City of Milford v. Local 1566, Council 4, AFSCME

• Decision Date: 03 June 1986
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF MILFORD v. LOCAL 1566, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME et al.

Page 177

510 A.2d 177

200 Conn. 91

CITY OF MILFORD v. LOCAL 1566, COUNCIL 4, AFSCME et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 13, 1986.

Decided June 3, 1986.

Michael J. Lombardo, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on brief, was Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., for appellant-appellee (State Bd. of Mediation and Arbitration).

Bruce L. Levin, with whom were Julia B. Geib, law student intern, and, on brief, George F. Martelon, Jr., Milford, for appellee-appellant (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.

SANTANIELLO, Associate Justice.

The principal issue raised on these appeals is whether members of the state board of mediation and arbitration must take an oath pursuant to General Statutes § 52-414(d) ¹ before arbitrating every dispute. The appeals arise out of an employment dispute between Frank Redin, represented by Local 1506, Council 4, of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (the union), and the plaintiff, the city of Milford. Redin filed a grievance with the union alleging that the plaintiff unfairly discharged him. In accordance with the procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the union, the grievance was submitted to arbitration before the state board of mediation and arbitration (the board). A panel of three board members heard the case and found that Redin had been discharged in violation of his rights under the bargaining agreement. The award provided that Redin be reinstated and that he be compensated for lost wages. The plaintiff thereafter applied to the superior court to have the award vacated, arguing, inter alia, that the award was invalid because the arbitrators did not take the oath required by General Statutes § 52-414(d) before hearing the grievance. The board moved to intervene in order to defend the validity of its arbitration procedures. The court allowed the board to intervene, but agreed with the plaintiff that the award should be vacated on the ground that the arbitrators did not take the oath under the statute. The court then ordered that the case be reheard by another panel of arbitrators.

The board appeals from the trial court's order vacating the award. ² It argues that the court erred in holding that before the members of the board can arbitrate a dispute, they must take the oath required by § 52-414(d). The plaintiff responds that the board has no standing to appeal the court's decision and that the court properly vacated the award. The plaintiff also cross appeals, arguing that the court erred in permitting the board to intervene and that the court should not have ordered a rehearing. We find the issues in favor of the board and remand the case for further proceedings.

I

We address first those issues which question the board's interest in this action: whether the court erred in granting the board permission to intervene in the application to vacate the arbitration award and whether the board has standing to appeal the court's decision.

The plaintiff filed its application to vacate the arbitration award on February 2, 1982. In the application it argued that the arbitrators did not take the oath required by General Statutes § 52-414, that the award was contrary to the evidence, and that the award was vague, "against the law" and "contrary to public policy." Redin and the union defended the action and applied for an order confirming the award. On February 25, 1982, the board moved to intervene because its general practice at the time did not require its members to take the oath in question before hearing grievances, and an adverse ruling on the issue would affect all cases heard by the board. In the motion, the board did not specify whether it was moving to intervene as of right or was seeking permissive intervention. See Practice Book §§ 99 and 100. It argued that "[t]he integrity of the Board is being attacked, and the legality of Board proceedings and awards rendered by the Board is being questioned by the Plaintiff in this action." The court thereafter granted the motion without comment.

The plaintiff claims in its cross appeal that the board has no intrinsic interest in the outcome of the arbitration proceedings, and that, as a result, the trial court should not have permitted intervention. Because the court did not state the theory on which it allowed intervention, the plaintiff argues both that the board has no right to intervene under Practice Book § 99 and that the court abused its discretion in granting permissive intervention. It is unnecessary to consider the board's right to intervene, however, because we find that the court's action was fully supported under the law governing permissive intervention.

"The consideration of permissive intervention involves numerous factors including the timeliness of the intervention, the proposed intervenor's interests in the controversy, the adequacy of representation of such interests by existing parties, the delay in the proceedings or other prejudice to the existing parties the intervention may cause, and the necessity for or value of the intervention in terms of resolving the controversy before the court. See Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 24(b). A ruling on a motion for permissive intervention would be erroneous only in the rare case where such factors weigh so heavily against the ruling that it would amount to an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 197, 445 A.2d 579 (1982); see also In re Juvenile Appeal, 188 Conn. 259, 266, 449 A.2d 165 (1982) (Shea, J., dissenting).

Applying the factors set forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the board's request to intervene. The board's intervention, coming two weeks after the city's application, was timely under the circumstances. Intervention before that date would not have been practical. Although the board does not have an interest in whether the award is ultimately vacated or confirmed, it has a significant interest in protecting the validity of the procedures used to determine the award. To vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrators were not sworn as required by law calls into question the legality of the board's proceedings and, by implication, jeopardizes the validity of almost all of its arbitration decisions. Concerning the factor of delay or prejudice, the city argues that the board's appeal caused a three year delay in the resolution of the grievance. The possibility of an intervenor's appeal is present every time intervention is requested, however, and that possibility should not, standing alone, be grounds for denying permission to intervene. Finally, while it is true that the union and Redin would have been able to argue the board's position concerning the oath, the court reasonably could have assumed that the board was in a better position to defend its own procedures.

The city also contends that even if the board were properly allowed to intervene, the board does not have standing to appeal the court's order vacating the award. The gravamen of the claim is that the board was not "aggrieved" by the trial court's ruling and therefore does not have sufficient interest in the matter to pursue an appeal.

" 'It is settled law that the right to appeal is purely statutory and is allowed only if the conditions fixed by statute are met. Zachs v. Public Utilities Commission, 171 Conn. 387, 394, 370 A.2d 984 [1976]; Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 293, 320 A.2d 797 [1973].' In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 292, 293, 435 A.2d 345 (1980)." Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. FOIC, 191 Conn. 173, 175, 463 A.2d 613 (1983). General Statutes § 52-423 provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order confirming, vacating, modifying or correcting an award, or from judgment or decree upon an award, as in ordinary civil actions." In all civil actions a requisite element of appealability is that the party claiming error be "aggrieved" by the decision of the trial court. General Statutes § 52-263; Practice Book § 3000; Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. FOIC, supra, 175-76, 463 A.2d 613; Kulmacz v. Kulmacz, 177 Conn. 410, 412, 418 A.2d 76 (1979).

The plaintiff argues that the board is not aggrieved because it has no personal interest in whether this particular arbitration award is vacated or confirmed. The board responds that its interest springs from the fact that the validity of its procedures are challenged and the court's ruling interferes with the discharge of its statutory responsibilities. The test for determining aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished from a general interest shared by the community as a whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 502, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); Cannavo Enterprises, Inc. v. Burns, 194 Conn. 43, 47, 478 A.2d 601 (1984); Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. FOIC, supra, 191 Conn. 176, 463 A.2d 613; Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 493, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). Mere status as a party or a participant in the proceedings below "does not in and of itself constitute aggrievement for the purposes of appellate review." Hartford Distributors, Inc. v. Liquor Control Commission, 177 Conn. 616, 620, 419 A.2d 346 (1979).

We have never specifically addressed the issue of whether a state agency is "aggrieved" by a ruling which questions the validity of its administrative procedures. The plaintiff relies on our decision in Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. FOIC, supra, where we held that under the governing statutes and the circumstances of...