City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Transit Co.

• Decision Date: 15 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. 39315,39315
• Citation: 270 Minn. 133,133 N.W.2d 364
• Parties: , 58 P.U.R.3d 93 CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 364

133 N.W.2d 364

270 Minn. 133, 58 P.U.R.3d 93

CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 39315.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 15, 1965.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1965.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Failure of a municipality to file a formal complaint in intervention in proceedings before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to establish urban bus rates did not deprive the city of the status of a party within the meaning of Minn.St. 216.24 where city attorney appeared, filed a resolution of the city council directing him to oppose application for increase in rates, and cross-examined applicant's witnesses and presented a complete case in opposition to the application.

2. The filing by the city attorney of the resolution of the Minneapolis City Council opposing application for rate increase was sufficient compliance with commission's rules relating to intervention. Any failure to file a more formal document was a technical defect which could in no way deprive the city of its status as a party or prejudice the applicant.

3. Mass transportation in an urban community is a matter of municipal concern; it is of special interest to the municipality in that it relates to important considerations of convenience and well-being of its inhabitants and the economy of the community; and the municipality is therefore a party 'affected' by any order increasing rates within the meaning of § 216.24.

4. The scope of review of an order of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, as provided by § 216.25, does not comprehend that a court may interfere with the legislative function of the commission by changing or fixing rates established by the order. The scope of review is limited to a determination of whether, on the basis of the entire record, the order is reasonable and lawful.

Daniel S. Feidt and Robert I. Lang, Minneapolis, Gordon Rosenmeier and John E. Simonett, Little Falls, for appellant.

Keith M. Stidd, City Atty., Arvid M. Falk, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for respondent.

MURPHY, Justice.

This matter is before us on an appeal from an order of the district court denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal and certifying that the questions involved are, in the opinion of the district court, important and doubtful. The issues grow out of an application before the Minnesota Railroad and Warehouse Commission by Minneapolis Transit Company, hereinafter called Transit, for an increase in motor bus fares, which the commission granted. The city of Minneapolis appealed to the district court from the commission's order.

There are two issues before us: (1) Was the city in fact a party to the proceedings before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission so as to have status to appeal under the provisions of Minn.St. 216.24? (2) Where Transit consents to an order of the commission determining rates of fare, does the order become final so as to deprive the city of the right to have the proceedings reviewed?

Because the points raised by the appeal are unique and original, certain preliminary observations should be made with reference to the character of the proceedings with which we are here concerned. At the outset it should be emphasized that this is a conventional rate case commenced by application of Transit for authorization to increase bus fares. The application was opposed by the city. It is the most recent of numerous rate cases which have been considered by the commission and reviewed by the courts over a period of many years. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 86 N.W.2d 657; St. Paul City Ry. Co. v. City of St. Paul, 242 Minn. 188, 64 N.W.2d 487; 18 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 9010.

Historically, proceedings relating to the establishment of urban transit fares have been controlled by Minn.St. c. 220, the Brooks-Coleman Act, which relates to the regulation of street railways. Because motor buses are now used in the operation of the public utility and the vehicles no longer run on tracks, it is apparently assumed by the commission and the parties that the explicit provisions of c. 220 no longer apply. It is assumed that the changeover from streetcar to motor bus transportation has brought into play the provisions of c. 221, which relate to the subject of control of motor carriers generally, and the provisions of c. 216, which relate to procedures and jurisdiction of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. It may be observed that c. 220 is a rather complete legislative enactment relating to control of the street railway form of urban transportation. Under its provisions the questions now before us would not have arisen. Chapter 220 provides that the city shall be a party to rate proceedings before the commission and expressly grants the right of appeal from its orders. §§ 220.14, 220.15. The provisions of c. 221 do not deal specifically with public utilities engaged in urban mass transportation. The reason obviously is that c. 221 was designed for the control of motor transit operations generally, including the broad area of intrastate freight and passenger service. While it is established that the rate-making power of the commission is the same under both chapters, Minneapolis St. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, supra, it appears that the provisions of the two acts are not coextensive. Chapter 221 has not been amended to include the provisions and sanctions applicable to motor transportation as an urban public utility which c. 220 contains. Transit would accordingly apply to the urban bus transportation the same procedures as those applied by the commission to motor freight rates, routes, and authorizations of motor transport carriers generally. Transit contends that the status of the city under c. 221 is no different from that of an ordinary objector in proceedings before the commission, and argues from a case dealing with investigations of intrastate telephone rates initiated under different statutes and on the commission's motion, State v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., 146 Minn. 247, 178 N.W. 603, that the city's participation in the case before us was only for the purpose of cooperating with and assisting the commission in determining facts, and that since Transit has consented to the commission's determination, the order is final and the city is left without a right to appeal.

1. We first consider the claim of Transit that the city does not have standing to appeal from the commission's order. Transit points to the provisions of § 216.24, which so far as applicable here provide:

'Any party to a proceeding before the commission, or any party affected by any order thereof, or the State of Minnesota, by the attorney general, may appeal therefrom to the district court of the county in which the complainants, or a majority of them, reside * * *.'

It is argued that under this provision the city is not a party to the proceedings or a party affected by the order. Transit concedes it might have been made a proper party if it had complied with the regulations of the commission with reference to pleadings. The rules of practice of the commission are found in Minnesota Regulations, Title IX (1960 ed.).

Regulation 9211 provides in part:

'Complainants, applicants, petitioners and respondents specifically named as such in any pleading are parties to the proceeding. No other person shall become a party to the proceeding except by leave of the commission upon petition to intervene under Rule IV, 9, * * *. Any person may enter an appearance in any proceeding, but no person shall become or shall be deemed to have become a party to the proceeding by reason of having entered an appearance therein.'

Regulation 9213 provides in part:

'7. Protest. Protests may be filed containing objections to any application or petition, and the person so protesting shall be styled 'protestant,' but shall become a party to the proceeding only by leave of the commission under the provision of Rule 9211.

'8. Petition to Intervene

'(aa) When Made. Any person desiring to be made a party to a pending proceeding may petition for leave to intervene therein, prior to or at the time it is called for hearing, but not thereafter except for good cause shown.'

Transit points out that the city did not file a complaint in intervention as required by the foregoing regulations and consequently is not a party entitled to appeal. Transit relies on State v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, and J. L. Shiely Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 252 Minn. 535, 91 N.W.2d 116.

It is true that the city did not file a formal document designated as a complaint in intervention. But intervention in fact is something more than a form of pleading. It is as well the act by which a party interposes his claim of interest in an adversary proceeding, the results of which may be favorable or unfavorable to him depending upon the outcome. ¹

In considering whether the city did in fact intervene, it is necessary to examine what actually happened in the proceedings before the commission. It is important to note that the city was served with notice of Transit's application for a rate increase. Counsel for the city appeared before the commission and filed a resolution of the Minneapolis City Council directing him to 'attend all hearings and to intervene on behalf of the city in opposition' to Transit's petition as dictated by the interests of the citizens of Minneapolis. The resolution recited among other things that the petition would result in 'unreasonable and unjust fares' and that 'the City of Minneapolis is seriously concerned with the necessity of having an efficient and adequate public transportation service available.' It further appears from the commission's findings that in the proceedings, which continued over a period of at least 13 days, the city and Transit were engaged as adversaries in a proceeding by which Transit sought a fare increase and the city opposed it....