City of Normandy v. Greitens
Decision Date | 16 May 2017 |
Docket Number | No. SC 95624,SC 95624 |
Citation | 518 S.W.3d 183 |
Parties | CITY OF NORMANDY, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. Eric GREITENS, et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
The state was represented by J. Andrew Hirth and Emily A. Wales of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.
The municipalities and taxpayers were represented by Sam J. Alton of SJAlton Law LLC in St. Louis, (314) 961-4878; and David H. Pittinsky and Matther I. Vahey of Ballard Spahr LLP in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, (215) 665-8500.
When the General Assembly chooses to pass a special law, the State can preserve the law from constitutional infirmity by offering evidence of substantial justification if challenged in court. City of DeSoto v. Nixon , 476 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Mo. banc 2016). The State failed to offer any evidence in the trial court of a substantial justification for the special laws in Senate Bill 5 ("SB 5") that were passed by the General Assembly in 2015. Consequently, the challenged provisions of SB 5 violate the Missouri Constitution's special law prohibition.
Twelve municipalities in St. Louis County, along with two taxpayers (referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs"), filed a petition against the Governor, the Attorney General, the Auditor, and the Director of Revenue (referred to collectively as the "State") for declaratory judgment alleging that provisions of SB 5 violate the Missouri Constitution, including the special laws provision in article III, section 40(30), the Hancock Amendment in article X, sections 16 and 21, and five other constitutional claims.
Of course, special laws like this may be passed by the General Assembly in the future and can survive a special law challenge as long as evidence of substantial justification is offered in the trial court. Because the State failed to present any evidence of substantial justification for enacting either section 67.287,1 in its entirety, or section 479.359.2, insofar as it creates a separate cap on counties with a charter form of government and with more than 950,000 inhabitants, they are special laws. The statutes target municipalities in one political subdivision: St. Louis County. The trial court's judgment permanently enjoining the State from enforcing these provisions is, therefore, affirmed.
Section 479.359.2, insofar as it provides "except that any county with a charter form of government and with more than nine hundred fifty thousand inhabitants and any city, town, or village with boundaries found within such county shall be reduced from thirty percent to twelve and one-half percent," is severed from the rest of section 479.359.2. By severing this language, section 479.359.2 imposes a uniform cap on fines, bond forfeitures, and court costs of 20 percent statewide.
This Court reverses the trial court's judgment that sections 67.287 and 479.359.3 are Hancock violations as these claims are not ripe for review because the General Assembly has until August 28, 2021, to appropriate funds, and the alleged increased duty is de minimis. The trial court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' other constitutional claims is affirmed. In total, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.2
Over the last two decades, the General Assembly has passed various limitations on the amount of revenue municipalities may generate from traffic fines. The first limitation, known as the "Macks Creek Law," was enacted in 1995. Sec. 302.341. It prohibited any city, town, or village from receiving more than 45 percent of its total annual revenue from fines for traffic violations. Id. Excess revenue would be remitted to the state's department of revenue and distributed to the county's schools. Id. The General Assembly reduced this cap from 45 to 35 percent in 2009 and to 30 percent in 2013. Sec. 302.341.2, RSMo Supp. 2009; sec. 302.341.2, RSMo Supp. 2013. The 2013 amendment further required an accounting of the percentage of general operating revenue that came from traffic violations be included in the annual financial report. Id.
Sec. 479.359.1 ( ). SB 5 also lowered the percentage cap from 30 to 20 percent. Sec. 479.359.2. The General Assembly created one exception to the new 20-percent cap: "any county with a charter form of government and with more than nine hundred fifty thousand inhabitants and any city, town, or village with boundaries found within such county shall be reduced from thirty percent to twelve and one-half percent."Id. (emphasis added).
In addition, section 479.359.3 now requires all counties, cities, towns, and villages to submit an addendum with their annual financial report to the state auditor pursuant to section 105.145. This addendum must include an accounting of the political subdivision's annual general operating revenue, "total revenues from fines, bond forfeitures, and court costs for minor traffic violations occurring within the county, city, town, or village, including amended charges from any minor traffic violations," and a calculation of the percent of the annual general operating revenue that the fines, bond forfeitures, and court costs for minor traffic violations represent. Sec. 479.359.3(1)-(3). Finally, "a representative with knowledge of the subject matter as to the accuracy of the addendum contents" must certify its accuracy and sign "under the penalty of perjury, and witnessed by a notary public." Sec. 479.359.3(4).
SB 5 also enacted section 67.287, which lists "minimum standards" for certain municipalities. The statute defines such a "[m]unicipality" as "any city, town, or village located in any county with a charter form of government and with more than nine hundred fifty thousand inhabitants."
Sec. 67.287.1(2). Section 67.287, in relevant part, requires covered municipalities to have "[a] police department accredited or certified by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies or the Missouri Police Chiefs Association or a contract for police service with a police department accredited or certified by such entities" within six years.
After the enactment of SB 5, twelve municipalities in St. Louis County3 and two taxpayers filed a petition in the Cole County Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunction. They alleged the new statutes created by SB 5 violate the Missouri Constitution's: (1) special law prohibition in article III, section 40(30); (2) restrictions on unfunded mandates in violation of article X, sections 16 and 21; (3) guarantee of separation of powers in article II, section 1; (4) prohibition on amending Supreme Court Rules without specifying which rules are being amended or limiting the amendments to a single bill as provided in article V, section 5 ; and (5) limit on the amount of fines a municipality can keep from minor traffic accidents in violation of article V, section 27(16).
In the trial court, Plaintiffs offered the testimony of two witnesses. Plaintiffs also introduced an affidavit from the certified public accountant who prepares the annual financial reports for both Normandy and Pagedale. The State conceded it did not offer any evidence, let alone any evidence to support a substantial justification. The trial court entered a judgment declaring (1) section 67.287's provision of minimum standards for certain municipalities, in its entirety, and section 479.359.2, insofar as it creates a lower cap applicable to only municipalities in counties with a charter form of government and more than 950,000 inhabitants, are unconstitutional special laws and (2) the requirement in sections 67.287 and 479.359.3 that annual financial reports include an addendum certified under oath and penalty of perjury are unconstitutional unfunded mandates. The trial court also entered a permanent injunction enjoining the State from enforcing the provisions declared unconstitutional. Finally, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' other constitutional claims for failure to state a claim.
The State appeals the trial court's judgment declaring that SB 5 contained special laws and unfunded mandates and permanently enjoining the enforcement of those provisions. Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's dismissal of their other claims.
Challenges to a statute's constitutional validity are questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Earth Island Inst. v. Union Elec. Co. , 456 S.W.3d 27, 32 (Mo. banc 2015). Similarly, a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. Conway v. CitiMortgage , Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Mo. banc 2014). A judgment awarding equitable relief "will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." St. Louis Police Officers' Ass'n v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of City of St. Louis , 259 S.W.3d 526, 528 (Mo. banc 2008).
Missouri's first constitution in 1820 did not contain a prohibition against special laws. Washington Univ. v. Baumann , 341 Mo. 708, 108 S.W.2d 403, 404 (1937). And prior to 1859, 87 percent of all legislation passed by the General Assembly was special legislation. Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot....
To continue reading
Request your trial-
City of Aurora v. Spectra Commc'ns Grp., LLC
...art. IV, sec. 27 ; Mo. Const. of 1875, art. IV, sec. 53 ; Mo. Const. of 1945, art. III, sec. 40 (30)." City of Normandy v. Greitens , 518 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. banc 2017).7 The analogy to equal protection, however, should not be interpreted to eliminate the need for special law provisions. I......
-
Neuner v. City of St. Louis, ED 105125
...III, Section 40(30) is not violated. Since 1865, the Missouri Constitution has prohibited special laws. City of Normandy v. Greitens , 518 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. banc 2017). The prohibition against special laws extends to city ordinances. City of Sullivan , 329 S.W.3d at 693 (citing McKaig v.......
-
City of Normandy v. Parson
...and 479.359.2 because it found those sections to be unconstitutional special laws. This Court affirmed that judgment. City of Normandy v. Greitens , 518 S.W.3d 183, 202 (Mo. banc 2017). After this Court restored the rational basis analysis for special laws claims in City of Aurora v. Spectr......
-
Trophy Room v. City of St. Louis, ED 104714
...premised upon factors that can change (e.g., population) are "open-ended" and are presumed constitutional. City of Normandy v. Greitens , 518 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. banc 2017). If the law is general and is not found to be "special," then the rational basis test applies, under which the burden......
-
Unconstitutional State Special Laws: Is Rational Basis Review the Rational Solution?
...Spectra, 592 S.W.3d 764, 781 (Mo. 2019) (en banc). (106) See, e.g., City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3d at 914; City of Normandy v. Greitens, 518 S.W.3d 183, 191 (Mo. 2017) (en banc); Jefferson Cnty. Fire Prot. Dists. Ass'n v. Blunt, 205 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Mo. (107) City of Saint Louis, 382 S.W.3......