City of Phoenix, Arizona v. Kolodziejski

Decision Date23 June 1970
Docket NumberNo. 1066,1066
Citation399 U.S. 204,90 S.Ct. 1990,26 L.Ed.2d 523
PartiesCITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZONA et al., Appellants, v. Emily KOLODZIEJSKI
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Rex E. Lee, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellants.

Fred H. Rosenfeld, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee.

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969), this Court held that a State could not restrict the vote in school district elections to owners and lessees of real property and parents of school children because the exclusion of otherwise qualified voters was not shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state interest. This ruling, by its terms applicable to elections of public officials, was extended to elections for the approval of revenue bonds to finance local improvements in Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969). Our decision in Cipriano did not, however, reach the question now presented for decision: Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to real property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds?

This question arises in the following factual setting: On June 10, 1969, the City of Phoenix Arizona, held an election to authorize the issuance of $60,450,000 in general obligation bonds as well as certain revenue bonds. Under Arizona law, property taxes were to be levied to service this indebtedness, although the city was legally privileged to use other revenues for this purpose.1 The general obligation bonds were to be issued to finance various municipal improvements, with the largest amounts to go for the city sewer system, parks and playgrounds, police and public safety buildings, and libraries. Pursuant to Arizona constitutional and statutory provisions, 2 only otherwise qualified voters who were also real property taxpayers were permitted to vote on these bond issues. All of the bond issues submitted to the voters were approved by a majority of those voting.

On June 16, 1969, six days after the election in Phoenix, this Court held in Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, that restricting the franchise to property taxpayers in elections on revenue bonds violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That ruling was applied to the case before the Court in which under local law the authorization of the revenue bonds was not yet final when the challenge to the election was raised in the District Court. On August 1, 1969, appellee Kolodziejski, a Phoenix resident who was otherwise qualified to vote but who owned no real property, filed her complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona challenging the constitutionality of the restriction on the franchise in Arizona bond elections and attacking the validity of the June 1969 election approving the Phoenix bond issues. A District Court of three judges was convened. In the District Court, appellants conceded that, under this Court's decisions in Cipriano and Kramer, supra, the bond election was invalid with regard to the revenue bonds that had been approved. The District Court perceived no significant difference between revenue bonds and general obligation bonds and therefore held that the exclusion of nonproperty-owning voters from the election on the general obligation bonds was unconstitutional under Cipriano and Kramer. Because the authorization of the Phoenix general obligation bonds was not final on the date of the Cipriano decision, the court held the Cipriano rule applicable and declared the June 10, 1969, bond election invalid. The appellants were enjoined from taking further action to issue the bonds approved in that election. The City of Phoenix and the members of the City Council appealed from the judgment of the District Court with respect to the general obligation bonds. We noted probable jurisdiction, 397 U.S. 903, 90 S.Ct. 930, 25 L.Ed.2d 85 (1970). We affirm the judgment of the District Court but do not agree that the ruling in this case should be retroactive to the date of the Cipriano decision.

I

In Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, the denial of the franchise to nonproperty owners in elections on revenue bonds was held to be a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the nonproperty owners since they, as well as property owners, are substantially affected by the issuance of revenue bonds to finance municipal utilities. It is now argued that the rationale of Cipriano does not render unconstitutional the exclusion of non- property owners from voting in elections on general obligation bonds.

The argument proceeds on two related fronts. First, it is said that the Arizona statutes require that property taxes be levied in an amount sufficient to service the general obligation bonds,3 the law thus expressly placing a special burden on property owners for the benefit of the entire community. Second, and more generally, whereas revenue bonds are secured by the revenues from the operation of particular facilities and these revenues may be earned from both property owners and nonproperty owners, general obligation bonds are secured by the general taxing power of the issuing municipality. Since most municipalities rely to a substantial extent on property tax revenues which will be used to make debt service payments if other revenue sources prove insufficient,4 general obligation bonds are in effect a lien on the real property subject to taxation by the issuing municipality. Whatever revenues are actually used to service the bonds, an unavoidable potential tax burden is imposed only on those who own realty since that property cannot be moved beyond the reach of the municipality's taxing power. Hence, according to appellants, the State is justified in recognizing the unique interests of real property owners by allowing only property taxpayers to participate in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds.

Concededly, the case of elections to approve general obligation bonds was not decided in Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra. But we have concluded that the prin- ciples of that case, and of Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, dictate a like result where a State excludes nonproperty taxpayers from voting in elections for the approval of general obligation bonds. The differences between the interests of property owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently substantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise. This is so far several reasons.

First, it is unquestioned that all residents of Phoenix, property owners and nonproperty owners alike, have a substantial interest in the public facilities and the services available in the city and will be substantially affected by the ultimate outcome of the bond election at issue in this case. Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise. Arizona nevertheless excludes nonproperty owners from participating in bond elections and vests in the majority of individual property owners voting in the election the power to approve or disapprove facilities that the municipal government has determined should be financed by issuing general obligation bonds. Placing such power in property owners alone can be justified only by some overriding interest of those owners that the State is entitled to recognize.

Second, although Arizona law ostensibly calls for the levy of real property taxes to service general obligation bonds, other revenues are legally available for this purpose. According to the parties' stipulation in this case, it is anticipated with respect to the instant bonds, as has been true in the past, that more than half of the debt service requirements will be satisfied not from real property taxes but from revenues from other local taxes paid by nonproperty owners as well as those who own real property.5 Not only do those persons excluded from the franchise have a great interest in approving or disapproving municipal improvements, but they will also contribute, as directly as property owners, to the servicing of the bonds by the payment of taxes to be used for this purpose.

Third, the justification for restricting the franchise to the property owners would seem to be strongest in the case of a municipality which, unlike Phoenix, looks only to property tax revenues for servicing general obligation bonds. But even in such a case the justification would be insufficient. Property taxes may be paid initially by property owners, but a significant part of the ultimate burden of each year's tax on rental property will very likely be borne by the tenant rather than the landlord since, as the parties also stipulated in this case, the landlord will treat the property tax as a business expense and normally will be able to pass all or a large part of this cost on to the tenants in the form of higher rent.6 Since most city residents not owning their own homes are lessees of dwelling units, virtually all residents share the burden of property taxes imposed and used to service general obligation bonds. Moreover, property taxes on commercial property,7 much of which is owned by corporations having no vote, will be treated as a cost of doing business and will normally be reflected in the prices of goods and services purchased by nonproperty owners and property owners alike.

While in theory the expected future income from real property, and hence property values in a municipality, may depend in part on the predicted future levels of property taxes,8 the actual impact of an increase in property taxes is problematical.9 Moreover, to the extent that property values are directly affected by the additional potential tax burden entailed in the bond issue, any adverse effect would normally...

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