City of Miami v. Haigley
| Decision Date | 23 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D13–1382.,3D13–1382. |
| Citation | 143 So.3d 1025 |
| Parties | CITY OF MIAMI, Appellant, v. Cheryl K. HAIGLEY, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Victoria Méndez, City Attorney, and John A. Greco, Deputy City Attorney, Warren Bittner, Deputy Emeritus, and Forrest L. Andrews, Assistant City Attorney, for appellant.
Eaton & Wolk, and William G. Wolk, Miami; Freidin Dobrinsky Brown & Rosenblum, P.A., and Eric Bluestein, for appellees.
Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER, and LOGUE, JJ.
The City of Miami (“City”) appeals the trial court's final summary judgment, which struck down a provision in section 2–234 of the City of Miami Code that requires non-residents of the City to pay $100 more than residents of the City who use the City's emergency medical transportation services (“non-resident surcharge.”).1The trial court struck the non-resident surcharge, finding in part that it is an unauthorized tax, not a user fee, and that even if the higher fee charged non-residents for the use of the City's emergency medical transportation services constitutes a user fee, it must be stricken because it violates the plaintiffs' rights to equal protection under Florida's Constitution and unconstitutionally impairs intrastate travel.Because we conclude that the fee charged non-City residents who use the City's emergency medical transportation services is a user fee, not a tax, and it does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection or unconstitutionally burden intrastate travel, we reverse the trial court's order entering final summary judgment in favor of Cheryl K. Haigley, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (“the plaintiffs”), and remandwith directions to enter final summary judgment in favor of the City.
In 1992, because “the cost of providing the highest possible fire safety and prevention services [was] steadily rising,” the City passed Ordinance 11007, which amended section 2–83.1 of the City of Miami Code.The ordinance increased the fees charged those who use the emergency medical transportation services provided by the City's Fire–Rescue Department.The ordinance, which is now codified in section 2–234 of the City of Miami Code, provides:
Sec. 2–234.Emergency medical transportation service fee.
(a) There is hereby established a schedule of fees for use of the emergency medical transportation services of the department of fire-rescue.Such fees shall be charged to each person receiving basic and advance life support transportation service ... ; such schedule of fees being as follows:
(1) Basic life support—Base rate ....$135.00
(2) Advance life support—Base rate....235.21
(3) Oxygen ....22.00
(4) Mileage, per mile ....6.60
(5) IV solution ....22.00
(6) Cardiac monitoring ....22.00
(7) Cervical collar ....22.00
(8) Special handling (extrication, antishock trousers, nonbreathing patients and hare-traction splints) ....22.00
(9) Nonresidents of the City of Miami will be assessed a surcharge of ....100.00.
(b) The city manager shall increase the charges for services as set forth in this section when necessary to reasonably cover the cost of providing such services.Whenever such charges are to be increased, the city manager shall file a list of new charges which shall become effective no earlier than 30 days after such filing with the city clerk.
The City currently charges residents and non-residents who use the City's emergency medical transportation services in accordance with the fee schedule set forth in section 2–234(a)(1)–(9).The collected emergency medical transportation services fees are deposited into the City's General Fund.
In March 2010, Cheryl K. Haigley(“Haigley”), a resident of St. Petersburg Beach, Florida, fell and injured herself while in the City of Miami.The City's Fire–Rescue Department responded, and Haigley was transported to a local hospital.The City billed Haigley a total of $445—a $330 “base rate” for “basic life support”2 services, $15 for mileage, and a $100 non-resident surcharge.3Haigley paid the bill in full.
In January 2011, the plaintiffs filed an action against the City, seeking a declaration that the City's non-resident surcharge is unconstitutional because it violates the right to intrastate travel and the guarantee of equal protection secured by the Florida Constitution(Count I) and because the surcharge is an unauthorized tax, not a user fee (Count II).The plaintiffs sought the return of all non-resident surcharges collected by the City during the four years preceding the filing of the action.
The plaintiffs and the City filed cross-motions for summary judgment.The trial court denied the City's motion, entered final summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and struck down the provision in section 2–234(a)(9) that establishes the additional non-resident surcharge.The trial court also enjoined the City from further collection of the non-resident surcharge and ordered the City to reimburse the plaintiffs for all non-resident surcharges collected during the four years preceding the filing of the action.The City's appeal followed.
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo.Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P.,760 So.2d 126, 130(Fla.2000);Sierra v. Shevin,767 So.2d 524, 525(Fla. 3d DCA2000).Additionally, constitutional challenges to statutes or ordinances involve pure questions of law, and therefore, the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are also reviewed de novo.SeeCaribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n,838 So.2d 492, 500(Fla.2003);Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables,62 So.3d 625, 629(Fla. 3d DCA2010).
In State v. City of Port Orange,650 So.2d 1(Fla.1994), the Florida Supreme Court established a three-prong test to determine whether a particular charge is a user fee or a tax.Specifically, the Court held:
[A] tax is an enforced burden imposed by sovereign right for the support of the government, the administration of law, and the exercise of various functions the sovereign is called on to perform....
User fees are charges based upon the proprietary right of the governing body permitting the use of the instrumentality involved.Such fees share common traits that distinguish them from taxes: [1]they are charged in exchange for a particular governmental service [2] which benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by other members of society, and [3]they are paid by choice, in that the party paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service and thereby avoiding the charge.
Id. at 3(internal citations omitted);see alsoCollier Cnty. v. State,733 So.2d 1012, 1018(Fla.1999)();State ex rel. Gulfstream Park Racing Ass'n v. Fla. State Racing Comm'n,70 So.2d 375, 379(Fla.1953)();City of Miami v. Quik Cash Jewelry & Pawn, Inc.,811 So.2d 756, 758–59(Fla. 3d DCA2002).Therefore, in the instant case, if the emergency medical transportation services fee, which includes the non-resident surcharge, satisfies the three-prong test, it is a user fee, not a tax.
(1)The fee the City charged Haigley was in exchange for a particular governmental service provided to her by the City
Haigley argues, and the trial court found, that the City did not provide her with a particular governmental service in exchange for the $100 non-resident surcharge.Haigley's argument is fatally flawed.
It is undisputed that the City provided Haigley with a particular governmental service.The City's Fire–Rescue Department transported Haigley to a medical facility for emergency treatment.The charge assessed for this service was assessed solely to Haigley, not to a non-user of the emergency medical transportation services.Thus, the $445 the City charged Haigley was in exchange for a particular governmental service.
The City provides the same emergency medical transportation services to City residents and non-residents.Section 2–234 merely charges residents and non-residents different rates for utilizing the emergency medical transportation services provided by the City's Fire–Rescue Department.Although the City charges residents and non-residents different rates for utilizing the same governmental service—emergency medical transportation services—non-residents are nonetheless receiving a particular governmental service in exchange for the fee charged by the City.In other words, Haigley was not charged a fee for the mere availability of the service, but rather for the service that was actually provided to her.Accordingly, we conclude that the City established the first prong set forth in City of Port Orange.
(2)The emergency medical transportation services benefited Haigley in a manner not shared by other members of society
In addressing the second prong set forth in City of Port Orange,the trial court concluded:
The City of Miami non-resident surcharge does not provide a benefit to non-residents in a manner not shared by other users of the City of Miami emergency medical services.Even if the City uses most of the non-resident surcharge money collected to pay for a portion of the overall cost of providing Fire Rescue transportation services to everyone, the surcharge does...
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