CITY OF MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE v. Ingram

Decision Date25 April 1952
Docket NumberNo. 14443.,14443.
Citation195 F.2d 338
PartiesCITY OF MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE v. INGRAM et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Kenneth C. Larkey and F. B. Gianotti, Jr., Memphis, Tenn. (Wils Davis, Memphis, Tenn. on the brief), for appellant.

John A. Fogleman, Marion, Ark. (Hale & Fogleman, Marion, Ark., on the brief), for appellees.

Before SANBORN, WOODROUGH and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff in the district court from a judgment dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction.

The complaint alleges that the City of Memphis is a municipal corporation located on the east side of the Mississippi river in Shelby County, Tennessee. The defendant W. K. Ingram is the county judge of Crittenden County, Arkansas, which is situated on the west side of the Mississippi river opposite the city of Memphis. The Arkansas and Memphis Railway Bridge and Terminal Company, hereinafter called the Bridge Company, is a Tennessee corporation.

The Mississippi river is a navigable stream and forms the boundary line between Arkansas and Tennessee. The construction of bridges across the Mississippi river at Memphis is governed by 33 U.S. C.A. §§ 491-498 as amended.

By an Act of Congress, July 20, 1912, 37 U.S.Stat., p. 195, amended by Act of August 23, 1912, 37 U.S.Stat. p. 359, the Bridge Company was "authorized to construct, maintain, and operate a bridge, and all approaches thereto, across the Mississippi River at Memphis, Tennessee, * * * Provided, That said bridge shall be so constructed, maintained, and operated that, in addition to its use for railroad purposes, it shall provide for an adequate and a separate roadway and approaches and continuous use by the public as a highway bridge, to be used by vehicles, pedestrians, horsemen, animals, and all kinds of highway traffic and travel * * *." Section 2 provided that the Bridge Company should not be required to construct the approaches for vehicles until local interests provided the sum of $50,000. Section 3 provided that the company should have the right to sell and transfer to any county, city, improvement district, or municipality any part or all of the separate roadway and the approaches thereto, and that in case of such sale the Bridge Company should be relieved of any requirement to maintain the property so sold.

The bridge was thereafter constructed. It is known as the Harahan Bridge.

On August 25, 1917, the Bridge Company sold and transferred to the city of Memphis that part of the double wagonway attached to the sides of the bridge in Shelby county, Tennessee, and to Crittenden county, Arkansas, that part of such roadway in Arkansas, for the consideration of $25,000 and $40,000 respectively. The indenture of conveyance to Crittenden county provided among other things "that it shall not only be the right, but likewise the duty of the said Crittenden County, or its assigns, to repair any portion of said wagonway, herein conveyed, which may break or wear out, and to replace such broken or worn out portions by new parts or material; it being the sole duty of said Crittenden County to take care of and maintain said premises herein conveyed."

Prior to the execution of these conveyances the Bridge Company and the parties had entered into an agreement on October 27, 1916, providing that after the transfers were made the Bridge Company would no longer be required to maintain the roadways, "but they will be maintained by the City of Memphis and the County of Crittenden, * * * and said first party will be relieved of any further responsibility therefor * * *."

In 1926 the parties agreed that certain improvements should be made in connection with the wagonways and the approaches thereto to which the city of Memphis contributed $369,000.

In 1928 a portion of the roadway attached to the bridge in Tennessee was destroyed by fire, and on August 9, 1928, the Bridge Company, the City of Memphis and Crittenden County provided for reconstruction of the part destroyed and for the widening of the roadway.

It was further alleged that the defendants were threatening to dismantle and destroy that part of the wagonways attached to the bridge in Arkansas, and a mandatory injunction was demanded requiring the defendants to take all necessary steps to protect the continuous operation of the bridge and the roadways attached thereto and upon final hearing to make the injunction permanent.

Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. A. § 1331 and § 1332, that is, as an action wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs and arises under a law of the United States and is between citizens of different states. The original complaint alleged that "If the defendants are not enjoined, and if said roadways in Crittenden County, Arkansas, attached to said Harahan Bridge are demolished, the plaintiff City of Memphis will be irreparably injured and damaged, and the actual damages will be far in excess of the sum of Three Thousand ($3,000.00) Dollars, exclusive of interest and costs."

Thereafter the action was dismissed by the plaintiff against the Bridge Company.

The defendants W. K. Ingram and Crittenden County filed an answer alleging: 1. That the complaint fails to state a claim against them upon which relief can be granted; 2. That original jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested in the County Court of the defendant County; that the amount in controversy is less than $3,000; that the cause of action does not arise under the laws of the United States; and 3. Deny the material allegations of the complaint and pray that it be dismissed.

The court took evidence for two days and dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that (1) the federal question alleged is not substantial; (2) there is no sufficient allegation of the amount in controversy and no evidence as to what the amount is; and (3) the suit to enjoin the action of the county court of Crittenden County is a collateral attack on the judgment of the county court and that judgment is not subject to collateral attack.

The defendant W. K. Ingram testified that, as Chief Administrative Officer of Crittenden County, Arkansas, he intended to dismantle those portions of the Harahan vehicular roadways within the state of Arkansas, and that as judge of the Crittenden County court he had entered an order of the court authorizing the dismantling of the same and the salvage of the materials therefrom, and authorizing a contract with the Highway Department of the state of Arkansas pertaining thereto.

The contracts and statutes referred to above were introduced in evidence. Engineers testified on behalf of the plaintiff that they were familiar with the Harahan bridge, its construction and its condition; that if Crittenden County, Arkansas, should dismantle and demolish those portions of the roadways lying within the state of Arkansas, it would be imperative that the city of Memphis demolish and dismantle those portions of the roadways lying in the state of Tennessee; that the reasonable cost of dismantling those parts in Tennessee would be $150,000, which would be at least $50,000 more than the value of the salvage; that the wooden parts of the roadways are in need of some repairs, but that they are in reasonably good condition and would safely accommodate the natural traffic using them.

The evidence showed also that a new four-way vehicular bridge has been constructed over the river only a comparatively short distance from the Harahan bridge and that all state highways have been routed over the new bridge. Witnesses for the defendants testified, also, that the runways on the Harahan bridge are dangerous to traffic.

Other matters were introduced in evidence, but they are not material on the issues on appeal. The record contains no findings of...

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7 cases
  • Hedberg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 30, 1965
    ...suit may not be capable of exact valuation in money, this fact of itself does not negative federal jurisdiction. City of Memphis v. Ingram, 195 F.2d 338, 342 (8 Cir. 1952). With these principles in mind, we turn to the complaint. The four plaintiffs purport to allege two "joint and several ......
  • Kiernan v. Lindsay
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • November 24, 1971
    ...could be measured "by the cost of obtaining an equivalent education at private institutions." 24 F.Supp. at 275. In City of Memphis v. Ingram, 195 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1952), a municipal corporation in Tennessee sought to enjoin a county officer in another state from the demolition of a bridg......
  • Chambers-Liberty Counties Nav. Dist. v. PARKER BR. & CO., 66-G-51.
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    ...v. Bigan, 170 F.Supp. 219 (W.D.Penn.1959); City of Memphis v. Ingram, 98 F.Supp. 395 (E.D.Ark. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 195 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1952); Gulf Atlantic Transportation Co. v. Becker County Sand & Gravel Co., 122 F.Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1954), and cases cited therein. Nor d......
  • Moss v. CALUMET PAVING COMPANY
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    ...268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 (1935); Pearl River County, Miss. v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 270 F. 26 (5th Cir. 1921); City of Memphis, Tenn. v. Ingram, 195 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1952); Pettibone v. Cook County, Minn., 120 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1941); Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, 67 F.Supp. 5......
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