City of New Brunswick v. Speights

• Decision Date: 14 February 1978
• Parties: CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, Plaintiff, v. Ronald SPEIGHTS, Defendant. (Criminal), New Jersey
• Court: New Jersey County Court

Page 9

157 N.J.Super. 9

384 A.2d 225

CITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, Plaintiff, v. Ronald SPEIGHTS, Defendant.

Middlesex County Court, Law Division (Criminal), New Jersey.

Feb. 14, 1978.

Michael R. Justin, Perth Amboy, for defendant (Rodriguez, Justin & Jess, Perth Amboy, attorneys).

Joseph E. Sadofski, Asst. City Atty., for plaintiff (Gilbert L. Nelson, City Atty.).

ROCKOFF, J. C. C.

This opinion is addressed to a motion to suppress evidence filed by Ronald Speights pursuant to R.3:5-7. Speights seeks to have certain evidence declared inadmissible at an anticipated Department of Civil Service disciplinary action in which Speights can be sanctioned by permanent removal from his position as a police officer with the City of New Brunswick as well as loss of back pay from the date of his initial suspension, December 19, 1975. This motion reveals a series of novel questions of constitutional dimension which require discussion and disposition.

Speights has previously been convicted in a federal court criminal proceeding involving the charge of illegal possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. On appeal, United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (3 Cir. 1977), the court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded, holding in part that criminal evidence (i. e., the shotgun) was improperly admitted at the trial in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and that the Federal District Court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was reversible error.

Subsequent to the termination of the aforementioned criminal proceeding Speights received notice of the presently pending disciplinary hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 11:22-38 and Rule 4:1-16.8 of the Civil Service Rules of the New Jersey Administrative Code. Speights is therein charged with threatening to take a life (N.J.S.A. 2A:113-8), breaking and entering with an intention to steal (N.J.S.A. 2A:194-1) larceny over $500 (N.J.S.A. 2A:119-2) and illegal possession of a sawed-off shotgun (N.J.S.A. 2A:151-16). It is clear from the record that no administrative determination has been made and no hearing has yet been conducted.

Petitioner argues that the penal nature of the administrative proceedings requires the Middlesex County Court, Criminal Division, to hear this motion. He further argues that since the evidence to be required at the hearing is the same evidence suppressed by the federal court in the prior criminal action, this evidence must be suppressed by this court and its use at the hearing barred to assure him the continuing protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution as made applicable to the states by the litany of cases commencing with Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

In support of his arguments Speights points to the language of R. 3:5-7 of our Rules of Court:

* * * a person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure and having reasonable grounds to believe that the evidence obtained may be used against him in penal proceedings, may apply only to the Superior Court or county court of the county in which the evidence was obtained to suppress the evidence. * * * (Emphasis supplied)

He thus asserts that this court is the only forum in which his arguments for suppression may be heard because of the "penal" consequences of the disciplinary hearing.

Before resolving the issue of whether petitioner's arguments misconstrue the scope of the Rules and the nature of the proceeding in which a motion to suppress may properly be brought, this court is compelled to address itself to the novel question raised herein, to wit: Does the exclusionary rule of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments apply to an administrative hearing of this type? Also of novel import in New Jersey is the question of whether evidence is admissible at a state civil-administrative hearing when the same evidence was excluded in a prior federal criminal proceeding.

The applicability of the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings has evoked enormous controversy. See Annotation, 5 A.L.R.3d 670. The controversy is in part due to the relaxed rules of evidence applicable to administrative proceedings in general, as well as the paucity of cases dealing with the issue. 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 380 (1962); McCormick, Evidence, § 168 [384 A.2d 228] at 370-71 (1972). Nevertheless, it is apparent that those jurisdictions which have been faced with this question have based their decisions on two factors warranting analysis herein: (1) the deterrent policy of the exclusionary rule and (2) the nature of the penalty to be imposed The guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are applicable to law enforcement and government officials seeking to enforce criminal statutes. Mapp v. Ohio, supra. The Supreme Court has established that the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful governmental conduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). See also, United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). Although it has been held that state courts can impose higher standards of conduct in preserving the guarantees of the rule by way of interpretation of state constitutions, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the policy of the rule as enumerated by the Supreme Court is no different under state law. State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. Cymerman, 135 N.J.Super. 591, 343 A.2d 825 (Law Div.1975); State v. Droutman, 143 N.J.Super. 322, 362 A.2d 1304 (Law Div.1976).

The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it. (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)).

An extension of the policy of the exclusionary rule to the realm of a civil proceeding no doubt derives from the seminal case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), where the rule was held applicable to a civil forfeiture of property. However, evolution of the rule has been one of limitation rather than growth.

Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. * * * (Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620 It is therefore necessary, in line with the above authority, to analyze whether the policy of the exclusionary rule will be efficaciously served by its application to a civil disciplinary hearing. The problem in the instant matter becomes more complex because the evidence in question herein was not seized for the immediate scrutiny of the administrative tribunal or by administrative agents. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Rather, it is sought to be excluded from a state civil proceeding because it was suppressed at a prior federal criminal proceeding.

In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976), the Supreme Court held that exclusion from federal tax proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by a state law enforcement officer was unjustified in light of the overriding policy limitations of the exclusionary rule. The court reasoned that because this was an "intersovereign" matter, the deterrent effect of exclusion of relevant evidence was so weakened and reduced that to "punish" the law enforcement officer by removing the evidence from a civil suit in a different sovereign would violate this policy. The court found that exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal proceeding adequately satisfied the policy of the exclusionary rule. Extension of the rule to the civil matter was held "an unjustifiably drastic action by the courts in the pursuit of what is an undesired and undesirable supervisory role over police officers." 428 U.S. at 458, 96 S.Ct. at 3034. The court limited its holding to circumstances involving said "intersovereign" violations. 428 U.S. at 456, n. 31, 96 S.Ct. 3021.

A second factor applied by some courts that have had to deal with civil matters where the exclusionary rule was considered applicable was the nature of the sanction to be imposed. Although termination of employment proceedings are clearly "civil" in form, In re Darcy, 114 N.J.Super. 454, 277 A.2d 226 (App.Div.1971); Sabia v. Elizabeth, 132 N.J.Super. 6, 331 A.2d 620 (App.Div.1975); Kelly v. Sterr, 119 N.J.Super 272, 291 A.2d 148 (App.Div.1972), aff'd 62 N.J. 105, 299 A.2d 390 (1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 822, 94 S.Ct. 122, 38 L.Ed.2d 55 (1973), the penalty to be imposed is a factor which may require a finding that the proceeding is sufficiently "quasi -criminal" to justify the application of certain criminal procedures. Often this finding presupposes a determination by the court as to whether the administrative proceeding is "penal" as opposed to "regulatory." McCormick, Evidence, § 167 at 370-71 (1972); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law, §§ 380, 381 (1962). A court should consider whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether the sanction is historically regarded as punishment, whether a finding of scienter is required, whether the imposition of the sanction will promote the aims of punishment retribution and deterrence and whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-9, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) (deportation proceeding).

An analysis of the few cases nationwide on the subject is valuable to appreciate the...