City of Louisville v. McDonald
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky) |
| Citation | 470 S.W.2d 173 |
| Parties | CITY OF LOUISVILLE et al., Appellants, v. Ray L. McDONALD et al., Appellees. |
| Decision Date | 02 April 1971 |
Page 173
v.
Ray L. McDONALD et al., Appellees.
Page 174
Eugene H. Alvey, Director of Law, Bernard S. Goldstein, Asst. Director of Law, Louisville, for appellants.
James F. Steinfeld, Alex Berman, Louisville, for appellees.
REED, Judge.
This zoning case points up the necessity of a definitive expression of our views concerning basic requirements necessary to be observed in the procedure of rezoning of property. We must as a consequence delineate the scope of judicial review with respect to actions of the so-called 'administrative' body (in this instance a planning and zoning commission) and the scope and extent of judicial review with respect to actions of the so-called 'legislative' body (in this instance a board of aldermen).
Page 175
The facts in this particular case are simple and will be briefly stated, but the picture presented by these facts is one that is all too prevalent. There is no good reason why courts should confine themselves to labels to which lip service only is paid; when an insistence upon observance of fundamental requirements of constitutional rights to due process and freedom from arbitrary action will breathe life into the unrealized desire that the public interest on the one hand, and the individual property owner's interest on the other hand, can be dealt with in a manner which strives for impartial and objective adjudication of disputes which arise when those interests collide--and the key word is 'adjudication'--it surely is not 'legislation' in the context of the problem with which we are concerned.
The Shaffer family owns an undeveloped two-and-one-half-acre tract of land in Louisville; this parcel of land for many years has been zoned R--5 (single family residence). This zoning classification is one provided by a comprehensive zoning plan of the City of Louisville. The Shaffers apparently contracted to sell this property to McDonald, a real estate developer, who desired to locate several apartment buildings in a complex on the Shaffer lot. This contract of sale must have been made subject to the condition that the property be rezoned in order to permit McDonald's proposed use. The Shaffer family and McDonald jointly applied to the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission for a rezoning of the subject property to a classification designated R--7, which permits high-density apartment use.
The Zoning Commission, after statutorily required public notice, held a public hearing at which evidence in favor of the application for the proposed zone change was heard. Objection from neighbors and evidence which sought to establish the invalidity of the zone change were also received. The commission caused a transcript of the hearing to be made and thereafter issued factual findings. These findings were: (1) The Shaffer property is adjacent to commercial property and is not suitable for single-family residences. (2) There is a need for apartment units in this area. (3) The subject property is a large tract occupied by a single-family residence and surrounded on the east, south and north by single-family residences. (4) There is commercial development on land across an alley to the west fronting on a major arterial highway. The commission concluded that 'there had been major changes of an economic nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the comprehensive plan and which have substantially altered the basic character of the area.' It also concluded that the location of apartments on the subject property would 'provide for an appropriate transition between existing commercial and single-family residential development.'
These findings and conclusions, together with a recommendation to rezone the subject property to R--7, were transmitted to the board of aldermen of the City of Louisville. Then the Shaffer application was turned over to a zoning committee of aldermen headed by Aldermen Noble. Mr. Noble had consulted with neighbors who objected to the proposed rezoning and had committed himself to oppose the rezoning of the property. This had occurred even before the public hearing by the zoning commission. The zoning committee of aldermen met at a local restaurant one morning for coffee and Chairman Noble informed the other members that he had committed himself to the objectors to oppose the rezoning--he had gone out on a limb. Some of the other aldermen on the committee then went out and viewed the property. When the board of aldermen met to consider the report of the zoning commission, Chairman Noble orally reported to the board that its zoning committee opposed adoption of the recommendation of the zoning commission. The aldermen unanimously voted to refuse any rezoning of the property.
Page 176
The Shaffer family and McDonald instituted a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court. There evidence was heard which preponderantly established that the subject property could not feasibly be used for single-family residence purposes because of the change in conditions that had occurred since the adoption of the comprehensive zoning plan. It was the conclusion of the aldermen who testified in circuit court that the property should be used and zoned for multi-family residence purposes, but that the classification sought for such high-density occupancy was not feasible because it would unreasonably inconvenience the neighboring residents and would adversely affect the value of their properties.
The circuit judge declared the action of the board of aldermen to be arbitrary. He concluded that the legislative body had not afforded the applicant property owned due process. He directed that the property be rezoned for the classification sought. The city thereupon appealed that decision to this court.
The city argues that the action of its legislative body was neither arbitrary nor capricious and that the circuit court assumed a nonjudicial function when it directed the board of aldermen to rezone the property. The applicant property owner argues that the action of the board of aldermen was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious and amounted to confiscation of property without due process of law. The property...
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Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, No. 94-SC-334-MR
...facts to permit a court to conduct a meaningful review"), is, after all, among the progeny of City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173, 178-179 (1971): ("On the other hand, when the local legislative body is used as a vehicle not to make generally applicable law, rules or policy,......
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Baker v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-001588-MR (Ky. App. 10/19/2007), No. 2005-CA-001588-MR.
...legislative prerogative in deciding "[g]eneral policy-based controversies[.]" Hilltop at 470; see also City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Ky. 1971)("when the local legislative body undertakes . . . to enact a generally applicable zoning regulation, the facts to be consi......
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City of Leb. v. Goodin ex rel. Good (In re in Revocable Trust), No. 2011–SC–000468–DG.
...of La Grange, 132 S.W. at 170. 56.Id. at 171. 57.White v. Danville, 465 S.W.2d 67, 69–70 (Ky.1971). 58.City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky.1971). 59.Id.; see also Conrad, 659 S.W.2d at 196; Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 709–10. 60.Id. (internal quotati......
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Bellemeade Co. v. Priddle
...contrary views. This procedure sufficiently constituted trial-type hearings as referred to in City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173 (1971), under the circumstances presented here. The findings made by the Planning Commission were supported by substantial evidence as shown by t......
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Baker v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-001588-MR (Ky. App. 10/19/2007), 2005-CA-001588-MR.
...legislative prerogative in deciding "[g]eneral policy-based controversies[.]" Hilltop at 470; see also City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 177-78 (Ky. 1971)("when the local legislative body undertakes . . . to enact a generally applicable zoning regulation, the facts to be consi......
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Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 94-SC-334-MR
...facts to permit a court to conduct a meaningful review"), is, after all, among the progeny of City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173, 178-179 (1971): ("On the other hand, when the local legislative body is used as a vehicle not to make generally applicable law, rules or policy,......
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City of Leb. v. Goodin ex rel. Good (In re in Revocable Trust), 2011–SC–000468–DG.
...of La Grange, 132 S.W. at 170. 56.Id. at 171. 57.White v. Danville, 465 S.W.2d 67, 69–70 (Ky.1971). 58.City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky.1971). 59.Id.; see also Conrad, 659 S.W.2d at 196; Prestonia Area Neighborhood Ass'n, 797 S.W.2d at 709–10. 60.Id. (internal quotati......
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General Elec. Co. v. Martin
...made before the pension board. Davis v. Humble Oil & Rfg. Co., supra, 283 So.2d at 793-95; Cf. City of Louisville v. McDonald, Ky., 470 S.W.2d 173, 179 (1971); City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, Ky., 495 S.W.2d 502, 505 In this case, there is no dispute respecting what matters were considered......