City of New York v. Vill. of Lawrence

Decision Date19 March 1929
Citation250 N.Y. 429,165 N.E. 836
PartiesCITY OF NEW YORK v. VILLAGE OF LAWRENCE et al.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Action by the City of New York against the Village of Lawrence and others. From an order of the Appellate Division, First Department (232 N. Y. S. 273, 225 App. Div. 1), affirming as matter of law an order of the Special Term which denied motion for an injunction pendente lite, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

The following questions were certified:

‘1. Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action?

‘2. Was the act, chapter 802 of the Laws of 1928, passed by the Legislature in violation of section 2 of article 12 of the Constitution of the State of New York?

‘3. Was the act, chapter 802 of the Laws of 1928, passed in violation of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution of the State of New York?

‘4. Was the act, chapter 802 of the Laws of 1928, section 2 thereof, passed by the Legislature in an unlawful assumption of judicial interpretation of the Greater New York charter by providing as follows: ‘It is hereby declared to have been the intention of the Legislature of the State of New York in heretofore establishing the boundary line between the city of New York and the town of Hempstead to fix and establish the same in accordance with the foregoing description?’'

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

George P. Nicholson, Corporation Counsel, of New York City (William E. C. Mayer, J. Joseph Lilly, Thomas W. A. Crowe, and Robert J. Culhane, all of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert J. Fox, Charles J. Nehrbas, and Robert P. Schur, all of New York City, for property owners, amici curiae.

Edward S. Bentley, of Lawrence, for respondents village of Lawrence et al.

M. Linn Bruce, of New York City, Fred Ingraham, Jr., of Mineola, Raymond Ballantine, of New York City, and H. Stewart McKnight, of Mineola, for respondent county of Nassau.

Hamilton Ward, Atty. Gen. (Robert P. Beyer, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State of New York.

LEHMAN, J.

The boundary lines of the city of New York are described in the city charter. By chapter 802 of the Laws of 1928, entitled ‘An Act to define the boundary line between the city of New York and the town of Hempstead along the eastern and southerly boundary lines of the former village of Far Rockaway,’ the Legislature of the state has attempted to change the description of a boundary line of the city. The act is, undoubtedly, special or local in its terms and in its effect, and it was not passed by the Legislature on a message from the Governor declaring that an emergency exists. The city of New York, in this action, claims that the act relates to the property, affairs or government of the city, and, in the absence of such a message, violates the provisions of section 2 of article 12 of the Constitution of the state of New York.

A municipal corporation must from its nature have definite territorial limits. The state creates the municipality and fixes its territorial limits. Statutory description of these limits may, at times, leave room for dispute as to the exact location of a boundary line; experience may show, at times, that these territorial limits should be enlarged or restricted in the interests of the public. At such times, at least before article 12 of the Constitution was adopted in its present form, the Legislature has had power to define anew the territorial limits of a city. It has used this power on several occasions in relation to the boundary line between the city of New York and the town of Hempstead (chapter 466 of the Laws of 1901; chapter 692 of the Laws of 1921).

The amendment of article 12 of the Constitution commonly known as the Home Rule Amendment approved by the people at the election of 1923 (see Laws 1923, p. 1765), was intended to vest in the cities of the state increased control of their own property, affairs, and government. Power to adopt and amend certain local laws relating to enumerated subjects is expressly conferred upon them. By general laws, the Legislature may confer upon them further powers of local legislation and administration. Enlargement of legislative powers by the city in relation to their ‘property, affairs or government’ is balanced by restriction of the powers of the Legislature within the same field. In relation to such matters, the Legislature may not pass any law which is ‘special or local, either in its terms or in its effect,’ except on message from the Governor declaring that an emergency exists. In relation to other matters, the provisions of article 12 of the Constitution ‘shall not be deemed to restrict the power of the Legislature.’ Existing charters must continue in force ‘until repealed, amended, modified or superseded in accordance with the provisions of this article.’ Section 7. The description of the boundaries of the city of New York contained in the charter has been modified in accordance with the provisions of article 12 if the special bill passed by the Legislature does not relate to the ‘property, affairs or government’ of the city, within the meaning of those terms as used in the Constitution.

The act passed by the Legislature, which the plaintiff challenges in this action, does more than settle the location of a disputed boundary. True, there had been disputes as to the correct line, but there can be little doubt that the line, as defined in the act, is, at least in part, a new line. A strip of land varying in width from 100 to 400 feet and approximately a mile long is declared to be part of Nassau county, and there seems to be no dispute that some of this strip was included within the limits of the city of New York, as defined in the charter. Why the Legislature saw fit to annex to Nassau county any land which had previously been part of the city of New York does not appear in the record. If the Legislature had power to pass the act, the courts may not inquire into the reasons which moved the Legislature to exercise its power. If such inquiry were permissible, we might find indications in this record that the Legislature did not act arbitrarily; for it appears that a committee appointed by the board of estimate of the city of New York to confer with a similar committee from the county of Nassau, for the purpose of adjusting the boundary line, agreed upon the line subsequently fixed by the Legislature. Apparently the board of estimate failed to accept the report of the committee appointed by it.

By express command of the Constitution, it is the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities (article 12, § 1). Such provisions have been inserted in earlier Constitutions of the state, and constitute ‘merely directions for the exercise of an existing authority, and not its creation.’ Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467. In the absence of express restrictions placed by the Constitution upon the exercise of its legislative powers, the Legislature may create or destroy, enlarge or restrict, combine or divide, municipal corporations. ‘Modifications of their boundaries may be made, or their names may be changed, or one may be merged in another, or it may be subdivided and the moities of their territory may be annexed to others.’ Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 25 L. Ed. 699;Laramie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. Ed. 552. They are political institutions, erected to be employed in the internal government of the state. Their power may be modified or the corporations themselves abrogated. People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325;Matter of Gertum v. Board of Supervisors Kings Co., 109 N. Y. 170, 16 N. E. 328. The state may determine the territory in which such political subdivisions of the state shall exercise the governmental powers conferred upon them (Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151), and the legislative power of the state includes complete discretion in regard to such matters (People ex rel. Shumway v. Bennett, 29 Mich. 451, 18 Am. Rep. 107; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 353).

In some states the Constitution restricts the exercise of this legislative power by prohibitions against special acts creating municipal corporations or conferring upon them corporate powers. It has been held that such prohibitions render invalid a special act providing for the annexation of territory to a city (State ex rel. Attorney General v. City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18), but has no application to special legislation which merely detaches territory; for in the latter event no corporate powers are conferred (Metcalf v. State, 49 Ohio St. 586, 31 N. E. 1076).

The constitutional provision directing the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages does not in terms provide that the legislation intended to carry out the direction shall be either special or general. Other provisions of the Constitution and the history of legislation in this state may throw light upon this subject. Article 8, § 1, provides that ‘corporations may be formed under general laws; but shall not be created by special act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws.’ Here we have an express recognition of the power of the Legislature to create municipal corporations by special act The express prohibition against the passage of a private bill to incorporate villages (article 3, § 18) emphasizes that no such limitation was implied in relation to the creation of cities.

The Legislature has, at times, provided by general law systems of governments for cities. General City Law, c. 26, Laws of 1909 (Consol. Laws, c. 21); Second Class Cities Law, c. 55, Laws of 1909 (Consol. Laws, c. 53). It has at times, by general law, given to cities a voice in the determination of the kind of charter which might meet their special needs. Optional City Government ...

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