courts also often overrule hearsay objections at summary judgment. For example, in reviewing a district court's ruling on summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has considered the hearsay contents of a diary whose substance would have been admissible in another form at trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). Foundation and authenticity problems similarly are nonfatal if “the substance could conceivably be made admissible at trial.” Portnoy v. City of Davis, 663 F.Supp.2d 949, 953 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
Most of the parties' objections fall within these categories. See, e.g., City's Resp. Stmt. Facts No. 3, ECF No. 98-2 (); County's Resp. Add'l Stmt. Facts No. 1 (arguing evidence mischaracterized). Because this order rests on only relevant and concrete evidence, the parties' objections based on arguments about irrelevance, vagueness and speculation are moot. Nor will the court attempt to fill in the legal arguments and citations the parties have omitted. Cf. County's Resp. Add'l Stmt. Facts No. 1 (objecting without elaboration that evidence is inadmissible hearsay). The court also declines to attempt to discern the justifications for hearsay objections. Most of the statements in question are not hearsay in any event. For example, many statements would be excluded from the rule against hearsay under the exception for “ancient documents.” See, e.g., id. (); cf. Fed.R.Evid. 803(16) (). The parties' other objections are otherwise overruled without further discussion. The court has reviewed all documents and records cited in this order and for each has determined the evidence either would be admissible for the specified purpose or could likely be reduced to an admissible form at trial.
The old Lincoln landfill is a six-acre square of grassy land in the low, rolling Sierra Nevada foothills just outside the City.[1] It has been closed since 1976. Placer Cty. Resp. Stmt. Facts Nos. 1, 6, ECF No. 98-2. The City began operating the landfill in the early 1950s, id., but it might have been a “dumping grounds” for some time before then, see, e.g., Placer Cty. Council Meeting Mins. at 2 (Jan. 3, 1949), Orrell Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 86-1. When the landfill was open, it was where the City's garbage haulers dumped whatever refuse they had collected from Lincoln homes and businesses. See City Resp. First Interrogs. at 11-12, Parker Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 792.
People living and working nearby, including people from the rural areas in the surrounding county, also could haul and dump their own waste. City Answer ¶ 9, ECF No. 11. The County did not operate a nearby landfill of its own. See Cty. Resp. to Req. for Admission Nos. 8, 31-37, Orrell Decl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 86-1. Instead, it paid the City a fee to ensure County residents from outside Lincoln could use the dump free of charge. See, e.g., Placer Cty. 1953- 1954 Budget, Orrell Decl. Ex. 11 at 9, ECF No. 86-1; Oberholtzer Letter (July 5, 1967), Orrell Decl. Ex. 26, ECF No. 87-1. The size of that fee was sometimes contentious. The City often claimed the County was not paying its fair share of the landfill's costs. In 1962, for example, a city engineer claimed more than half of the traffic to the dump originated outside city limits, and he estimated that forty percent of the waste was from outside Lincoln. See Thompson Letter (Jan. 5, 1962), Orrell Decl. Ex. 17, ECF No. 86-1. But later, when the City proposed a fee for out-oftown County residents, the local newspaper reported talk of a boycott, and the City reconsidered. See Orrell Decl. Exs. 30-33, 36, ECF No. 87-1.
In paperwork the City sent to state authorities while the landfill was open, it described the landfill's contents as typical of the refuse one might find at the curb in any neighborhood-trash, garbage, paper, leaves, and lawn and tree trimmings. See Applications, Parker Ex. 3, ECF No. 79-2. But some of those who knew the landfill from that time, including some of the City's former employees, remember more dangerous waste reaching its final resting place in the old dump. There were cars, batteries, air conditioners, refrigerators and other appliances, for example, and perhaps drycleaning waste as well. See Ojeda Dep. at 191-93, Orrell Decl. Ex. 41, ECF No. 87-1; Pasillas Dep. at 193-94, Orrell Decl. Ex. 42, ECF No. 87-1; Parker Decl. Ex. 2, 4, ECF No. 79-2. As far as the local authorities can tell, there was no other place nearby designated for locals to discard dangerous waste. See Cty. Resp. to Req. for Admission No. 36, Orrell Decl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 86-1.
We know today that hazardous substances are buried in the landfill. Resp. Add'l Stmt. Fact No. 25, ECF No. 98-5. Hazardous waste from these substances is in the groundwater below and around the landfill, too. See Cal. Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd., Central Valley Region, Solid Waste Assessment Test Exemption (Jan. 30, 1990), Req. J. Not. Ex. 2 at 2-3, ECF No. 794; 2003 WDR at 4, Req. J. Not. Ex. 6 at 14 ECF No. 79-4. The City hired an environmental engineer, George Savage, to give an opinion about the likely sources of this waste. He believes the substances came both from waste we would think of today as hazardous or dangerous, such as pesticides and solvents, as well as more common garbage we may not necessarily associate with dangerous chemicals, like paper. Savage Rep. at 2-3, Orrell Decl. Ex. 45, ECF No. 87-1. Paper was commonly printed with ink that contained lead. Savage...
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