City of New Orleans v. Pontchartrain Railroad Co., And Spanish Fort Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 01 May 1889
• Docket Number: 10,279
• Citation: 7 So. 83,41 La.Ann. 519
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. PONTCHARTRAIN RAILROAD COMPANY AND SPANISH FORT RAILROAD COMPANY

7 So. 83

41 La.Ann. 519

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS v. PONTCHARTRAIN RAILROAD COMPANY AND SPANISH FORT RAILROAD COMPANY

No. 10,279

Supreme Court of Louisiana

May 1, 1889

APPEAL from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans. King, J.

W. B Sommerville, Assistant City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellee.

Harry H. Hall and Bayne, Denegre & Bayne, for Defendants and Appellants.

OPINION

FENNER, J.

This suit involves a contestation as the constitutionality and legality of the license taxes levied on the defendants by the City of New Orleans under her ordinances Nos. 2035 of 1887 and 2661 of 1888.

The answer of defendants sets up various grounds of illegality and unconstitutionality, but all have been abandoned in this court except the following:

1. It is charged that the license taxes claimed are not graduated and are not equal and uniform as to all corporations transacting the same kind of business, being thereby violative of Article 217 of the Constitution.

A reference to Article 217 will show that it applies exclusively to foreign corporations, and not to domestic ones such as the defendants.

The other objections to the mode of graduation and want of equality and uniformity are met and silenced by our recent decisions on these questions. State and City vs Traders' Bank, 41 Ann.; State vs. Ins. Co., 40 Ann. 464; State vs. Marrero, 38 Ann. 397; State vs. Schonhausen, 37 Ann. 42; State vs O'Hara, 36 Ann. 94; State vs. Chapman, 35 Ann. 76.

2. The next objection is that the license taxes imposed by the city are invalid because there was no valid State law levying licenses on such corporations.

Article 206 of the Constitution provides that "No political corporation shall impose a greater license tax than is imposed by the General Assembly for State purposes."

This provision has been construed to mean that when the State levies no license on a particular business, the city can exact none.

It is not denied that the General Assembly has levied a license on the occupation of defendants and that the city exacts no greater sum for its own license.

But it is said that the provision of the State license law on this subject is invalid because it has made an unconstitutional discrimination between persons pursuing the same occupation in cities having population exceeding 50,000, and in those having a less population.

If there be any merit in such an objection to the validity of the license imposed by the State, it must be urged when the State seeks to enforce her license and contradictorily with her. It is very clear that it has no application to the license imposed by the city,...