City of Montgomery v. Hunter

• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Docket Number: 1170959
• Citation: 319 So.3d 1213
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: The CITY OF MONTGOMERY and American Traffic Solutions, Inc. v. Charles HUNTER and Mike Henderson

319 So.3d 1213

The CITY OF MONTGOMERY and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

v.Charles HUNTER and Mike Henderson

1170959

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 1, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 28, 2020

Robert E. Poundstone IV and George R. Parker of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Montgomery; and Marc James Ayers and J. Thomas Richie of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Birmingham, for appellant the City of Montgomery.

Joseph Jay Minus, Jr., and Day Peake III of Phelps Dunbar LLP, Mobile; and Kim M. Boyle and Allen C. Miller of Phelps Dunbar LLP, New Orleans, Louisiana, for appellant American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

J. Doyle Fuller and Susan G. Copeland of Fuller & Copeland, Montgomery, for appellees.

BOLIN, Justice.

The City of Montgomery ("the City") and American Traffic Solutions, Inc. ("ATS") (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"), were granted a permissive appeal from an order of the Montgomery Circuit Court denying their motion to dismiss a complaint, seeking, among other things, a declaratory judgment, filed by Charles Hunter and Mike Henderson (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs"), individuals who were cited for traffic violations. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged a local municipal ordinance authorizing the use of cameras for issuing traffic citations. The plaintiffs claimed that Act No. 2009-740, Ala. Acts 2009, and sections of the Montgomery Municipal Code allowing for the ticketing of drivers who are photographed proceeding through red lights violate §§ 89, 104, and 105, Ala. Const. 1901.

Facts and Procedural History

On April 27, 2015, Hunter ran a red light at an intersection within the corporate limits of the City. At some point "within the past two years," Henderson also ran a red light at another intersection within the corporate limits of the City. The automated-camera equipment at the intersections detected and photographed the plaintiffs' vehicles running the red lights. ATS installed and currently maintains, pursuant to an agreement with the City, the equipment that photographed both plaintiffs' vehicles. As a result, both Hunter and Henderson received civil citations.

On August 7, 2015, Hunter, individually and on behalf of a putative class of individuals who had received notice of violation pursuant to the local Act, sued the City and ATS, challenging sections of the Montgomery Municipal Code allowing ticketing of drivers by cameras and alleging that the City's issuance of citations pursuant to those sections violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Hunter sought to represent those persons who had been ticketed and had paid the fine. The defendants removed the case from state court to federal court. On February 3, 2016, Hunter filed an amended complaint, which added Henderson as a plaintiff and omitted any federal constitutional claims against the defendants. Henderson sought to represent those persons who had been ticketed but who had not paid the fine.

Upon determining that there were no federal claims remaining and that the Class Action Fairness Act was inapplicable, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama remanded the case to the Montgomery Circuit Court. The defendants appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Montgomery Circuit Court stayed the case during the pendency of that appeal. On June 14, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case, specifically holding that ATS was not a primary defendant and that, therefore, the home-state exception to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B), was applicable. Hunter v. City of Montgomery, 859 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2017).

On July 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint in the Montgomery Circuit Court. On July 20, 2017, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed a response, and the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Shortly after the hearing, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint. On June 7, 2018, the circuit court entered an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss.

On July 3, 2018, the circuit court entered an order granting a joint petition for a permissive appeal. On October 1, 2018, this Court granted in part the petition for permission to appeal.¹

Standard of Review

" ‘A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002). We must also view the allegations of the complaint most strongly in the pleader's favor to determine whether it appears the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle the pleader [to] relief. Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299. Furthermore, we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail on the complaint but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Id.

" ‘For a declaratory-judgment action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona fide justiciable controversy that should be settled. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) ; Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424, 427 (1975). The test for the sufficiency of a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is whether the pleader is entitled to a declaration of rights at all, not whether the pleader will prevail in the declaratory-judgment action. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

" ‘The lack of a justiciable controversy may be raised by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment. Smith, 309 So. 2d at 427. See also Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, a motion to dismiss is rarely appropriate in a declaratory-judgment action. Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978). If there is a justiciable controversy at the commencement of the declaratory-judgment action, the motion to dismiss should be overruled and a declaration of rights made only after an answer has been submitted and evidence has been presented. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641. However, if there is not a justiciable controversy, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted. Curjel v. Ash, 263 Ala. 585, 83 So. 2d 293, 296 (1955).’

" Harper v. Brown, Stagner, Richardson, Inc., 873 So. 2d 220, 223 (Ala. 2003)."

Muhammad v. Ford, 986 So. 2d 1158, 1161-62 (Ala. 2007).

State and Local Law

A. Statutory Law

Chapter 45, Title 11, Alabama Code 1975, sets forth certain requirements for the adoption and enforcement of municipal ordinances. Section 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"Municipal corporations may from time to time adopt ordinances and resolutions not inconsistent with the laws of the state to carry into effect or discharge the powers and duties conferred by the applicable provisions of this title and any other applicable provisions of law and to provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, order, comfort, and convenience of the inhabitants of the municipality, and may enforce obedience to such ordinances."

The Alabama Traffic Code, § 32-5A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, governs the rules of the road throughout the State. Section 32-5A-31, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"The driver of any vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device applicable thereto placed in accordance with law, unless otherwise directed by a police officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle in this chapter."

Section 32-5A-32, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"(3) Steady red indication:

"a. Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red signal alone shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on either side of the intersection, or if none, then before entering the intersection and shall remain standing until an indication to proceed is shown ...."

Section 32-5A-8, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this chapter or of Title 32, unless such violation is by this chapter or other law of this state declared to be a felony.

"(b) Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter for which another penalty is not provided, shall for a first conviction thereof be punished by a fine of not more than $100 or by imprisonment for not more than 10 days; for conviction of a second offense committed within one year after the date of the first offense, such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $200.00 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 days or by both such fine and imprisonment; for conviction of a third or subsequent offense committed within one year after the date of the first offense, such person shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500.00 or by imprisonment for not more than three months or by both such fine and imprisonment."

In addition, § 32-5A-11, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[t]his chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of various jurisdictions."

The uniform procedure for traffic citations issued by a law-enforcement agency or any other person is set forth in § 12-12-53, Ala. Code 1975, which provides:

"(a) Every law enforcement agency in the state shall use traffic citations of the form known as the uniform traffic ticket and complaint, which shall be substantially uniform throughout the state and which shall be issued, except for an electronic traffic ticket or e-ticket, as defined in Section 32-1-4, in books with citations in no less than quadruplicate.

"(b) The uniform traffic ticket and complaint shall be used in traffic cases where a complaint is made by a law enforcement officer or by any other person or an

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