City of Milwaukee v. Koeffler

• Decision Date: 04 January 1886
• Parties: CITY OF MILWAUKEE v. KOEFFLER. Filed
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

6 S.Ct. 372

116 U.S. 219

29 L.Ed. 612

CITY OF MILWAUKEE v. KOEFFLER.

Filed January 4, 1886.

This is an appeal from the circuit court for the Eastern district of Wisconsin.

The bill, originally filed in a state court, and afterwards removed into the circuit court of the United States, prayed for an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax assessed by the city of Milwaukee against Koeffler. The tax was assessed against him as a resident of that city on account of his personal property, and his complaint alleges that he did not reside in Milwaukee in the year for which the tax was levied against him, nor for some years before or since, and that the assessment is therefore void. The answer of defendants, filed in the state court before the removal of the case, denies complainant's allegation as to non-residence, and, averring his citizenship and residence there, adds: 'And for a further and separate answer and defense, the defendants allege and show unto the court that the plaintiff, if he is able to prove the allegations of his complaint herein, has a complete and sufficient remedy at law, and that for this reason this court, as a court of equity, should not and will not interfere, assume, or take jurisdiction of this action, and the defendants object for that reason to any and all interference of this court, as a court of equity, in the matter of which plaintiff complains, and asks that this action be dismissed.' Replication being filed, the case was heard on these issues, and on a considerable mass of testimony as to the question of residence in Milwaukee.

On the hearing it appears that the judges of the circuit court, assuming that complainant was not a resident of that city, were divided in opinion on the question of the jurisdiction of the court, as a court of equity, to grant relief. This question they present to us in the following certificate: 'The case coming on to be heard at this term upon the pleadings and proofs, it occurred as a question whether a bill in equity to set aside and restrain the collection of a personal tax, or a tax levied upon personal property by a municipal corporation, can be maintained on the sole ground of the illegality of the tax, by reason of the non-residence within the limits of such municipality of the person against whom the tax is levied. On which question the opinions of the judges were opposed. Whereupon, on motion of the plaintiff, by his counsel, that the point on which the disagreement hath happened may, during the term, be stated, under the direction of the judges, and certified, under the seal of the court, to the supreme court to be finally decided, it is ordered that the foregoing state of the pleadings and the following statement of facts, which is made under the direction of the judges, be certified according to the request of the plaintiff by his counsel, and the law in that case made and provided, to-wit: That Charles A. Koeffler, the plaintiff, in 1882, when the assessment and levy of tax against him on account of personal property were made, was not, and for several years prior thereto had not been, a resident of the city of Milwaukee, but was and had been a resident of the town of Wauwatosa in the county of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.'

Joshua Stark, for appellant.

Jas. G. Jenkins, for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 220-222 intentionally omitted]

MILLER, J.

In accordance with the opinion of the presiding justice a decree was made setting aside the assessment of the tax, and enjoining the city and its officers from collecting it.

We are of opinion that both this court and the supreme court of Wisconsin are committed to a contrary doctrine.

The case of Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, was a bill in equity in the circuit court of the Northern district of Illinois, brought by Dows, a citizen of New York, to restrain the city of Chicago from collecting a tax upon the shares of stock which he owned in a national bank located in that city. He alleged that the tax was illegal because his shares were assessed at a higher rate than other moneyed capital in the city; and because, not being a resident of Chicago, but of New York, his personal property belonged to his domicile, and any tax levied on it by the city of Chicago was void. The bill was dismissed on demurrer, on the ground that a court of equity had no jurisdiction to give relief for the reasons stated in the bill.

It will be observed that in that case, as in this, the tax was resisted as a tax on the person on account of personal property, on the ground that the party assessed did not reside within the city, and the corporation, therefore, had no power to tax him. The property for which the tax was assessed was in each case intangible property. In the first case it was bank shares, the certificates of which were undoubtedly held at the residence of Dows in New York, and in the present case it was for money loaned on mortgages.

Looking at the case then made by the bill, one in which the assessment of the tax was not only irregular, but void, the court, in the language of Mr. Justice FIELD, said 'Assuming the tax to be illegal and void, we do not think any ground is presented by the bill justifying the interposition of a court of equity to enjoin its collection. The illegality of the tax and the threatened sale of the shares for its payment constitute of themselves alone no ground for such interposition. There must be some special circumstances attending a threatened injury of this kind, distinguishing it from a common trespass, and bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction before the preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked. It is upon taxation that the several states chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes may derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public. No court of equity will therefore allow its injunction to issue to restrain their action, except where...