City of Miami v. Kayfetz
Citation | 30 So.2d 521,158 Fla. 758 |
Parties | CITY OF MIAMI v. KAYFETZ et al. |
Decision Date | 22 April 1947 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1947.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Charles A Carroll, judge.
J. W Watson, Jr., and W. W. Charles, Jr., both of Miami, for appellant.
Aronovitz Weinkle & Aronovitz and Thomas H. Anderson, all of Miami, for appellees.
On the 25th day of July, 1946, the City Commissioner of the City of Miami, Florida, enacted Ordinance No. 3139. The pertinent provisions of that ordinance are:
On November 21, 1946, appellee filed his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, in which he challenged the validity of the above stated provisions of the ordinance on numerous grounds. The City, in its answer, inter alia, said:
'Further answering said paragraph II of the Bill of Complaint, defendant would show that it is not necessary that an admission price be charged by a night club in order to subject such night club to the provisions of 3139 imposing the twenty-five cent tax. Section 32 of said Ordinance 3139 is a tax imposed upon each patron of a night club who attends or enjoys night club shows. Said Section of the Ordinance requires the night club operators to render a bill to each person attending a night club performance setting out the twenty-five cent excise tax as a separate item on the bill. The tax is not a tax upon the operator or owner of a night club, but is a tax upon those patrons of such establishments who attend or who enjoy a night club show. The night club operator is given the privilege under the ordinance of assuming said excise tax in lieu of collecting it from the patrons. Under the definitions contained in Section 31 Ordinance 3139, the word 'purchase' as applicable to admission to a night club is defined as 'every act or transaction whereby the right to admission to, attendance at, or enjoyment of, any night club show, and the duty and obligation to pay for the acquisition and utilization of such right, become vested in the purchase.''
The Chancellor, in holding the above stated provisions of the Ordinance invalid, said, inter alia:
'A reading of the applicable charter provisions shows that the power given for license or excise taxes does not extend to taxing an individual other than as an incident to his trade, business or profession. Nor shall the fact that the terms 'license tax' and 'excise tax' are here used together have any bearing. In Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615, at page 640, it is said: 'An excise tax partakes of the nature of a license tax.' And also 'an excise tax is one laid on licenses to pursue certain occupations, corporate privileges or sales or consumption of commodities.'
'Now, if the City under its said charter can impose an excise on an individual for the privilege of going into a night club, then it can impose a similar tax on the individual for walking, sleeping or for the privilege of breathing.
'This court is not unmindful of the case of Heriot v. City of Pensacola, 108 Fla.
480, 146 So. 654, decided in 1933, where the Supreme Court approved an excise on consumers of utilities (electricity, gas, water and certain telephone service). The frame of the present Miami ordinance indicates that the Pensacola case was relied on for precedent and support.
'In spite of the fact that the Court, in the Pensacola case, approved the excise as a tax on the privilege of purchasing the utility services (also saying 'the tax is levied on the consumption of commodities which in their distribution are necessarily transported by wires upon, and pipes under, the public ways of the City)', there were at least two features or distinctions in that case which serve to eliminate it as any support for the Miami Ordinance.
'First, this 'privilege' for which the individual was taxed was a legally enforceable right to receive public utility service. A person is not entitled to demand admission to a night club. It is not inconceivable that an applicant might be considered unsuited for admission to a night club. (Also, this 'privilege of receiving utility service' was classed by the Court as being a tax on consumption of commodities discussed at more length hereinbelow. So it is, that even if the charter could be construed to authorize such a tax on 'privileges' of its inhabitants aside from their business or occupations the power could...
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