City of New Haven v. Freedom of Information Com'n

Citation535 A.2d 1297,205 Conn. 767
Decision Date12 January 1988
Docket Number13145,Nos. 13144,s. 13144
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
PartiesCITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

Marianne D. Smith, Asst. Gen. Counsel, with whom, on brief, was Mitchell W. Pearlman, Gen. Counsel, Hartford, for appellant (named defendant).

Richard F. Orr, with whom, on brief, was Ben A. Solnit, New Haven, for appellant (defendant Susan M. Stone).

Martin S. Echter, Deputy Corp. Counsel, New Haven, for appellees (plaintiffs).

Before SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

These are consolidated appeals by the defendants, the freedom of information commission (hereinafter commission) and Susan Stone, from a judgment of the Superior Court, Schaller, J., that reversed, in part, the final order of the commission. The final order required the city of New Haven to provide Susan Stone "with copies of invoices for services rendered by the law firm of Beveridge and Diamond and by any other law firm or attorney retained for the purpose of litigating claims pertaining to the East Shore wastewater treatment plant." The two issues raised in these appeals are (1) whether the trial court exceeded the permissible scope of judicial review of the final order of the commission, and, if not, (2) whether invoices that bear only the name of the firm and the amount billed from law firms that rendered legal services to the city of New Haven in connection with the East Shore wastewater treatment plant are exempt from disclosure under Connecticut's Freedom of Information Act as "records pertaining to strategy and negotiations" under General Statutes § 1-19(b)(4).

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In the mid-1970s the named plaintiff, the city of New Haven, entered into a series of contracts for the construction of the East Shore wastewater treatment plant. When the construction of the plant had been substantially completed in 1982, the city took possession of it and began operations. The plant did not function properly and shortly thereafter the city entered into a series of arbitrations with the general contractor. Upon the unfavorable termination of the arbitration proceedings, the city brought separate federal actions against Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc., the consulting engineer of the project, and Zimpro, Inc., a chief supplier of component parts.

In February, 1986, Stone sent a letter to the public information/public advocacy office of the city and town of New Haven, and in accordance with General Statutes § 1-19(a) 1 requested the following: "As the result of constructing the East Shore sewage treatment plant, the City of New Haven has been, and continues to be, involved in legal proceedings relating to the construction of that facility. I hereby request that you provide copies of all invoices from any attorney or law firm retained or consulted by the city in conjunction with any legal proceeding, whether an arbitration or litigation, connected with the construction of that facility. This request includes, but is not limited to, invoices from the law firm of Beveridge and Diamond." The letter went on specifically to limit the information requested to only the name of the attorney or law firm submitting the invoice, and the total amount of the invoice. The city did not respond to Stone's letter, whereupon she filed a letter of complaint with the commission pursuant to General Statutes § 1-21i(b). 2 At the time Stone sent the letter of request to the city, she was employed as an associate with the law firm which has been representing Zimpro, Inc., in the federal actions filed by the city and which represents her in connection with the present appeal.

At the administrative hearing conducted by Commissioner E. Bartlett Barnes as the hearing officer, the city argued that the information was exempt from disclosure as: (1) attorney-client communications within General Statutes § 1-19(b)(10); 3 (2) attorney work product; and (3) records pertaining to strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims and litigation under General Statutes § 1-19(b)(4). 4 Barnes rejected all of the city's arguments and in a proposed written decision he found that the city had violated General Statutes §§ 1-15 5 and 1-19(a) by refusing to disclose the invoices. The freedom of information commission adopted Barnes' findings and conclusions and issued a "Notice of Final Decision" that ordered the city to provide Stone with the requested information from the invoices.

The city and the public information/public advocacy office of the city and town of New Haven took timely appeals from the final order of the commission pursuant to General Statutes §§ 1-21i(d) 6 and 4-183(a). 7 The trial court, Schaller, J., held that, while the requested invoices are not exempt from disclosure as attorney-client communications or attorney work product, they are exempt from disclosure as "records pertaining to strategy and negotiations" under General Statutes § 1-19(b)(4). The trial court found: "The plaintiff[s] [are] correct in stating that access to the requested information would allow [the city's] adversaries to 'balance the amounts spent, the rate of expenditure and the course and posture of litigation proceedings against the amount of exposure in damages supported by the evidence revealed in discovery.' This process would result in a 'highly informed judgment about the negotiating posture and strategy of the City.' That type of advantage is what the exemption under section 1-19(b)(4) was designed to prevent." The trial court also balanced the public's interest in its right to know against its need for confidentiality during the pendency of litigation and held that "the public interest is best served by preventing the public's legal adversaries from obtaining an advantage in the ongoing litigations." Accordingly, the trial court sustained the plaintiffs' appeals and reversed the final decision of the commission.

The appeals of the commission and Stone from the decision of the trial court were transferred to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023. The defendants argue that the trial court erred in reversing the final decision of the commission because it (1) exceeded the permissible scope of judicial review and (2) expanded the narrow scope of the exemption under § 1-19(b)(4) by holding that the invoices requested pertained to strategy and negotiations. We find error.

The defendants first argue that the trial court exceeded the scope of judicial review as set forth in General Statutes § 4-183. Specifically, they argue that the commission's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence on the record as a whole, and thus, the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the commission as to a question of fact. The city, however, argues that the trial court properly concluded that the commission's decision was affected by an error in statutory interpretation which is a question of law and a matter for the courts.

" 'Judicial review of [an administrative agency's] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted. Lawrence v. Kozlowski, 171 Conn. 705, [707-708,] 372 A.2d 110 (1976) [cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2930, 53 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1977) ]. Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant.' C & H Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 176 Conn. 11, 12, 404 A.2d 864 (1978); DiBenedetto v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 168 Conn. 587, 589, 362 A.2d 840 (1975); see General Statutes § 4-183(g). 'The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of [its] discretion.' Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 322, 439 A.2d 1008 (1981); Riley v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 178 Conn. 438, 441, 423 A.2d 87 (1979); see also Persico v. Maher, 191 Conn. 384, 409, 465 A.2d 308 (1983)." Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 3, 509 A.2d 489 (1986).

In reversing the final decision of the commission, the trial court found that the decision was affected by an error of law in that the commission misinterpreted § 1-19(b)(4). Ordinarily, the construction and interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the courts where the administrative decision is not entitled to special deference, particularly where, as here, the statute has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny or time-tested agency interpretations. Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 202 Conn. 583, 599, 522 A.2d 771 (1987); Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dubno, 202 Conn. 412, 423, 521 A.2d 569 (1987); see also Board of Education v. Board of Labor Relations, 201 Conn. 685, 698-99, 519 A.2d 41 (1986); Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission 81 Conn. 324, 342-43, 435 A.2d 353 (1980). Nevertheless, " '[j]udicial review of the conclusions of law reached administratively is also limited. The court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.' " (Emphasis added.) Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986); Burnham v. Administrator, supra, 184 Conn. at 322, 439 A.2d 1008. Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. Finkenstein v. Administrator, 192 Conn. 104, 112-13, 470 A.2d 1196 (1984); Robinson v. Unemployment Security Board of Review, 181 Conn. 1, 5, 434...

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