City of Milwaukee v. Rissling

• Decision Date: 03 June 1924
• Citation: 199 N.W. 61,184 Wis. 517
• Parties: CITY OF MILWAUKEE v. RISSLING.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

184 Wis. 517

199 N.W. 61

CITY OF MILWAUKEE

v.RISSLING.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 3, 1924.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Milwaukee County; A. C. Backus, Judge.

Roy Rissling was convicted of violation of ordinance regulating and licensing electricians, and he appeals. Affirmed.Lamfrom & Tighe, of Milwaukee (Leon B. Lamfrom, of Milwaukee, of counsel), for appellant.

John M. Niven, City Atty., and Leo A. Mullaney, Asst. City Atty., both of Milwaukee, for respondent.

DOERFLER, J.

[1] Section 479 of the Ordinances reads as follows:

“Sec. 479. No person, firm or corporation shall engage in the business of installing, altering or repairing any electric wiring, fixtures or apparatus for any purpose whatsoever in the City of Milwaukee, without first having procured a license therefor as hereinafter provided in this article.

Application for a license shall be made to the inspector of buildings on forms furnished by him, and before such license shall be issued, the application therefor shall be approved by an examining committee, who shall be selected to determine the fitness of applicants for licenses. * * *

All applications for license shall be referred by the inspector of buildings to the committee, who shall promptly investigate and report to the inspector of buildings as to the fitness of the respective applicants for the license.

The committee shall meet at least once in every month for the consideration of such applications, and regular examinations shall be held during the months of December and January of each year, but special examinations may be held at any time selected by the committee. * * *

A license fee of ten dollars each calendar year shall be charged for any person, firm or corporation who regularly employs a competent electrician to do the maintenance work in their plant, but in no case shall he or they be permitted to engage in the installation of any electrical wiring, fixtures or apparatus outside of that solely in connection with their own plant. Such license may be granted to individuals, partnerships or corporations, but when granted to a partnership the license shall contain the names of all the partners.

No license shall be granted to any person, firm or corporation unless some person connected with such firm or corporation, either as copartner, stockholder, or an employé who has had at least six years' practical experience on electrical work who shall be supervisor of all work done by the licensee. * * * Such supervisor shall be subject to examination as provided for a contractor.”

Defendant's counsel makes the contention that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates section 1 of article 14 of the Constitution of the United States, and section 1 of article 1 of the Constitution of Wisconsin. It is first argued that--

“The ordinance can only be sustained on the ground of the exercise of police power, and as such it must fall because it fails to provide for the licensing of the very men who do the work--that is to say, the journeymen.”

The ordinance in question by its terms is made applicable only to those who are engaged in the contracting business in the electrical field, whether they be individuals, partnerships, or corporations. It thus recognizes a distinction between contractors in this line and journeymen. The council therefore, acting in its legislative capacity, duly created two classes--contractors on the one hand, and journeymen on the other. This classification is based upon a marked and proper distinction between the classes so created, considering the purpose of the law. The test to be applied is to ascertain whether all those included in the class are treated alike under like circumstances and conditions. In such a situation, the legislative body has the right to discriminate in the exercise of its police power. All included within the purview of the act being treated alike, we conclude that the ordinance in question is not subject to the attack made by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground stated, and that it is constitutional. State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens et al., 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L. R. A. 252;Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 144 Wis. 371, 129 N. W. 518, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066;Mehlos v. Milwaukee, 156 Wis. 591, 146 N. W. 882, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1009, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1102. In the Mehlos Case this court, on the subject of classification, uses the following language, which is decisive of the issue here raised:

“There is no federal guaranty which exempts citizens of the United States from reasonable police regulations as regards persons and property, * * * or which prevents legitimate classification for the purpose of police regulation. In case of such classification and the regulation affecting all members of the class alike, there is no violation of any equality clause of national or state Constitution.”

[2] Defendant's counsel also make the point that the ordinance does not provide for or fix any definite standard, nor does it define and limit the nature and scope of the examination; that the power delegated to the committee to pass upon applicants for licenses is arbitrary and is legislative in its nature. The ordinance provides that applications for a license shall be made to the inspector of buildings, on forms furnished by him, for approval of such applications by the examining committee, and for an examination and investigation of the committee to determine the fitness of the applicants. The council therefore has created a fact-finding body, such as the Railroad Commission or the Industrial...