City of Oakland v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 February 1942
• Docket Number: No. 9801.,9801.
• Parties: CITY OF OAKLAND v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

124 F.2d 959 (1942)

CITY OF OAKLAND v. UNITED STATES.

No. 9801.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 14, 1942.

Rehearing Denied February 18, 1942.

Charles A. Beardsley, Port Atty., and W. Reginald Jones, Asst. Port Atty., both of Oakland, Cal., for appellant.

Norman M. Littell, Asst. Atty. Gen., M. Mitchell Bourquin, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., of San Francisco, Cal., and Charles R. Denny, Jr., and John F. Cotter, Attys., Department of Justice, both of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GARRECHT, HANEY, and STEPHENS, Circuit Judges.

GARRECHT, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, Southern Division, in the above-entitled action on January 15, 1941, and from the order of the same court entered on March 6, 1941, denying appellant's motion to vacate the judgment. The appeal is both from the judgment and from the order, each appeal serving the same purpose.

A proceeding by the United States to acquire by condemnation seventy-two acres of land on the Oakland waterfront for the military purposes of the United States as these are described in "An act to authorize condemnation proceedings of lands for military purposes", 40 Stat. 241, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. § 171, and referred to in the Act of September 8, 1940, Public No. 781, 76 Cong., 3d sess., appropriating money therefor, was instituted by filing a complaint in condemnation against appellant and others on January 15, 1941. The complaint alleged that the Secretary of War, acting under the authority of the acts of Congress had selected for acquisition by the United States of America the land described and had determined the same to be suitable and necessary for military purposes of the United States. It further alleged that the land was necessary for such purposes and that the use thereof was immediately required in order that necessary work could be begun at the earliest practicable date for the location, construction, and prosecution of works described in the acts of Congress referred to; that the purposes for which said land and appurtenances were being taken are necessary, suitable, and constitute a public use, and the use to which said property was to be applied was a use authorized by law.

Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint there was filed in the name of the United States by the Secretary of War a declaration of taking conforming to the requirements of 40 U.S.C.A. § 258a, and there was deposited in the registry of the court the sum of $2,168,000, being the estimated amount of just compensation for the property. Upon the filing of the declaration of taking and the making of the deposit the court entered a judgment, finding that the requirements of said statute had been complied with, and decreeing that in accordance with the terms and provisions of the statute, title had vested in the United States; that the lands were deemed to have been condemned and taken for the use of the United States, and that the right to just compensation had vested in the persons entitled thereto, to "be ascertained and awarded in this proceeding and established by judgment herein pursuant to law".

The Declaration of Taking Act, approved February 26, 1931, c. 307, 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C.A. §§ 258a-258e, is printed in the margin.¹

Summons was served upon this appellant January 16, 1941. On February 14, 1941, appellant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which was denied on March 6, 1941. On April 4, 1941, appellant gave notice of appeal from the judgment and from the order denying the motion to vacate said judgment.

Specifications of error relied upon are thus stated by appellant:

"Since the questions involved on the appeal from the judgment, and on the appeal from the order denying the motion to vacate the judgment, are the same or substantially the same, and since both appeals serve the same purpose, the specifications of the errors upon which the appellant relies, whether addressed to the judgment or addressed to the order, will be numbered consecutively herein. Specifications numbered (1) to (5) are addressed to the judgment; specification numbered (6) is addressed to the order; as follows:

"(1) The court erred in entering a judgment of condemnation, without either process, or appearance by the appellant, or a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard upon the issues adjudicated in said judgment;

"(2) The court erred in entering a judgment of condemnation on the declaration of taking, in the absence of any statutory authorization for any judgment thereon;

"(3) The court erred in entering a judgment of condemnation upon the commencement of the proceeding, contrary to the Acts of Congress requiring conformity to the practice in such proceedings in the California courts;

"(4) The court erred in entering a judgment of condemnation upon the declaration of taking, because it does not specify the public use for which the Secretary of War seeks to condemn the appellant's property;

"(5) The court erred in entering a judgment of condemnation on the declaration of taking, because the Act of Congress providing for such a declaration of taking in such a proceeding is unconstitutional in that it provides for a deprivation of property without due process of law, contrary to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and because the ex parte judgment itself is likewise violative of the due process requirement of said Amendment;

"(6) The court erred in denying the appellant's motion to vacate the judgment, to the end that the appellant might be given an opportunity to be heard at the trial upon any and all issues that may properly be raised in the proceeding."

Appellant's Right To Be Heard.

Appellant's principal grievance, most strongly voiced, is to the effect that the action taken by the District Court deprives it of property without giving it any opportunity to be heard. The judgment order complained about, by its very terms contradicts such claim. After determining that the ex parte showing made by the Government is sufficient to warrant the determination that the premises in question are necessary for the military uses of the United States, that they have been condemned and taken, and that the United States is entitled to immediate possession, it further provides that the actual taking of possession be suspended until after thirty days' notice of the judgment has been given to the defendant. The judgment then recites that "this cause is held open for such other and further orders, judgments and decrees as may be necessary in the premises".

As the learned District Court in its opinion on the motion to vacate the judgment order points out, there will be ample opportunity, if relief is prayed for on any such grounds, for appellant to be heard on the question that the Secretary of War was acting without authority or that there was no necessity for the Government to acquire the land or any other reason that would make the action of the officials wrongful or fraudulent. The answer of the District Court to these suggestions merits quotation: "Assuming for purposes of argument that it is ultimately determined that the declaration of taking is affected with fraud or bad faith, it would follow that the declaration of taking will be a nullity, ineffective to vest title, and that the judgment thereon would also be a nullity. There has therefore been no prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant by the entry of the judgment here under attack. The occasion and the authority for such judgment at this juncture is manifest. * * *."

But appellant does challenge the power of the court to enter the judgment complained of, and insists that there is no authority therefor to be found in the law. The statute, however, declares that upon the performance of certain requirements the condemnation shall be effective. The judgment of the court here merely recites that it has found that these requirements have been met. The statute also provides that if the final award made exceeds the amount paid into court, interest shall be allowed on the amount of the excess from the date of the taking, and, further, the court is required to fix the time and the terms upon which defendant shall surrender possession, which all implies that the court must first express its judgment that the requirements of the statute have been complied with. This is in accordance with orderly procedure. To advise the appellant of the action that has been taken certainly does not adversely affect the enforcement of its rights.

The entry of an order by a District Court, without the benefit of express statutory authority, permitting the United States to take immediate possession to land sought to be condemned was upheld in Commercial Station Post Office v. United States, 8 Cir., 48 F. 183, and followed in Hessel v. A. Smith & Co., D.C., 15 F.Supp. 953, and United States v. Eighty Acres of Land, D.C., 26 F.Supp. 315.

Eminent Domain and Due Process.

Appellant contends the taking of its property under this act is an attempt to deprive it of property without due process of law, contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The title of the act declares its purpose to be "To expedite the construction of public buildings and works * * * by enabling possession and title of sites to be taken in advance of final judgment in proceedings * * * under the power of eminent domain." 46 Stat. 1421. The power of eminent domain is not dependent upon any specific grant in the Constitution; it is inherent in sovereignty, limited and conditioned by the just-compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment. Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581, 587, 43 S.Ct. 442, 67 L.Ed. 809.

The act provides that in any condemnation proceedings brought by the United States, upon filing the petition and before judgment but after filing a declaration of taking and the...