City of Meriden v. Board of Tax Review of Town of Berlin

Decision Date25 June 1971
Citation288 A.2d 435,161 Conn. 396
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesCITY OF MERIDEN v. BOARD OF TAX REVIEW OF the TOWN OF BERLIN.

Harry N. Jackaway, Kensington, for appellant (defendant).

Morton H. Greenblatt, Meriden, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, RYAN, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.

RYAN, Associate Justice.

The city of Meriden owns 745 acres of land in the town of Berlin, which is used for water supply purposes. The tax assessor of Berlin assessed the land on the list of October 1, 1969, as improved farmland under the provisions of § 12-76 of the General Statutes. 1 The plaintiff admits that it does not furnish the right to use and the use of such water supply to the inhabitants of the town of Berlin on the same terms and conditions as it does to the inhabitants of the city of Meriden. The plaintiff applied to the state forester for a certificate designating these lands as forest lands under the provisions of § 12-107d and the state forester issued the certificate. The plaintiff, thereafter, applied to the assessor of the town of Berlin for classification of the 745 acres as forest land, but the assessor refused to make such classification, claiming that the land must be assessed as improved farmland under the provisions of § 12-76. The plaintiff duly appealed to the defendant board of tax review of the town of Berlin from the action of the assessor. The board made no change in the classification or the assessment of the plaintiff's land and the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which sustained the plaintiff's appeal and reclassified the property in question from 'improved farm land' valued at $214,560 to 'forest land' valued at $22,350. The defendant has appealed to this court.

The following question is basic in the determination of this appeal: Is the plaintiff's land used for water supply purposes and located in the town of Berlin subject to taxation as forest land under the provisions of § 12-107d, or is it subject to taxation as improved farmland under the provisions of § 12-76?

An examination of the legislative history of the statutes is required. In West Hartford v. Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 360, it was held that land owned by a municipal corporation and used by it for reservoir purposes was not liable to assessment for taxes in an adjoining town where the land was located. After that decision was rendered, however, chapter 79 of the Public Acts of 1879, the predecessor of § 12-76, was enacted by the legislature. The statute provided that land so owned, used and situated should be set in the list for taxation in the town where it is situated at a valuation which would be fair for such land if used for agricultural purposes, unless the inhabitants of the town where the land is situated were given the right to use, and actually did use, the water supply from such reservoir on the same terms and conditions as the inhabitants of the municipality which owned the reservoir, in which case the land was exempted from taxation. 'The purpose in view in the enactment seems apparent. Under existing law as held in West Hartford v. Board of Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 360, land owned or taken for reservoir purposes by a municipality was removed from the assessment list of the town where the land was situated. Such town thus became a loser by such taking unless its inhabitants had the use of the water supply thus created. If they were given the use of the water supply upon the same terms as the inhabitants of the municipality owning the reservoir, they shared in the public use. It was proper that towns not thus sharing in the public benefit should not lose the tax upon the land taken for the reservoir. It was the purpose of the act to restore this exempted land to the assessment list of such towns.' Norwalk v. New Canaan, 85 Conn. 119, 126, 81 A. 1027, 1029-1030. Section 12-76 has remained substantially unchanged except for the method of assessment.

Section 12-81(4) of the General Statutes provides: 'Except as otherwise provided by law, property belonging to, or held in trust for, a municipal corporation of this state and used for a public purpose' shall be exempt from taxation. Section 12-76 is an exception to § 12-81(4). It permits a municipality in which there is located land used for water supply purposes owned by another municipality to tax that land as improved farmland unless its inhabitants are permitted to use and actually do use such water supply on the same terms as the inhabitants of the town which owns the land.

In 1963 the General Assembly enacted Public Act No. 490, the pertinent portions of which in the present inquiry are §§ 1 and 4, now §§ 12-107a and 12-107d, respectively, of the General Statutes. Section 10 of the act was an amendment of § 12-76. Section 12-107a is a declaration of policy and recites that it is in the public interest to encourage the preservation of farmland, forest land and open space land in order to maintain a readily available source of food and farm products close to the metropolitan areas of the state, to conserve the state's natural resources, to provide for the welfare and happiness of the inhabitants of the state, and to prevent the forced conversion of farmland, forest land and open space land to more intensive uses as a result of economic pressures caused by the assessment of the land for the purposes of property taxation at values incompatible with this preservation as farmland, forest land and open space land.

Section 12-107d(a) provides that any owner of land may apply to the state forester for its designation as forest land. The same statute in subsection (c) provides that an owner of land so designated as forest land may apply for its classification as forest land to the assessor of the municipality where the land is located and if the state forester has not canceled his designation of such land as forest land at or prior to the date of the assessment list, 'such assessor shall classify such land as forest land and include it as such on such assessment list.' Subsection (f) of this statute authorizes an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas by the municipality within which the land is designated as forest land by the state forester or by the owner of land aggrieved by the refusal of the state forester so to designate his land. Subsection (g) provides that an owner of land aggrieved by the denial of any application to the assessor for classification of land as forest land shall have the same rights and remedies for appeal and relief as are provided in the General Statutes for taxpayers claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of assessors or boards of tax review.

The assessor of the town of Berlin claims that the plaintiff's land should be assessed under the provisions of § 12-76 at 'what would be its fair market value were it improved farm land.' The plaintiff claims that the provisions of § 12-107d, a statute later in date, are controlling and that since the plaintiff has complied with the provisions of this statute, its land should be classified as forest land and included as such in the 1969 assessment list of the town of Berlin. The defendant urges that § 12-107d is broad in character and general in its application; that § 12-76 deals specifically with the situation in question, namely, one municipality owning land used for water-supply purposes located in another municipality wherein it does not supply water to the inhabitants on the same terms and conditions as it does to its own inhabitants; and that § 12-76 is a statute which is specific in its application in conflict with the provisions of § 12-107d, an act general in scope.

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    ...of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the enactment speaks for itself and there is no occasion to construe it. Meriden v. Board of Tax Review, 161 Conn. 396, 402, 288 A.2d 435; 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) §§ 46.01, 46.03.04. There is no indication in the text of § 31-12......
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