City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club

Decision Date27 March 1942
Citation290 Ky. 241
PartiesCity of Louisville et al. v. Louisville Automobile Club, Inc., et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

5. Municipal Corporations. — Generally municipal regulations do not necessarily have to operate on all alike, provided they operate equally on all of a class embraced within their provisions.

6. Automobiles. — A Louisville ordinance providing for installation of parking meters was not invalid on ground that it authorized "abandonment" of deed or dedication of land for use as public street (Ky. Stats., secs. 2742-2825, 2783).

7. Automobiles. — A Louisville ordinance providing for installation of parking meters, and providing that persons violating ordinance could satisfy traffic court by payment of one dollar within 24 hours after notice, was not invalid on ground of discrimination in that one parking on street not within meter zone was liable to fine of from one to five dollars for overparking (Ky. Stats., secs. 2742-2825, 2783).

8. Automobiles. — A Louisville ordinance providing for installation of parking meters was valid and violated no provision of the state or federal constitution (Ky. Stats., secs. 2742-2825, 2783).

9. Action. — In action under the Civil Code of Practice for a declaration of rights, persons whose interests are affected by declaration must be made parties (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 639a — 6).

10. Action. — In action under the Civil Code of Practice for declaration as to validity of Louisville ordinance providing for installation of parking meters, and of contract to purchase meters, wherein contract was assailed because of absence of competitive bidding, but company to which contract was awarded was not made a party, court could not determine validity of contract (Ky. Stats., secs. 2824-2829; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 639a — 6).

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.

Hal O. Williams, Cornelius W. Grafton and Lawrence S. Poston for appellants.

Stanley B. Mayer and James P. Miller for appellees.

Before Eugene Hubbard, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MORRIS, COMMISSIONER.

Affirming in part and reversing in part.

Suit below was instituted to test the validity of an ordinance of the city providing for establishment of parking meters, and of a purchase contract. The city and proper officers were made defendants, plaintiffs being the Louisville Automobile Club, Robert Ball, a citizen and conducting a business on Fourth Street; N.B. Wigginton, operating a parking lot adjacent within one area, and Eugene Stewart, car owner and citizen.

The proceeding in form provided by Section 639a — 1 et seq., Civil Code of Practice, sought a declaration of rights. The court held the contract invalid, and from this ruling defendants appeal, but held the ordinance valid; from this ruling plaintiffs cross appeal.

The ordinance recited that traffic conditions were such as require the use of parking meters in certain areas; the enforcement of parking laws through means at hand difficult, expensive and inadequate, making it advisable to adopt some plan to assist in enforcement. It was contended that the ordinance is invalid, because:

(1) The erection of meters creates a nuisance; they will permanently obstruct flow of traffic and interfere with movement to and from places of business and residences abutting on streets; interfere with pedestrian traffic over sidewalks upon which meters are installed, thus constituting a taking of plaintiffs' rights in violation of constitutional inhibitions.

(2) Their maintenance has no proper relation to the regulation of parking, but the ordinance constitutes an attempt on the part of the city to rent parking spaces to automobile owners for obtaining revenue; nor has it any relation to the safety, health, regulation of traffic, prevention of crime, or any other purpose properly classified as a "police power," and that the city will derive a substantial amount in excess of sums necessary to their cost, maintenance and regulation, such excess to be "used by the city for other and general purposes," thus constituting a revenue measure.

(3) The ordinance discriminates against plaintiffs, particularly those owning property, engaged in business or residing in the affected area, and in favor of those of the same class not within the zone.

(4) There was, and is in effect a "parking ordinance" which provides for the parking of motor vehicles within the area, which is not changed by the instant ordinance, except that a fee is charged in the new zone, whereas no fee is charged for parking on streets without the zone, this working a discrimination.

(5) The use of the street for installation of meters is an "unauthorized abandonment of the deed of dedication of said land for use as a public street."

(6) Under the terms of the ordinance (Section 13) any owner parking within the zone for a longer period than provided may pay one dollar to the Traffic Bureau of the Police Department in satisfaction of the offense of overtime parking, thus relieving the person overparking from subjection to an overtime parking ordinance which provides a fine of from one to five dollars for each offense, discriminating in favor of such owners as park within the zones as against those who park elsewhere, constituting an attempt to circumvent the possible activities of the city's ordinance court, and to substitute therefor the activity of the Traffic Bureau.

It is contended that the contract is invalid since being for the purchase of material in excess of the amount fixed by ordinance requiring competitive bidding, no such bidding was had. Kentucky Statutes, Sections 2824-2829; City Ordinances, Ord. No. 52.

It is explained in briefs that parking meters are manufactured by several companies, and operate in various ways, but insofar as mechanics are concerned the basic principle is practically the same. On such streets as are selected for their use, spaces wide enough to accommodate a car are marked next to the curb. Opposite each space there is set in the curb a metal post, about 2 inches in diameter, 3 1/2 or 4 feet in height, having attached to it a clock-like instrument set in operation when the motorist drops in a coin, and indicating the prescribed parking time limit. An officer notes overtime and tickets the car.

Proof was heard only upon the validity of the contract (a self-liquidating set-up) and upon submission the court in a comprehensive opinion declared the rights of the parties, to be: (a) By statute the city is vested with all reasonable police power, including the regulation of parking vehicles on the streets; under that power it has the right to provide means to assist in enforcing reasonable regulations. Counsel for appellees do not seriously challenge this declaration, and it seems necessary for us to make reference only to Kentucky Statutes, Sections 2742-2825, 2783; Com. v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 224 S.W. 506, 11 A.L.R. 202; Nourse v. City of Russellville, 257 Ky. 525, 78 S.W. (2d) 761; City of Ashland v. Ashland Supply Co., 225 Ky. 123, 7 S.W. (2d) 833; Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235 Ky. 265, 30 S.W. (2d) 968, and parking meter cases, infra.

(b) The fee charged for the privilege of parking is for the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring, installing, maintaining and supervising the meters, is a valid and reasonable charge, and if these fees exceed the cost and incidental expenses, excess will be used and applied for valid purposes within the doctrine approved in the cases of Blue Coach Lines v. Lewis, 220 Ky. 116, 294 S.W. 1080; Smith v. Com., 175 Ky. 286, 194 S.W. 367; McGlone v. Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S.W. 688, 17 L.R.A., N.S., 855; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. City of Lancaster, 276 Ky. 585, 124 S.W. (2d) 745.

As we read the ordinance, it provides for application of the proceeds from fees to the purposes named above, and for no other purposes, save "for the regulation and control of traffic and the streets of the city," which may be construed to include pay of traffic officers, whose duties in regard to the supervision of the meters are defined in the ordinance.

However, counsel for appellees insist that their undenied allegation that the "excess" will be so substantial "as to take said operation outside of a police regulation, and therefore it is a revenue raising measure," requires us to reverse and give them opportunity to produce proof on this question. The suit was filed in April, 1939; issue was raised by demurrer in June, 1939. Proof was heard on the validity of the contract in July, 1941, and judgment rendered in September.

We note from a stipulation that "demurrers to each of the first fourteen paragraphs of the petition having been sustained, and exceptions reserved, with respect...

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