City of Pewaukee v. Carter

• Citation: 276 Wis.2d 333,2004 WI 136,688 N.W.2d 449
• Decision Date: 04 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1114.,03-1114.
• Parties: CITY OF PEWAUKEE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Thomas L. CARTER, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin

276 Wis.2d 333

2004 WI 136

688 N.W.2d 449

CITY OF PEWAUKEE, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, v. Thomas L. CARTER, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 03-1114.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument September 22, 2004.

Decided November 4, 2004.

For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by H. Stanley Riffle, Rick D. Trindl, Julie A. Aquavia and Arenz, Molter, Macy & Riffle, S.C., Waukesha, and oral argument by Rick D. Trindl.

For the defendant-respondent there were briefs by Rex R. Anderegg and Anderegg & Mutschler, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Rex Anderegg.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel M. Olson, Madison, on behalf of the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.

¶ 1. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

This is a review of the published decision of the court of appeals affirming an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County, Mark Gempeler, Judge.¹ The circuit court denied the City of Pewaukee's request for a new trial and dismissed the case upon the motion of Thomas L. Carter, the defendant. The City requested a new trial pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) (2001-02),² which provides that upon a request from either party to a municipal court action (or on its own motion), the circuit court shall order that a new trial be held in circuit court.³

¶ 2. Relying on Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) and Village of Menomonee Falls v. Meyer,⁴ the court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court. The court of appeals held that no trial occurred in municipal court under § 800.14(4) because the matter had not been "fully litigated." The matter had not been fully litigated, according to the court of appeals, because only the City had presented witnesses and evidence and the municipal court dismissed the City's case with prejudice after the defendant moved for dismissal at the close of the City's presentation of its evidence, but before the defendant put in his evidence.

¶ 3. The issue before this court is whether a "trial" occurred in the municipal court for the purpose of triggering the City's right to obtain a new trial in circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4). More precisely, the question is: Did the municipal court proceeding constitute a "trial" under § 800.14(4) when the City presented sworn witnesses, those witnesses were cross-examined by the defendant, and the case was dismissed with prejudice upon the defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of the City's case-in-chief?

¶ 4. We conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the present case constituted a trial under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) because the City presented its case, the defendant had an opportunity to present his evidence (even though he chose not to do so), and the matter was judicially resolved on its merits. We therefore conclude that the municipal court proceeding in the instant case triggered the City's statutory right to a new trial under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and the order of the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court to grant the City's request for a new trial.

I

¶ 5. The facts of this case are not in dispute. At approximately 7:30 a.m. on July 27, 2001, after his involvement in an automobile accident, Thomas L. Carter (the defendant) was cited by the City of Pewaukee for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and with a prohibited alcohol concentration. After several delays, the trial was set for June 20, 2002, in municipal court for the Town of Brookfield.⁵

¶ 6. The City presented three witnesses at the municipal court proceeding. The first was an analyst from the State Laboratory of Hygiene who testified regarding the defendant's blood sample and on how blood-alcohol concentration was determined. The second witness was the driver of the car with which the defendant's car collided. Finally, the City presented the police officer who was called to photograph the accident scene. The City elicited testimony from all three witnesses, and the defendant cross-examined each one. The City also presented documentary evidence.

¶ 7. After the City's witnesses testified and were subject to cross examination, the City informed the municipal court that it would not move to admit the defendant's blood test because the arresting officer (who had ordered the defendant's blood drawn but was not the officer who had testified) was unavailable to testify. Instead of requesting a continuance or adjournment, the City rested its case, relying on the evidence already presented.

¶ 8. Before presenting any evidence, the defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the City had failed to meet its burden of proof. The municipal court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action with prejudice.

¶ 9. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4), the City requested a new trial in circuit court. The defendant filed a motion in circuit court to dismiss the City's request on the ground that the municipal court proceeding was not a "fully litigated" trial and therefore the City did not have the right to request a "new trial" as provided in § 800.14(4). The circuit court, relying on the Meyer case, issued an order granting the defendant's motion. The circuit court reasoned that the matter was not fully litigated because each party was not able to litigate fully its respective position. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court, concurring with the circuit court's reasoning that a full trial requires that a defendant have the opportunity to present a defense or rest its case. The City now seeks review of the decision of the court of appeals.

II

[1]

¶ 10. This case involves the interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) and the application of the statute to the undisputed facts of the present case. These are issues of law that we determine independently of the circuit court and court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses.⁶

A

¶ 11. We begin with the statutes governing the parties' rights to move a case from municipal court to circuit court. Either party may move a case from municipal court to circuit court by way of appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(1)⁷ and by way of a new trial (before a judge or jury) pursuant to § 800.14(4). A defendant may also in certain cases plead not guilty, bypass the municipal court, and seek a jury trial in circuit court pursuant to § 800.04(1)(d).

[2]

¶ 12. An appeal differs from a new trial. An appeal is determined on the record in the municipal court.⁸ No one disputes that in the instant case the City could have appealed the circuit court's order of dismissal under Wis. Stat. § 800.14(5); the circuit court would have reviewed the record of the municipal court to determine the validity of the dismissal of the action.

[3-5]

¶ 13. In a new trial, each party presents its evidence anew. "[A]ny errors committed by the municipal court are completely vitiated. A party may also raise issues in the circuit court that he or she failed to raise in the prior proceeding."⁹

¶ 14. Wisconsin Stat. § 800.14(4) provides that after notice of appeal is filed under § 800.14(1) and "[u]pon request of either party ... or on its own motion, the circuit court shall order that a new trial be held in circuit court."

[6]

¶ 15. The very words of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) that "a new trial be held in circuit court" presuppose that a trial has taken place in municipal court.¹⁰ This interpretation of § 800.14(4) is uncontroversial and leaves us with the seemingly simple question of determining whether a particular proceeding in municipal court constitutes a trial under § 800.14(4).

B

¶ 16. Defining the word "trial" would not seem to present a particularly difficult task, and in the abstract, it is not difficult. Black's Law Dictionary defines "trial" as "[a] formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding."¹¹ ¶ 17. This dictionary definition is consistent with the definition of "trial" found in the 1856 Wisconsin statutes and in later versions of the statutes: "A trial is the judicial examination of the issues between the parties, whether they be issues of law or of fact."¹²

¶ 18. The word "trial" is not currently defined in the Wisconsin statutes. The lack of a definition matters little though, because the definitions of the word "trial" set forth above are not particularly helpful in determining for the purposes of Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) what events in a particular municipal court proceeding constitute a judicial examination of the issues between the parties, whether they be issues of law or fact. Resolving what events constitute a "trial" under the statutory right to a new trial in Wis. Stat. § 800.14(4) requires a more nuanced determination of the meaning of "trial" than provided by a general definition.

¶ 19. The word "trial" has different meanings in different contexts. Trials take many forms depending on such factors as the nature of the case, the forum and the purpose for which the word "trial" is being determined. Trials are also a continuum of events.

¶ 20. Courts and legislatures have taken different approaches to describing the events needed to constitute a trial. On the one hand, the events constituting a trial may be established by setting forth a bright-line rule for the commencement of a trial and then treating the commencement of a trial sufficient to constitute a trial.

[7]

¶ 21. For example, the California civil procedure code declares that a trial shall be deemed to actually commence at the beginning of the opening statement of any party, or if there is no opening statement, then on the administering of the oath or affirmation to the first witness or the introduction of evidence.¹³ Similarly, in determining when an accused's double jeopardy protections attach, the rule is that the protections attach once a jury is empanelled (in a jury trial) or once the first witness has been sworn (in a bench trial).¹⁴

¶ 22. In the context of...