City of Lubbock v. Land

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Don H. Reavis; Quinn; Johnson; Brian Quinn; Phil Johnson
• Citation: 33 S.W.3d 357
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000) CITY OF LUBBOCK, APPELLANT v. ANGIE LAND, APPELLEE NO. 07-00-0256-CV
• Decision Date: 23 October 2000

Page 357

33 S.W.3d 357 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000) CITY OF LUBBOCK, APPELLANT
v.
ANGIE LAND, APPELLEE NO. 07-00-0256-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO OCTOBER 23, 2000

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 98-501,773; HONORABLE SAM MEDINA, JUDGE

Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

Page 358

Don H. Reavis, Justice.

By this accelerated appeal,¹ the City of Lubbock challenges the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss Angie Land's action for personal injuries allegedly sustained while she was an inmate participating in a work release program. By its motion and plea to the jurisdiction, and its sole issue presented on appeal, the City contends it has immunity from Land's action pursuant to Article 42.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated (Vernon Supp. 2000). Based upon the rationale expressed herein, we reverse and render judgment dismissing Land's action against the City.

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1144, 119 S.Ct. 2018, 143 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1999); Bush v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Services, 983 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied). When reviewing an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and plea to the jurisdiction, we construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and consider only the allegations in the petition. Tex. Ass'n of Business v. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993); Texas Nat. & Conser. Com'n v. White, 13 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).

According to Land's live pleading, while an inmate in the Lubbock County Jail and pursuant to a court order, she participated in a work release program to pay a fine for public intoxication. After she was transported to a warehouse owned and controlled by the City, she was instructed by a City employee to sweep the warehouse. While doing so, she was injured when metal backstops being stored in the warehouse fell on her causing injuries that required hospitalization and surgery. Land alleged the City was negligent in (1) failing to provide supervision; (2) failing to warn of a hazardous condition; (3) failing to correct a hazardous condition; (4) failing to act in a manner that a reasonably prudent person would under the same or similar circumstances in allowing her to sweep in an area of the warehouse that was dangerous; and (5) failing to provide a reasonable [sic] safe work environment in stacking the backstops in an unsafe manner.

By its sole issue, the City contends that it has immunity from Land's action pursuant to Article 42.20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Land, however, contends that Article 42.20 does not apply to the City, but only to the entity establishing the program. Thus, in construing Article 42.20, our objective is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Phillips v. Beaber, 995 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1999). When the Legislature fails to define a word or term, we will apply its ordinary meaning. Geters v. Eagle Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Tex. 1992). Under Article 42.20 (a) and (c)(5), employees or officers of political subdivisions other than a county, and the governmental entity they serve, are not liable for damages

arising from an act or failure to act by the individual or governmental entity in connection with a community service program or work program . . . if the act or failure to act:

(1) was performed pursuant to a court order or was otherwise performed in an official capacity; and

(2) was not performed with conscious indifference for the safety of others.

(Emphasis added).²

Among other matters, as affirmative defenses, the City pled governmental immunity

Page 359

pursuant to sections 101.021, 101.0215, 101.023, and 101.056 of the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Annotated (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2000). Also, as relevant here, by its pleadings and motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, the City raised the immunity provisions of Articles 42.20 and 43.09(l) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Annotated (Vernon Supp. 2000).

Because we must accept Land's pleading as true for purposes of our analysis, we must also accept her allegation that her injuries were sustained while she was "performing work release for the County of Lubbock" while performing "her work at the warehouse" owned by the City. By her petition, she does not contend the City was not a proper entity to participate in a work release program or that it lacked standing to contend it was entitled to immunity under Article 42.20. Nevertheless, Land contends that the City, a mere employer of work release participants, is not sufficiently connected with the Lubbock County Work Release Program to have standing to support its claim of immunity. However, Land's argument overlooks the fact that in addition to affording immunity to officers or employees of political subdivisions, Article 42.20(a) also grants immunity to governmental entities that employ such officers or employees.

Moreover, Article 42.20 does not contain any provision limiting immunity to particular political subdivisions or otherwise prescribe any requirements or conditions to entitle a political subdivision to coverage. Additionally, Article 43.09(a) recognizes that political subdivisions may participate in inmate work programs as therein provided. The City qualifies as a political subdivision. See Tex. Gov't. Code Annotated § 418.004 (6) (Vernon 1998). Unfortunately, the statute does not define the term official capacity. Because Article 42.20(a)(2) applies to...