City of Newark v. Nine-Sixteen Welfare Club of Newark

Citation29 A.2d 405,21 N.J.Misc. 17
PartiesCITY OF NEWARK v. NINE-SIXTEEN WELFARE CLUB OF NEWARK.
Decision Date22 December 1942
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

Syllabus by the Board.

Where a fraternal organization rents a portion of its premises on a permanent basis to a restaurant concession, the property is not entitiled to exemption from taxation either under R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.26 or R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.6, N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.26, 54:4-3.6.

Proceeding in the matter of the application of the Nine-Sixteen Welfare Club of Newark, New Jersey, for exemption from taxation of real property situated in the City of Newark, for the year 1941. From a judgment of the Essex County Board of Taxation granting exemption, the City of Newark appeals.

Exemption denied and judgment of Essex County Board of Taxation reversed.

Raymond Schroeder and Vincent J. Casale, both of Newark, for petitioner.

Ferdinand J. Biunno, of Newark, for respondent.

WAESCHE, President.

Respondent was granted an exemption from taxation for the year 1941, by the Essex County Board of Taxation, on account of a building which it uses as a club house in the City of Newark. The City appeals in order to restore the assessment. Respondent claims to be entitled to exemption from taxation under either R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.6, N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6, exempting the property of charitable, benevolent, religious and other similar organizations, or under R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.26, N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.26, exempting the property of fraternal organizations.

The claim under the latter section cannot be allowed in view of the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rutgers Chapter of Delta Upsilon Fraternity v. City of New Brunswick et al., 28 A.2d 759, holding that section to be unconstitutional. Aside from this circumstance, respondent is not entitled to exemption for the reason that we find that the property does not satisfy the statutory proviso that "no part of such property is used for pecuniary profit". This finding, moreover, makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether respondent is the type of organization contemplated for exemption by either R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.26 or R.S. Sec. 54:4-3.6, as to which we entertain considerable doubt.

It is frankly conceded by respondent that a portion of its premises is rented out on a concession basis to a restaurant, and that respondent neither exercises any control over, nor partakes of the management of the restaurant. It is thus a fact that a part of the premises for which an exemption is claimed is...

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