City of N. Myrtle Beach v. E. Cherry Grove Realty Co.

• Citation: 397 S.C. 497,725 S.E.2d 676
• Decision Date: 24 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 27113.,27113.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: CITY OF NORTH MYRTLE BEACH, Respondent, v. EAST CHERRY GROVE REALTY CO., LLC, The State of South Carolina, and John Doe, Defendants, Of whom East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC is the Appellant, and The State of South Carolina is Respondent.

397 S.C. 497

725 S.E.2d 676

CITY OF NORTH MYRTLE BEACH, Respondent,

v.EAST CHERRY GROVE REALTY CO., LLC, The State of South Carolina, and John Doe, Defendants,Of whom East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC is the Appellant,andThe State of South Carolina is Respondent.

No. 27113.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 8, 2012.

Decided April 11, 2012.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 2012.

Gene M. Connell, Jr., of Kelaher, Connell & Connor, of Surfside Beach, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson and Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Emory Smith, Jr., of Columbia, and Michael W. Battle, of Battle, Vaught & Howe, of Conway, for Respondents.

Justice PLEICONES.

Appellant East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC, appeals from a jury verdict finding that the State of South Carolina holds title to disputed canals in North Myrtle Beach. The question was submitted to the jury on three theories: that two quitclaim deeds established title in the canals; that the canals had been dedicated to the public; and that the State of South Carolina holds title to the canals in trust for the public. The jury returned a verdict for the State on all three theories. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's motions for directed verdict on each theory. We find that the question of ownership under the quitclaim deeds was properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirm.[ ¹]

FACTS

In 1961, the State of South Carolina (State) filed suit against the predecessors in interest of East Cherry Grove Realty, LLC (collectively, East Cherry Grove), seeking to establish its title to all tidal lands in the East Cherry Grove area of North Myrtle Beach. In 1963, a consent order stipulated that certain property was not a subject of the suit and exempt from a temporary injunction that prevented East Cherry Grove from selling any property below the mean high-water mark.[ ²] The order provided in relevant part that

Since this action was filed[,] the title to certain property not intended by the [State] to be included in this suit, has been questioned.... In order that the title to this property (that above the unquestioned mean high water mark) could be quieted a survey was made....

Ordered[,] that all the land lying between said ... “estimated line of Demarcation between upland and marsh land” ... and the Atlantic Ocean is hereby released and is declared not to be involved in nor within the scope of the above entitled action as it is and was above the mean high water mark of the adjacent tidal water prior to any alleged artificial changing of the level of the land or of the waterway.

After a bench trial, the trial judge ruled in favor of East Cherry Grove. However, in 1969, while the case was on appeal to this Court, the parties negotiated a settlement. As part of the settlement, the parties exchanged quitclaim deeds. These deeds defined an “agreed-on mean high water mark” by metes and bounds, which appeared as a bold line enclosing an area of marshlands on the related plat. The agreed mean high-water mark referred to in these deeds is not coterminous with the “Estimated Line of Demarcation” used in the 1963 order. The deeds quitclaimed all of the land “below” that mark, i.e., the land within the bold line (State's Land), to the State and all of the land “above” that mark, i.e., the land between the marshlands and the oceanfront (East Cherry Grove's Land), to East Cherry Grove. The deed from East Cherry Grove to the State contains additional language as follows:

That all areas lying below the agreed mean high water mark on Northeast Canal, Nixon Canal, proposed Nixon Canal Extension, Main Channel, Nye Cut and all other existing canals are quitclaimed to the State of South Carolina, except that: It is understood and agreed that Nye Cut will remain open until Main Channel (“proposed relocationof Creek”) between 25th Avenue and Nixon Canal has been cut, at which time C.D. Nixon, et al, will have the right to build a bridge at either 22nd Avenue or 23rd Avenue across Main Channel, and close Nye Cut, all as shown on the said plat; and title to land proposed to be closed will remain in C.D. Nixon, et al.

That all areas that become areas lying below the mean high water mark as the result of excavation above the agreed mean high water mark are quit-claimed to the State of South Carolina.

The quitclaim deeds were approved and made part of a 1969 court order ending the original litigation. The 1969 order also stated that it did not affect the 1963 order.

The parties agree that the canals have been open to public use at all times since their construction.

Respondent City of North Myrtle Beach (City) brought the present lawsuit against East Cherry Grove, LLC (Appellant), and the State to settle title to the canal bottoms located in the property deeded to East Cherry Grove in the 1969 settlement. The City asserted that the State held title to the canal bottoms, a position in which the State concurred. (Hereinafter the City and State are jointly designated Respondents.) At the conclusion of a jury trial, the trial court denied Appellant's motions for a directed verdict. The jury returned a special verdict with separate findings that the State has title in the canals based on the quitclaim deeds; that East Cherry Grove had dedicated the canals to the public; and that the State holds title to the canals in trust for the public. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err when it failed to find the 1963 order conclusive on the issue of ownership and found the quitclaim deeds ambiguous?

2. Did the trial court err when it failed to find that the State is estopped to deny the 1963 order?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The nature of the underlying issue determines the nature of a suit for declaratory judgment. Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991). The determination of title to real property is an action at law. Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 367 S.E.2d 156 (1988). In reviewing an action at law tried to a jury, the Court's jurisdiction extends only to the correction of errors of law, and a factual finding of the jury will not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses that there is no evidence that reasonably supports the jury's findings. Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976). Questions of law are decided with no particular deference to the trial court. Wiegand v. U.S. Automobile Association, 391 S.C. 159, 163, 705 S.E.2d 432, 434 (2011).

DISCUSSION

Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously refused to grant it a directed verdict because title to the canals was unambiguously established in East Cherry Grove in the court-approved settlement of prior litigation. We disagree.

On the first theory submitted to it, the jury found that the State owns the canals under the quitclaim deeds. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant's motion for a directed verdict and submitted this question to the jury. Appellant argues in the alternative that the trial court should have found that the 1963 order was conclusive on the issue of ownership; that the quitclaim deeds unambiguously quitclaimed all interest in the canals to East Cherry Grove; and that the State is estopped by the 1963 order from claiming ownership of the canals. We find no error.

1. Did the trial court err when it failed to find the 1963 order conclusive on the issue of ownership and found the quitclaim deeds ambiguous?

Appellant argues that the 1963 order is conclusive on the issue of ownership under the quitclaim deeds because it effectively eliminates contradictory language from the quitclaim deeds, rendering them unambiguous,or, in the alternative, that the language of the quitclaim deeds unambiguously conveys all interest in the canals to East Cherry Grove. We disagree.

“As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments. The determinative factor is the intent of the court, as gathered, not from an isolated part thereof, but from all the parts of the judgment itself. Hence, in construing a judgment, it should be examined and considered in its entirety. If the language employed is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction or interpretation, and the effect thereof must be declared in the light of the literal meaning of the language used.” Weil v. Weil, 299 S.C. 84, 90, 382 S.E.2d 471, 474 (Ct.App.1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the original suit was ultimately settled by the 1969 order, which incorporated the parties' quitclaim deeds and stated that it did not affect the 1963 order. Thus, the 1963 order and quitclaim deeds must be interpreted as parts of a single, court-approved settlement agreement.

The 1963 consent order does contain language arguably implying that most property in the area of East Cherry Grove's Land as established in the deeds is titled in East Cherry Grove. Appellant construes this language as both the State's admission that it had no claim to that land in 1963 and the court's ratification in 1969 that none of East Cherry Grove's Land would be quitclaimed to the State by virtue of the settlement agreement. We disagree.

Viewed in isolation, the 1969 reference to the 1963 order is susceptible of this interpretation. As explained below, however,construing all of the documents together we find the settlement at least ambiguous as to ownership of the canal bottoms. First, this argument ignores the fact that the land was divided by one line, the Estimated Line of Demarcation, in the 1963 order and by a different line, the agreed-on mean high water mark, in the deeds. Second, Appellant's argument ignores the fact that when parties settle a lawsuit, either may include property or other concessions not a part of the original suit. In other words, whatever land was involved in the original suit, the settlement was not necessarily limited to that property. The court might...