City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Writing for the Court | McCOMB; GIBSON |
Citation | 52 Cal.2d 620,342 P.2d 898 |
Parties | CITY OF PALM SPRINGS, Petitioner, v. Mary G. RINGWALD, as City Clerk, etc., Respondent. L. A. 25251. |
Decision Date | 18 August 1959 |
Page 898
v.
Mary G. RINGWALD, as City Clerk, etc., Respondent.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1959.
Page 899
[52 Cal.2d 622] Jerome J. Bunker, City Atty., Palm Springs, Kirkbride, Wilson, Harzfeld & Wallace and Ernest A. Wilson, San Mateo, for petitioner.
Thompson & Colegate, Roy W. Colegate and F. Gillar Boyd, Jr., Palm Springs, for respondent.
McCOMB, Justice.
Petitioner is a general law city governed by a city council. An ordinance was enacted by the council pursuant to the Parking District Law of 1951 (Sts. & Hy.Code, § 35100 et seq.) providing for a proposed parking district to be known as Parking District No. 1 of the city of Palm Springs.
To pay the cost of acquiring property for the parking lots and to construct improvements and install parking meters, the ordinance provides that bonds shall be issued in the amount of $1,400,000. It further provides that the bonds and interest thereon are not to be a debt of the city, or a charge, lien, or encumbrance, legal or equitable, on any of the city's property or upon any of its income, receipts or revenues, other than the revenues pledged to the payment thereof.
The revenues to be pledged are to be derived from the following sources: (1) the net revenue from parking facilities to be acquired; (2) the net revenue from street parking meters existing or to be installed within the proposed district; (3) contributions of money by the city to the district; and (4) the creation of a special fund to be supplied from future revenue from the city's sales and use taxes.
The first three proposed methods of financing the parking district bonds are specifically enumerated in section 35411 of the Streets and Highways Code. There is no provision in the act for the pledge of sales and use tax revenue for such purpose.
Respondent city clerk refuses to publish the ordinance, upon the ground that it and the bonds proposed to be issued pursuant to it are and will be invalid. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling the city clerk to cause the ordinance to be published.
These questions are presented:
First: Is mandamus a proper remedy to compel a city clerk to publish an ordinance whereby a city is attempting to set up a parking district?
[52 Cal.2d 623] Yes. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy in such a case if the proposed ordinance
Page 900
meets the requirements of the law, since the act demanded is a ministerial duty. (Cf. City of Walnut Creek v. Silveira, 47 Cal.2d 804, 807(1), 306 P.2d 453; City of Oxnard v. Dale, 45 Cal.2d 729, 731(1), 290 P.2d 859.)Second: Do the ordinance and the proposed bond issue violate the constitutional limitations on municipal debt contained in article XI, section 18, of the California Constitution?
Yes. The city proposes to pledge as a trust fund part of city sales and use tax revenue to be received in future years. This sales and use tax revenue is to supplement the income from the operation of the parking areas to be acquired and the parking meters, because such income alone will be insufficient to discharge the bond payments as they become due.
There is no provision in the law for the pledge of sales and use tax revenue for such purpose. Section 35255 of the Streets & Highways Code reads: 'The staement of the amount of city contribution in the petition or in the resolution of intention shall not prevent the city from making additional contributions to the project before or after the issuance of bonds therefor and shall not prevent the city from paying all or any part of the incidental expenses in connection with the proceedings under this part.'
Petitioner's theory is that if it is empowered to make contributions under section 35255 of the Streets & Highways Code 'after the issuance of bonds,' it has implied authority to pledge those contributions in futuro, as proposed.
Petitioner's contention is unsound, for the reason that diversion of future sales and use tax revenue from the general fund of the city without advance approval of two thirds of the electorate would violate the provisions of article XI, section 18, of the California Constitution, which reads in part: 'No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose, nor unless before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness provision shall be made for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also provision to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof. * * *'
[52 Cal.2d 624] It is conceded that petitioner does not propose to hold a bond election or seek the approval of the bonds by two thirds of the electors, asserting...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Westbrook v. Mihaly, S.F. 22706
...purpose and an extraordinary majority vote requirement is, or was intended to be. Finally, while City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald (1959) 52 Cal.2d 620, 342 P.2d 898, does address itself to that portion of section 18 which requires a referendum, the case states only that it 'is designed to a......
-
City of Saratoga v. Huff
...without first obtaining the consent of two thirds of the Page 42 electorate.' (City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald[24 Cal.App.3d 990] (1959) 52 Cal.2d 620, 627, 342 P.2d 898, 902--903. See also City of Redondo Beach v. Taxpayers, Property Owners, etc., of City of Redondo Beach (1960) 54 Cal.2d......
-
Conrad v. City of Pittsburgh
...restrictions. See, e.g., American Co. v. City of Lockport, 220 Cal. 548, 32 P.2d 622 (1934), but see City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald, 52 Cal.2d 620, 342 P.2d 898 (1959) (semble); Quill v. City of Indianapolis, 124 Ind. 292, 23 N.E. 788, 7 L.R.A. 681 (1890); City of Springfield v. Monday, 3......
-
City of San Diego v. Rider, D025921
...pay off the debt as it comes due. This of course is what the courts in City of Palm Springs v. Ringwald, supra, 52 Cal.2d at pp. 626-627, 342 P.2d 898, and Starr, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at pages 174-175, 140 Cal.Rptr. 73, explicitly This debt reduction as consideration theory, unsupported by ......