City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, No. 77-1844

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtMr. Justice STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE
Citation64 L.Ed.2d 47,100 S.Ct. 1490,446 U.S. 55
Decision Date19 March 1979
Docket NumberNo. 77-1844
PartiesCITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, et al., Appellants, v. Wiley L. BOLDEN et al

446 U.S. 55
100 S.Ct. 1490
64 L.Ed.2d 47
CITY OF MOBILE, ALABAMA, et al., Appellants,

v.

Wiley L. BOLDEN et al.

No. 77-1844.
Argued March 19, 1979.
Reargued Oct. 29, 1979.
Decided April 22, 1980.
Syllabus

Mobile, Ala., is governed by a Commission consisting of three members elected at large who jointly exercise all legislative, executive, and administrative power in the city. Appellees brought a class action in Federal District Court against the city and the incumbent Commissioners on behalf of all Negro citizens of the city, alleging, inter alia, that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although finding that Negroes in Mobile "register and vote without hindrance," the District Court nevertheless held that the at-large electoral system violated the Fifteenth Amendment and invidiously discriminated against Negroes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered that the Commission be disestablished and replaced by a Mayor and a Council elected from single-member districts. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held : The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. Pp. 61-80 (opinion of STEWART, J.); Pp. 80-83 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.); Pp. 83-94 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).

5th Cir., 571 F.2d 238, reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice STEWART, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice POWELL, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, concluded:

1. Mobile's at-large electoral system does not violate the rights of the city's Negro voters in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. The Amendment does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected but prohibits only purposefully discriminatory denial or abridgment by government of the freedom to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Here, having found that Negroes in Mobile register and vote without hindrance, the courts below erred in believing that appellants invaded the protection of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 61-65.

2. Nor does Mobile's at-large electoral system violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 65-80.

Page 56

(a) Only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. And this principle applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination. Pp. 66-68.

(b) Disproportionate effects alone are insufficient to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution. Where the character of a law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race, as would nearly always be true where, as here, an entire system of local governance is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose. Pp. 68-70.

(c) Even assuming that an at-large municipal electoral system such as Mobile's is constitutionally indistinguishable from the election of a few members of a state legislature in multimember districts, it is clear that the evidence in this case fell far short of showing that appellants "conceived or operated [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination," Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1872, 29 L.Ed.2d 363. Pp. 70-74.

(d) The Equal Protection Clause does not require proportional representation as an imperative of political organization. While the Clause confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters, this right does not protect any "political group," however defined, from electoral defeat. Since Mobile is a unitary electoral district and the Commission elections are conducted at large, there can be no claim that the "one person, one vote" principle has been violated, and therefore nobody's vote has been "diluted" in the sense in which that word was used in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506. Pp. 75-80.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN concluded that the relief afforded appellees by the District Court was not commensurate with the sound exercise of judicial discretion. The court at least should have considered alternative remedial orders to converting Mobile's government to a mayor-council system, and in failing to do so the court appears to have been overly concerned with eliminating at-large elections per se, rather than with structuring an electoral system that provided an opportunity for black voters to participate in the city's government on an equal footing with whites. Pp. 80-83.

Mr. Justice STEVENS concluded that the proper standard for adjudging the constitutionality of a political structure, such as Mobile's, that treats all individuals as equals but adversely affects the political strength of an identifiable minority group, is the same whether the minority is identified by a racial, ethnic, religious, or economic characteristic; that Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, suggests that the standard asks

Page 57

(1) whether the political structure is manifestly not the product of a routine or traditional decision, (2) whether it has a significant adverse impact on a minority group, and (3) whether it is unsupported by any neutral justification and thus was either totally irrational or entirely motivated by a desire to curtail the political strength of the minority; and that the standard focuses on the objective effects of the political decision rather than the subjective motivation of the decisionmaker. Under this standard the choice to retain Mobile's commission form of government must be accepted as constitutionally permissible even though the choice may well be the product of mixed motivation, some of which is invidious. Pp. 83-94.

Charles S. Rhyne, Washington, D. C., for appellants.

James U. Blacksher, Mobile, Ala., for appellees.

James P. Turner, Washington, D. C., for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of appellees.

Page 58

Mr. Justice STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice POWELL, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST joined.

The city of Mobile, Ala., has since 1911 been governed by a City Commission consisting of three members elected by the voters of the city at large. The question in this case is whether this at-large system of municipal elections violates the rights of Mobile's Negro voters in contravention of federal statutory or constitutional law.

The appellees brought this suit in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Alabama as a class action on behalf of all Negro citizens of Mobile.1 Named as defendants were the city and its three incumbent Commissioners, who are the appellants before this Court. The complaint alleged that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at large unfairly diluted the voting strength of Negroes in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of the Fifteenth Amendment. Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the constitutional rights of the appellees had been violated, entered a judgment in their favor, and ordered that the City Commission be disestablished and replaced by a municipal government consisting of a Mayor and a City Council with members elected from single-member districts. 423 F.Supp. 384.3 The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in its entirety, 5th Cir., 571 F.2d 238, agreeing that Mobile's at-large elections operated to discriminate against Negroes in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, id., at 245, and finding that the remedy formulated by the District Court was

Page 59

appropriate. An appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction, 439 U.S. 815, 99 S.Ct. 75, 58 L.Ed.2d 106. The case was originally argued in the 1978 Term, and was reargued in the present Term.

I

In Alabama, the form of municipal government a city may adopt is governed by state law. Until 1911, cities not covered by specific legislation were limited to governing themselves through a mayor and city council.4 In that year, the Alabama Legislature authorized every large municipality to adopt a commission form of government.5 Mobile established its City Commission in the same year, and has maintained that basic system of municipal government ever since.

The three Commissioners jointly exercise all legislative, executive and administrative power in the municipality. They are required after election to designate one of their number as Mayor, a largely ceremonial office, but no formal provision is made for allocating specific executive or administrative duties among the three.6 As required by the state law enacted in 1911, each candidate for the Mobile City Commission runs for election in the city at large for a term of four years in one of three numbered posts, and may be elected

Page 60

only by a majority of the total vote. This is the same basic electoral system that is followed by literally thousands of municipalities and other local governmental units throughout the Nation.7

II

Although required by general principles of judicial administration to do so, Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154, 89 L.Ed. 101; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (Brandeis, J., concurring), neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed the complaint's statutory claim—that the Mobile electoral system violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Even a cursory examination of that claim, however, clearly discloses that it adds nothing to the appellees' complaint.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:

"No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or...

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585 practice notes
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    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • March 25, 2021
    ...his right to vote. Moreover, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a plaintiff must allege invidious discrimination. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Plaintiff has failed to do so here. Finally, to the extent the alleged denial of the right to vote stems from HCSD and its board taki......
  • Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08–322.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 22, 2009
    ...state law that would limit a citizen's access to the ballot on one of the three bases enumerated in the Amendment. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion) (the Fifteenth Amendment guards against “purposefully discriminatory denial or a......
  • Holder, etc., et al. v. Hall, et al., 912012
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1994
    ...district is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect"); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1499, n. 12, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that single-member districts should be preferred in court-orde......
  • Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 2:15–cv–02193–LSC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama
    • January 10, 2018
    ...electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose"); City of Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55, 62, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions "confirm the principle that racially discriminatory moti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
582 cases
  • Gifford v. Kampa, No. 2:17-CV-2421-TLN-DMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • March 25, 2021
    ...his right to vote. Moreover, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a plaintiff must allege invidious discrimination. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Plaintiff has failed to do so here. Finally, to the extent the alleged denial of the right to vote stems from HCSD and its board taki......
  • Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, No. 08–322.
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 22, 2009
    ...state law that would limit a citizen's access to the ballot on one of the three bases enumerated in the Amendment. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion) (the Fifteenth Amendment guards against “purposefully discriminatory denial or a......
  • Holder, etc., et al. v. Hall, et al., 912012
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1994
    ...district is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect"); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66, n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1499, n. 12, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion) (noting that single-member districts should be preferred in court-orde......
  • Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 2:15–cv–02193–LSC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Alabama
    • January 10, 2018
    ...electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose"); City of Mobile v. Bolden , 446 U.S. 55, 62, 100 S.Ct. 1519, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions "confirm the principle that racially discriminatory moti......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
8 books & journal articles
  • Indigenous Subjects.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 131 Nbr. 8, June 2022
    • June 1, 2022
    ...was either motivated by racial consideration or in fact drew the districts on racial lines); see also City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980) (Stewart, J., plurality) ("[O]nly if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause ......
  • Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and Actions to Promote Environmental Justice
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter Nbr. 39-3, March 2009
    • March 1, 2009
    ...strict scrutiny to choices between communities apply as readily to racial as economic classiications. 80. See City of Mobile v. Bolden 446 U.S. 55, 79 n.26 (1980) (rejecting claim for equal treatment of “political groups,” noting practical diiculties of determining “geographic location” of ......
  • YOU CAN'T HAVE YOUR VOTE AND DILUTE IT TOO: CLOSING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LOOPHOLE IN GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS.
    • United States
    • William and Mary Law Review Vol. 63 Nbr. 3, February 2022
    • February 1, 2022
    ...vote. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 187 (2008). (42.) Li & Rudensky, supra note 24, at 720-21. (43.) 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) (holding that section 2 "was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment (44.) Id. at 58. (45.) ......
  • Formulating Voting Rights Act Remedies to Address Current Conditions
    • United States
    • American Politics Research Nbr. 42-3, May 2014
    • May 1, 2014
    ...against them, showing only discriminatory effect. This amendment effectively overruled the Court’s opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) that Section 2 required plaintiffs to show intentional 12. See for example U.S. v. Charleston County, 318 F.Supp.2d 302 (D.S.C. 2002).13......
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