City of Nevada v. Bastow, 22964

• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
• Citation: 328 S.W.2d 45
• Docket Number: No. 22964,22964
• Parties: CITY OF NEVADA, Missouri, Respondent, v. Rex W. BASTOW, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 05 October 1959

Page 45

328 S.W.2d 45

CITY OF NEVADA, Missouri, Respondent, v. Rex W. BASTOW, Appellant.

No. 22964.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Oct. 5, 1959.

Everett E. Teel, Nevada, for appellant.

Amos Wight, Nevada, for respondent.

MAUGHMER, Commissioner.

Appellant was charged with failure to register and purchase a city license for his tractor-trailer truck as required by ordinance of the City of Nevada, Missouri. He was found guilty by the Police Court. On appeal he was found guilty by the Circuit Court and his punishment fixed at a fine of $2 and costs. An appeal therefrom has been duly perfected to this court.

The case was tried and submitted under an Agreed Statement of Facts, the pertinent provisions of which are: The City of Nevada, Missouri is a city of the third class and as such is authorized by ordinance to levy and collect licenses taxes on owners of motor vehicles residing in said city, except that no such license tax may be collected from a resident for a motor vehicle used exclusively outside of such municipality. Sections 94.110 and 301.340, V.A.M.S. During the year 1957, Ordinance No. 2249, City of Nevada, was in full force and effect. This ordinance provided that every resident owner of a motor vehicle which shall be driven or operated on any street in the city shall cause the same to be registered with the city collector, furnish description of same, address of owner and state license plate. It provided further that upon such registration the owner should pay an 'Annual license tax' of $5. The penalty provided for noncompliance was a fine of not more than $100.

It was further stipulated that defendant (appellant) was at all times involved herein a resident of Nevada, Missouri; owned and operated a tractor-trailer truck; his occupation was that of trucking, with headquarters in said city; he hauls cedar posts from Arkansas to Iowa and other states, and grain and other farm products from Iowa to Arkansas and adjoining states; that he does not pick up or discharge cargoes in the City of Nevada, but while he is at home the truck is parked on a vacant lot in said city, and that while so parked, it is sometimes loaded and sometimes unloaded. It was further agreed that defendant at all times operated under State Permit No. T-13976, issued by the Public Service Commission of Missouri, which authorized him to operate this truck on the highways of Missouri. It was admitted that defendant's city license on said truck expired June 30, 1957, and at the times he was charged and tried, was not licensed under this city ordinance.

On appeal defendant presents two points of error, namely: First, that under Section 301.340, V.A.M.S., he is exempted from these provisions of the ordinance because his truck is used exclusively outside the City of Nevada and, second, that under Section 390.126, V.A.M.S., the city is forbidden to levy and collect such license tax on a truck which is operating under authority of the Public Service Commission of Missouri and defendant is therefore exempt from the ordinance provision in this respect.

Section 301.340, V.A.M.S., provides in part: 'Municipalities, by ordinance, may levy and collect license taxes from the owners of and dealers in motor vehicles, residing in such municipalities * * *. No municipal license tax shall be collected from a resident of any municipality for motor vehicles used exclusively outside of such municipality * * *.'

In 33 C.J.S. p. 112, Exclusive, it is stated: 'The word is derived from 'ex,' out, and 'claudere,' to shut, and precludes the idea of coexistence. In its usual and generally accepted sense, as given by lexicographers, and in the ordinary speech of the people it means possessed to the exclusion of others; possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any other; * * *.'

In 82 C.J.S. Statutes Sec. 382, pp. 891, 892, 893, we find the following: 'Exceptions in a statute, as a general rule, should be strictly construed, and, at the same time, exceptions should be reasonably construed; they extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exception.' We do not believe that defendant's motor vehicle was 'used exclusively outside of such municipality', within contemplation of the statute. Whatever office facilities he had for the conduct of his trucking business were inside the city. In the operation of defendant's affairs the truck was regularly, not just occasionally, parked within Nevada when it was empty. Even when loaded and en route between Iowa and Arkansas it was his common practice to drive into Nevada and park the vehicle over night or longer. He regularly and in these respects used the city streets and regularly parked within the city. All of this constituted usage of the truck and was a part of the trucking operation. We rule the first point against appellant.

Defendant's second point presents a more serious question. By Chapter 390, V.A.M.S., the legislature undertook the 'Regulation of Motor Carriers and Contract Haulers.' To do this it set up the Public Service Commission, an expert board, to promote and conserve the interests and convenience of the public and authorized this Board, within prescribed limits, to promulgate rules and regulations, compliance with which are prerequisite to licensing as contract haulers. Extra state licenses and fees are assessed against these common, contract or private carriers, the amounts of which depend upon the type of permit, the size of the vehicle and the load weight. Secs. 301.030 and 301.060, V.A.M.S.

Section 390.126, subd. 2, V.A.M.S., of this chapter reads: 'No other or additional policies, bonds or licenses than...