City of Minot v. Bjelland, Cr. N
Decision Date | 01 March 1990 |
Docket Number | Cr. N |
Citation | 452 N.W.2d 348 |
Parties | CITY OF MINOT, North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Gary D. BJELLAND, Defendant and Appellant. o. 890024. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark Ashley Flagstad (argued), Asst. State's Atty., Minot, for plaintiff and appellee.
Schoppert Law Firm, Minot, for defendant and appellant; argued by Thomas K. Schoppert.
Gary Bjelland appeals from a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. We affirm.
Bjelland's vehicle was stopped and he was arrested for driving under the influence. The arresting officer, in accordance with Section 29-05-31, N.D.C.C., issued a uniform traffic complaint and summons which listed the charged offense as:
"Drove under the Influence of an Intoxicating Beverage with a BAC at or greater than .10% in violation of N.D.C.C."
The uniform traffic summons and complaint also indicated that Bjelland was charged pursuant to Section 39-08-01, N.D.C.C., and Section 20-6(a)(18) of the Minot City Ordinances, which incorporates Section 39-08-01(1) and (2).
Bjelland was convicted in municipal court and appealed to county court. The City moved to amend the complaint in county court by striking the language referring to blood alcohol concentration. The motion was denied. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found Bjelland guilty of driving while under the influence.
Bjelland asserts on appeal that he was convicted of an offense other than the one with which he was charged. Specifically, he asserts that the complaint 1 charged him with a violation of Section 39-08-01(1)(a), N.D.C.C., the so-called "per se" statute, but that he was convicted under Section 39-08-01(1)(b), N.D.C.C., the "general" driving under the influence statute. Section 39-08-01 provides, in pertinent part:
Bjelland asserts that the language of the complaint charges only the "per se" violation of Section 39-08-01(1)(a), and that he therefore could not be convicted because the City presented no evidence of his blood alcohol concentration. In support of this argument, Bjelland relies upon his assertion that the complaint tracks the language of Section 39-08-01(1)(a). While it may be true that the last phrase of the charging language tracks subsection (1)(a), Bjelland ignores the fact that the first phrase of the complaint tracks the language of subsection (1)(b). It is not necessary to allege that the person drove while under the influence of intoxicating liquor to sustain a conviction of the "per se" offense. The crime created by subsection (1)(a) is driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10, without regard to its influence or effect upon the driver. Conversely, the crime created by subsection (1)(b) is driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, regardless of the driver's blood alcohol concentration. Violations of subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of Section 39-08-01 may be pleaded alternatively. See State v. Whitney, 377 N.W.2d 132, 133 (N.D.1985); State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601, 603 (N.D.1985).
In order to sufficiently charge an offense, a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential elements of the offense. See State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 629 (N.D.1989); Rule 7(c), N.D.R.Crim.P. In considering the sufficiency of a criminal pleading, technicalities have been abolished and it is only necessary to plead an offense in its usually designated name in plain, ordinary language. State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1, 6 (N.D.1977); State v. Medearis, 165 N.W.2d 688, 693 (N.D.1969). Bjelland does not assert that the complaint fails to plead essential elements of the general driving under the influence offense. The complaint contains a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential elements of driving under the influence, and pleads the offense in its usually designated name in plain, ordinary language.
We read the complaint as sufficient to alternatively plead violations of both subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b). Counsel for Bjelland candidly admitted at oral argument that, if the language following "beverage" were deleted from the complaint, it would adequately plead a violation of driving under the influence. Thus, under the circumstances presented in this case, we consider the additional language regarding blood alcohol concentration as mere surplusage.
Under similar circumstances this court has previously held that surplusage in a complaint does not subject it to dismissal:
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State v. Gray, 20160289
...the defendant of the charge in order to prepare his defenses. State v. Jelliff , 251 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D. 1977) ; City of Minot v. Bjelland , 452 N.W.2d 348, 351 (N.D. 1990). Criminal complaints phrased in statutory language have been held sufficient. Jelliff , at 5 (citing State v. Prince , 7......
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...information must contain a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential elements of the offense. City of Minot v. Bjelland, 452 N.W.2d 348, 350 (N.D.1990). In considering the sufficiency of a criminal information, technicalities have been abolished, and it is only necessa......
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