City of Miami v. City of Coral Gables, 69--1006

Decision Date10 March 1970
Docket NumberNo. 69--1006,69--1006
Parties, 41 A.L.R.3d 1000 CITY OF MIAMI, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, a municipal corporation of the State of Florida, et al., Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Alan H. Rothstein, City Atty., and Jack R. Rice, Jr., and John S. Lloyd, Asst. City Attys., for appellant.

Charles H. Spooner, City Atty., Carr & Warren, Miami, for appellees.

Before BARKDULL, HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

The appellant was defendant below, in an action brought by the City of Coral Gables and twenty individual residents of that city to enjoin the operation of an incinerator located in Coconut Grove, which is owned and operated by the appellant. The circuit court rendered its findings, opinion and judgment granting the injunctive relief sought. The chancellor found as follows:

'Considering all of the evidence presented and arguments presented by able counsel for the respective parties, the Court finds:

'1. That the equities are with the plaintiffs and against the defendant.

'4. That the operation of the City of Miami Incinerator No. 2, located in Co-conut Grove, constitutes both a public and private nuisance; and that continued operation of the incinerator would constitute a continuing nuisance to the plaintiffs.

'5. That the plaintiffs are entitled to the entry of an injunction enjoining and prohibiting the present operation of the said incinerator.'

The chancellor thus ordered that:

'* * * (T)he City of Miami be and it is hereby prohibited and enjoined from operating its Incinerator No. 2 located in Coconut Grove.

'2. That the Court hereby defers the operation of such injunctive order for a period of 45 days during which time the defendant City of Miami, may present to this Court a plan whereby the incinerator can be so improved as to overcome the deleterious conditions which presently exist. * * *'

The City of Miami immediately filed its notice of appeal in case number 69--1006. In that case, the city has taken a plenary appeal, presenting the issues of law which it contends should have precluded the injunction by the circuit court. However, while that appeal was pending, forty-five days elaspsed and the chancellor entered a rule to show cause as to whether the City of Miami was in contempt for failure to present an ameliorative plan within that period of tine. A hearing was held on the rule, and the chancellor indicated to counsel that he would find the city in contempt for failure to file the plan. Before the actual contempt order had been entered, however, the city filed in this court for writ of prohibition addressed to the chancellor, such case being number 70--104.

Nevertheless, on January 27, 1970, the chancellor entered his order of contempt from which the city has taken an interlocutory appeal in case number 70--110. Due to the nature of the relief sought in each of these cases, they have been consolidated for appellate purposes.

We shall treat the basis issues of law presented in the plenary appeal first. The appellant raises the doctrine of res judicata, contending that a similar action filed in 1962 by the City of Coral Gables for injunctive relief, which was dismissed with prejudice, should have acted to bar the instant litigation under the aforementioned doctrine. This contention is without merit. The instant case presented the issue as to whether or not the incinerator constituted a nuisance in 1967, when the suit was filed, and in 1969, when it was tried. The determination made in 1962 has no bearing on this case. Hialeah Race Course, Inc. v. Gulfstream Park Racing Association, Inc., Fla.App.1968, 210 So.2d 750.

As its second point on appeal, the City of Miami contends that the evidence presented was not sufficient to sustain the final judgment and findings. The evidence presented was, in our opinion, substantial and competent. The chemical and physical tests conducted by the expert witnesses, engineering firms and officers of the Dade County Pollution Control Board amply sustained the findings of the chancellor. At the heart of the appellant's argument is its position that '* * * the minor form of pollutants which may be emitted into the air by the stack of defendant's incinerator is a relatively insignificant factor when compared to the other forms of pollution which affect the air and water of Dade County.' Though it is unfortunately true that Dade County is the victim of environmental abuse from sources other than the Coconut Grove incinerator, this fact does not mitigate the offenses committed by this particular party. The underlying principle supporting the law of nuisance has been succinctly stated in the case of Jones v. Trawicks, Fla.1953, 75 So.2d 785, 50 A.L.R.2d 1319, wherein the court stated:

'This court recognizes that the law of private nuisance is bottomed on the fundamental rule that every person should use his own property as not to injure that of another * * *

'Anything which annoys or disturbs one in the free use, possession, or enjoyment of his property, or which renders its ordinary use or occupation physically uncomfortable, is a 'nuisance' and may be restrained.'

See also cases collected in Annot, 52 A.L.R.2d 1134 (1957); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1305 (1961); Annot. 2 A.L.R.3d 1372 (1965).

No doubt the instant litigation is representative of an entire assault by the people of this nation in response to the 'crimes against the environment' which have been perpetrated by the users of our amassed technologies. 1 Recognition of the public's right to pure air, soil, and water has been forthcoming from a vast segment of the governmental agencies entrusted to protect these interests for our country's people, and the legal community is now mobilizing itself to pursue the avenues of relief available. 2 In all likelihood, the lion's share of these efforts to secure a pollution-free environment will be heard by the many courts existing in the federal and state jurisprudential systems, and it appears to us that the appellant's position on this point, if accepted, would lodge a perpetual barrier against any subsequent pursuit of legal remedy by parties aggrieved in the future.

The record on appeal contains testimony from citizens participating in this law suit as to smoke, odors, ash and soot falling on their properties. They further testified as to the inconvenience of being awakened by noxious smells from the smoke and burning garbage being emitted by the incinerator. The evidence shows that ashes and other particulate matter fell upon their persons and property, and some expressed having experienced physical discomfort therefrom. The numerous tests conducted, treated infra, graphically demonstrated the degree of severity with which this incinerator was violating their property rights or their persons. We commend the chancellor when he stated in his final judgment:

'This court will not stand idly by while citizens are required to endure the existence of a nuisance until such time as those responsible for remedying it discharge their responsibilities.

'* * * (The Court finds) that the operation of the City of Miami's incinerator No. 2, located in Coconut Grove constitutes both a public and private nuisance; and that continued operation of the incinerator would constitute a continuing nuisance to the plaintiffs.'

The appellants also contend that the chancellor erred when he admitted into evidence Metropolitan Dade County Code Chapter 24, which is the Dade County Pollution Control Ordinance. The City of Miami contends that certain provisions of that ordinance are unreasonable because they bear no reasonable relationship to health of the citizens of the county which it purports to protect. 3 The chancellor, in commenting upon that ordinance, stated in his judgment that:

'(T)his court does not hold that proof of the violation of the Dade County Code or of any ordinance, standing alone, would necessarily be sufficient to establish the existence of a nuisance, but is evidence which can be considered by the court in determining whether the nuisance does exist. See Philbrick v. City of Miami Beach, Fla. (1941), (147 Fla. 538) 3 So.2d 144.'

Thus, we initially note that the court properly construed the weight to be given as to this particular evidence, and the constitutional attack posed by the appellant herein would not, in view of the additional corroborating evidence demonstrated by the record, be grounds for reversal. Nevertheless, we should set to rest any doubts about the constitutionality of the cited sections of the Dade County Code, Footnote 3, supra, and hereby hold that there is a definite relationship between the public health and welfare being protected and the ordinance regulating pollutant discharges into the atmosphere. Moreover, the standards setting forth the maximum allowable emission of smoke and particulare matter are easily ascertainable from the language of the code. The use of the Ringelmann chart, as provided for in § 24--15 of the Code, has been specifically litigated and approved in other jurisdictions. Sittner v. Seattle, 1963, 62 Wash.2d 834, 384 P.2d 859; People v. International Steel Corporation, 1951, 102 Cal.App.2d Supp. 935, 226 P.2d 587; Board of Health of Tp. of Weehawken, etc. v. New York Central Railroad Co., 1950, 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511; Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation v. City of Kingsport, 1949, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270. We therefore find sections 24--3, 24--15 and 24--21 of the Dade County Code to be constitutional.

The appellant next argues that the chancellor failed to consider certain evidence relating to the efficiency of operation of the incinerator, and therefore erred in his ultimate finding, and that such...

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