City of Manhattan v. Huncovsky

• Decision Date: 22 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74647,74647
• Citation: 913 P.2d 227,22 Kan.App.2d 189
• Parties: CITY OF MANHATTAN, Appellant, v. Christine M. HUNCOVSKY, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

Page 227

913 P.2d 227

22 Kan.App.2d 189

CITY OF MANHATTAN, Appellant, v. Christine M. HUNCOVSKY, Appellee.

No. 74647.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

March 22, 1996.

Review Denied June 11, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Kansas law, collateral estoppel may be invoked where the following is shown: (1) A prior judgment must have been entered on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity, and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment.

2. Whether the elements of collateral estoppel exist and whether the doctrine should be applied in a given situation are questions of law over which this court exercises unlimited review.

3. An exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel exists where a new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts.

4. The limited procedures utilized in an administrative driver's license suspension proceeding are inappropriate to the determination of the same issues when presented in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Thus, collateral estoppel should not be applied in a criminal proceeding to bar relitigation of issues decided in an administrative driver's license suspension hearing.

Appeal from Riley District Court; Jerry L. Mershon, Judge. Opinion filed March 22, 1996.

Kurt D. Maahs, of Morrison, Frost & Olsen, Manhattan, for appellant.

Ted E. Smith, of Myers, Pottroff & Ball, Manhattan, for appellee.

Before BRAZIL, C.J., LEWIS, J., and TOM MALONE, District Judge, Assigned.

TOM MALONE, District Judge, Assigned:

The City of Manhattan (City) brings this interlocutory appeal of the district court's order suppressing the results of a breathalyzer test in a DUI prosecution. The test results had previously been found to be unreliable by an administrative hearing officer at a driver's license suspension hearing. The district court ruled that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevented reconsideration of the validity of the breath test results and suppressed the evidence solely on this ground. The issue on appeal is whether collateral estoppel should apply to an administrative driver's license suspension hearing in order to bar relitigation of issues in a subsequent criminal proceeding. This is an issue of first impression in Kansas.

On November 2, 1994, the City charged Christine Huncovsky with driving under the influence of alcohol. An Intoxilyzer 5000 breath test registered Huncovsky's blood alcohol level at .135. On January 11, 1995, the municipal court found Huncovsky guilty of DUI. Huncovsky appealed her conviction to the district court.

Meanwhile, on December 20, 1994, the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR) instituted an administrative driver's license suspension proceeding. The matter was continued until February 27, 1995, when the hearing officer concluded there was a significant probability that interferants had contaminated the breathalyzer test. The hearing officer dismissed the license suspension proceeding due to the questionable validity of the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results. Neither party appealed the administrative ruling.

In the criminal proceedings at the district court level, Huncovsky filed a motion to suppress the breathalyzer test results. Huncovsky contended that collateral estoppel prevented reconsideration of the validity of the breath test results. The district court agreed and suppressed the evidence. The City filed this appeal.

We must first examine whether all the elements of collateral estoppel are met under the facts of this case.

"Under Kansas law, collateral estoppel may be invoked where the following is shown: (1) a prior judgment [must have been entered] on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties on the issue based upon ultimate facts as disclosed by the pleadings and judgment, (2) the parties must be the same or in privity, and (3) the issue litigated must have been determined and necessary to support the judgment. [Citation omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority, 242 Kan. 683, 690, 751 P.2d 122 (1988).

The City argues that the elements of collateral estoppel are not met in the instant case. Whether the elements of collateral estoppel exist and whether the doctrine should be applied in a given situation are questions of law over which this court exercises unlimited review. See, e.g., Jackson Trak Group, Inc., 242 Kan. at 690-92, 751 P.2d 122; Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986).

First, the City contends that because the administrative ruling occurred after the municipal court conviction, the administrative ruling was not a prior judgment. The City argues that a district court does not acquire original jurisdiction over a municipal court appeal, but rather takes the matter merely as an appealed case. The City concludes that because the district court proceeding is an appeal, only a judgment that existed when the municipal court proceeding was initiated can be used for collateral estoppel purposes.

The City's contention is unpersuasive. Kansas law mandates a trial de novo at the district court level in a criminal case. K.S.A. 22-3610(a). The district court's de novo review encompasses a new trial of the action and is not limited to evidence and arguments raised at the municipal court level. See Reddington v. Rank, 176 Kan. 484, 271 P.2d 807 (1954). Thus, in the present case, it seems irrelevant whether the administrative ruling occurred before or after the municipal court proceeding. Logically, the prior judgment requirement means that for collateral estoppel to apply, the judgment must have occurred earlier in time than the attempted relitigation of an issue. In this case, it is clear that the administrative ruling constitutes a prior judgment which the district court could properly consider.

The City next argues that privity does not exist between the KDR and the City. " 'There is no generally prevailing definition of "privity" which can be automatically applied to all cases. A determination of the question as to who are privies requires careful examination into the circumstances of each case as it arises.' " In re Estate of Beason, 248 Kan. 803, 813, 811 P.2d 848 (1991) (quoting Goetz v. Board of Trustees, 203 Kan. 340, 350-51, 454 P.2d 481 [1969] ).

In State v. Parson, 15 Kan.App.2d 374, 379, 808 P.2d 444 (1991), this court noted that agents of the same government are in privity with each other because they represent not their own rights but the rights of the government. The Parson court held that parties which are "arms of the same governmental body" are in privity with one another. 15 Kan.App.2d at 379-80, 808 P.2d 444.

In State v. Kolde, 18 Kan.App.2d 525, 855 P.2d 498, rev. denied 253 Kan. 862 (1993), this court applied the "arms of the same government" rule to a situation similar to the case at bar. In Kolde, this court upheld the application of collateral estoppel in a civil habitual violator action brought by the State of Kansas. The prior judgment came from a DUI conviction wherein the plaintiff was the City of Wamego. The Kolde court held that although the parties in the two actions were not precisely the same, they were nevertheless both arms of the government, and the parties were in privity for the purposes of collateral estoppel. 18 Kan.App.2d at 526-27, 855 P.2d 498.

The City attempts to distinguish Kolde by arguing that in Kolde, both the State and the City of Wamego were part of the criminal justice system, while in the present case, the KDR is not part of the criminal justice system. However, in Kolde, the State brought a habitual violator action, which is civil in nature. Thus, contrary to the City's assertion, the State in Kolde was not acting as part of the criminal justice system.

The City argues that because the interests of the parties differ, privity should not exist. It points out that the KDR's interest is in enforcing licensing requirements, while the City's interest is in the effective administration of criminal justice. The City cites State v. O'Rourke, 114 N.C.App. 435, 442 S.E.2d 137 (1994), in support of its contention. In O'Rourke, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that privity could not be established because of the different purposes behind administrative driver's license revocation actions and criminal DUI actions. 114 N.C.App. at 440, 442 S.E.2d 137.

We find the rationale behind the O'Rourke decision unpersuasive. Both the criminal DUI statute and the administrative driver's license suspension statute act to remove unsafe drivers from the roads. While the two actions take different forms, they share a common purpose of maintaining safe roadways. In that respect, the actions have a common interest, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the parties in each action (the KDR and the City) are in privity.

For its next argument, the City asserts that the issue determined at the administrative hearing was not the same question presented to the district court. The City contends that the administrative hearing officer did not decide whether the Intoxilyzer 5000 test results were admissible in a criminal prosecution, but rather only decided whether the license suspension proceeding should be dismissed.

Consideration of this issue is hampered by the fact that the appellate...