City of Milwaukee v. Shoup Voting Mach. Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 May 1972
• Docket Number: No. 108,108
• Citation: 54 Wis.2d 549,196 N.W.2d 694
• Parties: CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Appellant, v. The SHOUP VOTING MACHINE CORP., Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 694

196 N.W.2d 694

54 Wis.2d 549

CITY OF MILWAUKEE, Appellant, v. The SHOUP VOTING MACHINE CORP., Respondent.

No. 108.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 2, 1972.

In February of 1969 the appellant, City of Milwaukee (city), commenced this action against the respondent, The Shoup Voting Machine Corporation (Shoup), to collect ad valorem personal property taxes on 1,025 voting machines assessed for the years 1967 and 1968. The city alleged that taxes and interest for 1967 were $54,555.34, and for 1968 they were $65,672.44.

Shoup answered and admitted the taxes were assessed and levied; however, it denied that any part of the tax or any interest had become due. The answer also alleged three affirmative defenses:

'1. That although proper and timely objections to the assessments made by the plaintiff against the defendant were duly filed under the provisions of Chapter 70 of [54 Wis.2d 551] Wisconsin Statutes, the plaintiff has failed to schedule the hearings provided for in said Statutes so that there has been no final determination of the correct value at which the property being taxes should be assessed.

'2. That the assessed valuation placed on the property which is the subject of the tax referred to in plaintiff's complaint, is excessive, unreasonable and arbitrary.

'3. That under the provisions of the Charter Ordinance of the City of Milwaukee, the property which is the subject of the taxes claimed to be due in plaintiff's complaint is completely exempt from taxation.'

The parties entered into a written stipulation whereby the issue to be determined was whether the voting machines were exempt from taxation (other issues were reserved).

The stipulation then set out the following relevant facts:

'1. That the property which is the subject of the tax in question consists of 1,025 Shoup Voting Machines presently stored in the City of Milwaukee for use by the City of Milwaukee in the conduct of its general elections.

'2. That the plaintiff herein assessed and levied personal property taxes for the year 1967 against the defendant in the sum of $49,060.56 and for the year 1968 in the sum of $64,638.23, all of which the defendant has failed and refused to pay.

'3. That the said taxes were assessed in conformity with required legal procedures.

'4. That the subject property was leased to the City of Milwaukee pursuant to bids submitted at the request of the Central Board of Purchases of the City of Milwaukee, a copy of which bid request is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A.

'5. That pursuant to said request, the defendant herein submitted a bid providing in the alternative for lease or sale of said property to the plaintiff, a copy of which bid is attached hereto, marked Exhibit B.

'6. That subsequent to the submission of said bid, a contract for the leasing of said machines was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, a copy of which is attached hereto, marked Exhibit C.'

Appended to the stipulation were copies of the bidding specifications, the submitted bid of Shoup, and the contract entered into by both parties.

The trial court rendered its decision holding that Section 11 of the City Charter of Milwaukee as enacted by the legislature exempted the voting machines from taxation.

The trial court also concluded that the city was the owner of the voting machines for tax purposes.

The city appeals.

John J. Fleming, City Atty., Walter J. Schutz, Asst. City Atty., Milwaukee, for appellant.

Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, for respondent; Eugene C. Daly, Clarence W. Malick, Milwaukee, of counsel.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

There are three issues presented:

1. Are the voting machines leased by the city exempt from taxation under sec. 11 ¹ and the Milwaukee City Charter?

2. Does the exemption of the voting machines leased by the city violate the uniformity of taxation requirement of the Wisconsin Constitution?

3. Is the city the owner of the voting machines for purposes of the state ad valorem tax?

Shoup asserts and the trial court found that ch. 184, subch. XX, sec. 11, Laws of 1874, exempts the voting machines from taxation. The city argues that sec. 11 refers only to property owned by the city and that leased property does not come within the purview of sec. 11.

Ch. 184, subch. XX, sec. 11, Laws of 1874 (sec. 26.02 of the Milwaukee City Charter), provides:

'The said city may lease, purchase and hold real or personal estate sufficient for the convenience of the inhabitants thereof; and may sell and convey the same; and the same shall be free from taxation.'

The language of sec. 11 clearly indicates that personal property leased by the city for the convenience of its inhabitants shall be free from taxation. Both parties are agreed that the city leased 1,025 voting machines from Shoup, with an option to purchase, applying the rental payment to the purchase price.

Voting machines are personal property within the scope of sec. 70.04, Stats. ²

There is no doubt but that the voting machines were leased by the city, and for the 'convenience of the inhabitants' on election days. Therefore the voting machines come within the purview of sec. 11 and are exempt from taxation under the provisions of the charter ordinance.

In Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County (1897), 95 Wis. 424, 69 N.W. 819, this court stated that property leased by the city of Milwaukee was exempt from taxation. However, on the facts of that case the court held that the financial arrangement was not a lease but only an option to purchase. Therefore the property in question was not exempt from taxation under sec. 11 and the city charter.

Additionally, it is noted that to adopt the city's narrow construction of sec. 11 would effectively negate the term 'lease.' One of the time-honored maxims of statutory construction is that a separate meaning must attach to each individual term in a legislative act. State ex rel. Knudsen v. Board of Education (1969), 43 Wis.2d 58, 168 N.W.2d 295; Associated Hospital Service v. Milwaukee (1961), 13 Wis.2d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271. Consequently, the conclusion reached above that the leased property falls within the ambit of sec. 11 is harmonious with this elementary rule of statutory construction.

In 1921 the legislature repealed the charters of all cities except cities of the first class. Milwaukee is a city of the first class. Ch. 242, Laws of 1921 (now secs. 62.02 and 62.03, Stats.). The city's charter is therefore still operative.

Appellant-city cites Weeks v. Milwaukee (1860), 10 Wis . 186 (*242), for the proposition that a city cannot exempt property from taxation because this action would invalidate the entire tax. However, in Weeks the city council attempted to exempt taxable property whereas the exemption provision her was enacted by the legislature as a part of the city's charter.

The city also argues that the legislature intended to repeal or supersede sec. 11 by the enactment of ch. 70 of the statutes. Ch. 70 provides the basis on which general property, both real and personal, may be taxed.

Sec. 70.18(1), Stats., provides:

'Personal property, to whom assessed. (1) Personal property shall be assessed to the owner thereof, except that when it is in the charge or possession of some person other than the owner it may be assessed to the person so in charge or possession of the same. . . .'

Sec. 70.11, Stats., establishes various classes of property which are exempt from taxation but does not include personal property leased by a municipality.

On the basis of these statutory provisions the appellant city contends that taxation and, consequently exemption from the ad valorem personal property taxation, is not a local matter but rather a state matter. Therefore, concludes the city, the comprehensive statewide uniform rule of taxation and exemption manifests a legislative intent to withdraw its earlier enactments, specifically sec. 11.

However, the city's argument fails for two reasons. First, sec. 70.18(1), Stats., states that personal property shall be assessed to the owner or possessor. It does not deal with exemptions. Sec. 70.11 in general provides a list of exempted property but does not deal specifically with personal property leased by the city of Milwaukee even though sec. 70.11(2) ³ provides exemptions for property owned by the city. Consequently, in order for this court to find that the legislature intended to repeal sec. 11 and the city charter it would have to do so by implication.

Sec. 991.09, Stats., provides:

'In force in cities and villages. All the laws contained in these revised statutes shall apply to and be in force in each and every city and village in the state as far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the charter of any such city or village; but when the provisions of any such charters are at variance with the provisions of these revised statutes the provisions of such charters shall prevail unless a different intention by plainly manifested.'

Ch. 70, Stats., does not plainly manifest the legislative intention to repeal sec. 26.02 of the city charter. Therefore sec. 11 was not repealed or superseded by the enactment of ch. 70.

Further, the legislature, in enacting the city's charter, provided:

'No general law of this state, contravening the provisions of this act, shall be considered as repealing, amending or modifying the same, except such purpose be expressly set forth in such law.' Ch. 184, subch. XX, sec. 14, Laws of 1874 (sec. 26.05, Milwaukee City Charter).

In Baines v. Janesville (1898), 100 Wis. 369, 75 N.W. 404, 76 N.W. 481, the city charter of Janesville required unanimous approval by all the owners of lots on a street before such street could be discontinued. A later statute provided that only two-thirds of the lot owners need approve discontinuance of a street. This court held, in applying what is presently sec. 991.09, Stats., that the charter provision prevailed because the legislature had not specifically expressed an intention to overrule a...