City of Philadelphia v. Field

• Decision Date: 02 July 1868
• Parties: The City of Philadelphia <I>versus</I> Field <I>et al.</I>
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

58 Pa. 320

The City of Philadelphia versus Field et al.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 29 and 30, 1868.

July 2, 1868.

May 29th and 30th 1868.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., STRONG, READ, AGNEW and SHARSWOOD, JJ.

Certificate from Nisi Prius: In Equity. To January Term 1868, No. 37.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. Lynd, for appellants, cited Acts of 1861, Pamph. L. 713, of 1866, Pamph. L. 523; of 1867, Pamph. L. 1816. The legislature cannot force a municipal charter on citizens: Kyd on Corporations, page 65; Willcock Municipal Corporations *30; King v. Amery, 1 T. R. 575; Clarke v. City of Rochester, 24 Barb. 473. The authority to make contracts for the people is necessary to the existence of a public corporation: Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 9 Harris 165. In its capacity as owner of property a public corporation cannot be controlled more than a private corporation: Milwaukie v. Milwaukie, 12 Wise. 101; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 612; 2 Kent's Com. 275; Dartmouth v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 694; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 137; Hasbrouck v. Milwaukie, 13 Wisc. 37; Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Maine 133; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 84; Jackson County v. La Crosse, 13 Wisc. 490; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb. 447; Louisville v. The University, 15 B. Munroe 642; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Verm. 12; Bailey v. The Mayor, 3 Hill 531; Berlin v. New Britain, 9 Conn. 176; Moodalay v. The East India Co., 1 Brown Ch. Rep. *469; Britton v. The Mayor, 21 How. Pr. Rep. 251; Benson v. The Mayor, 10 Barb. 233; People v. Hawes, 37 Id. 440; Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Verm. 226; Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343.

In local taxation the consent of the local representatives is indispensable: Police Jury v. McDonough, 8 Louis. Ann. 341; City v. Graiple, Id. 563.

The acts are not legislative: Const. of Pa., Art. 1; Phila. Association v. Wood, 3 Wright 79; Tyson v. School Directors, 1 P. F. Smith 9; Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396; Greene v. Briggs, 1 Curtis C. C. 325; Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 173; Brown v. Hummell, 6 Barr 90; Mott v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 6 Casey 9; Parker v. The Commonwealth, 6 Barr 511; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 3 Harris 20; Const. of Pa., Article 6, § 8; State v. Kennon, 7 Ohio (N. S.) 546.

In local taxation the legislature is not the judge of the degree of the local interest: Sedgwick, Statutory and Constitutional Law 673; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W. & S. 417; McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 430; Dobbin v. Erie, 16 Peters 435.

Taxing Philadelphia to pay for the bridge is taking private property without the owners' consent: Morford v. Unger, 8 Clarke (Iowa) 82; Cheany v. Hooser, 8 B. Munroe 330; Wells v. Weston, 22 Missouri 384.

Meredith for appellees.—A municipal charter is not a contract: Angell v. Ames, on Corp. § 31; Baltimore v. Maryland, 15 Md. 376; Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; The People v. Wren, 4 Scam. 269; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray 104; The People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 337; Grogan v. San Francisco, supra. The increase in value of the city property is to be considered: Kirby v. Shaw, 7 Harris 258; N. Hempstead v. Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109; s. c., 1 Hopk. Ch. 289; Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 336.

Property not directly appropriated to public use is not taken within the constitutional prohibition although it may be subjected to heavier burdens: Sharpless v. Mayor, 9 Harris 147; Monong. Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 113; Henry v. Bridge Co., 8 Id. 85; Watson v. R. R. Co., 1 Wright 479; Mifflin v. R. R. Co., 4 Harris 192-3; Phila. & Trenton R. R. Co., 6 Wh. 35; Baltimore v. Md., supra.

The legislature may appoint to offices of temporary and local concern: Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 8 S. & R. 146.

The legislature can tax a local community for a public object without its consent: Smedley v. Erwin, 1 P. F. Smith 445; County v. Sharswood, 7 W. & S. 16; London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 686. He also referred to Acts of Assembly directing municipal officers to perform particular acts: August 14th 1725, 1 Sm. & R. Laws 168; February 27th 1798, 3 Id. 306; February 13th 1804, Respecting the poor of Delaware county, 4 Id. 129; March 10th 1806, Poor of Montgomery county, 4 Id. 294; March 31st 1807, 4 Id. 388; March 28th 1806, Poor of Dauphin county, Id. 341; March 11th 1807, Poor of Franklin county, 4 Id. 376; April 10th 1807, Poor of Bucks county, 4 Id. 452; March 24th 1808, Poor of Cumberland county, 4 Id. 502.

Empowering the courts to order municipal officers to do certain acts and compel payment by municipal taxation: April 11th 1799, 3 Sm. & R. Laws 401; April 6th 1802, Id. 520. Empowering the governor to appoint commissioners who are to be paid by the municipalities: March 31st 1812, 5 Sm. R. Laws 383; February 18th 1813, 6 Id. 24; March 29th 1819, 7 Id; May 20th 1864, Pamph. L. 911.

Directing courts to appoint officers and requiring municipalities to borrow money and levy a tax for the officers, April 28th 1854, Pamph. L. 506. Abolishing municipal corporations and creating others in their place: April 17th 1859, Pamph. L. 400; April 5th 1869, Pamph. L. 777. Appointing judges to erect public buildings and to borrow money, and requiring Philadelphia to make a loan and provide for its payment: April 2d 1860, Pamph. L. 586. Appointing local officers by name, directing other persons to appoint such officers, and requiring the municipality to pay the expenses: March 13th 1862, Pamph. L. 113; April 22d 1863, Id. 553; March 28th and 29th and April 10th 1867, Id. 592, 601, 1052; March 14th and 27th 1865, Id. 320, 786. Requiring a municipality to pay specific sums to certain persons, and certain officers to perform certain duties: April 1st 1863, Pamph. L. 242; May 20th 1864, Id. 607.

The opinion of the court was delivered, July 2d 1868, by READ, J.

The whole law making power of the state is committed to the legislature with certain restrictions and limitations imposed on that body by the constitution. Independently of those limitations the legislative power is supreme within its proper sphere.

In the exercise of this power the legislature have dug canals, built bridges and railroads, and paid for them by money raised by loans and taxation. This power is indisputable, and upon its constitutionality depends our large state debt. The legislature could undoubtedly build this bridge over a navigable river at South street, and pay for it by moneys proceeding from loans or taxes, and in doing it they might employ commissioners to erect it. This must be conceded, and it is but one step further, to impose the cost of erection on the city and county, through which the river passes and empties itself into the Delaware, and across which the bridge is thrown, connecting the east and west banks of the Schuylkill, upon which Philadelphia is built.

It becomes in fact a bridge of necessity, connecting two growing portions of the city, and forming a part of a continuous highway from the Delaware to the remotest parts of West Philadelphia. The city has an area of one hundred and thirty square miles and eight hundred thousand souls, and the question is, cannot the state place the cost of this great public improvement upon a locality and a population directly benefited by it? This does not appear to admit of argument, for the mere statement of it is sufficient.

But we are not wanting in direct authority upon this point. In Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wendell 65, it was held, that an act of the legislature imposing a tax upon a local district of the state, in reference to a public improvement, such as a canal, is valid and constitutional, notwithstanding that previous to the passage of such act, a number of individuals of such district had entered into a bond to the state, by which they bound themselves to pay the whole expense of the improvement. In answer to some objections Mr. Justice Cowen says, "But the argument proves quite too much. It would go to cut off entirely many acknowledged powers of taxation; such as that which raises money to relieve the poor, or establish and keep on foot common schools, to build bridges, or work the highway. It confounds two distinct legislative powers: a simple power of taxation with the power of taking private property for public use. The former acts upon communities, and may be exerted in favor of any object which the legislature shall deem for the public benefit. A tax to build a lunatic asylum may be mentioned as one instance. If the power to impose such a tax were to be rested on the ground of individual pecuniary benefit to each one who should be called on to contribute, it is quite obvious that it would not be maintained for a moment. Yet who would doubt that such might be imposed on a local community, a county or even a town? I admit that this power of taxation may be abused; but its exercise cannot be judicially restrained, so long as it is referable to the taxing power."

The same doctrine is laid down in Norwich v. County Commissioners of Hampshire, 13 Pickering 60, and Hingham and Quincy Bridge and Turnpike Corporation v. County of Norfolk, 6 Allen 353. "It has been the practice," says C. J. Shaw, "from the earliest times to charge the costs of certain large and expensive bridges, in whole or in part upon counties; and it is impossible to deny the equity of these provisions." "One of the main purposes," says C. J. Bigelow, "of this general grant of power, was to vest in the legislature a superintending and controlling authority, under and by virtue of which, they might enact all laws, not repugnant to the constitution, of a police and municipal nature, and necessary to the due regulation of the internal affairs of the Commonwealth. It is obvious, that the exercise of such a power is absolutely indispensable, in a wisely governed and well ordered community; and among the purposes for which it is to be exerted, none is more essential than a wise and careful distribution of certain public burdens or duties. Of these a leading one is the construction, support and maintenance of roads and bri...