City of Phoenix v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County

• Decision Date: 21 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 1,CA-CIV,1
• Citation: City of Phoenix v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County, 696 P.2d 724, 144 Ariz. 172 (Ariz. App. 1985)
• Parties: CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, and the Honorable Robert L. Myers, a Judge thereof; and Maricopa County, a body politic, and Jerry I. Hill, Sheriff of Maricopa County, the real parties in interest, Defendants-Appellees. 7509.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 724

696 P.2d 724

144 Ariz. 172

CITY OF PHOENIX, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, and the Honorable Robert L. Myers, a Judge thereof; and Maricopa County, a body politic, and Jerry I. Hill, Sheriff of Maricopa County, the real parties in interest, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CIV 7509.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department A.

Feb. 21, 1985.

Roderick McDougall, City Atty. by Richard J. Graci, Asst. City Atty., Phoenix, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas E. Collins, Maricopa County Atty. by Louis Barry Gorman, Deputy County Atty., Phoenix, for defendants-appellees.

OPINION

BROOKS, Judge.

The City of Phoenix [hereinafter "City"] filed a special action in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking to quash an order issued by Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Robert L. Myers. The order directed the Phoenix Police Department to cause an allegedly mentally disordered person, as to whom a petition for court-ordered evaluation had been filed, to be detained at a hospital facility and to serve copies of the petition, notice of right to hearing, and the court order on her. The City sought a declaratory judgment ruling that the Maricopa County Sheriff has sole legal responsibility in the City of Phoenix, which is within Maricopa County, for taking mentally disordered persons into custody and serving them with process emanating from proceedings pursuant to A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5. ¹ The City named Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff [hereinafter "County"] as the real parties in interest.

After an order to show cause hearing was held, Judge Marquardt found that Judge Myers had not erred or exceeded the scope of his authority in directing that the Phoenix Police Department serve orders issued in furtherance of mental health proceedings instituted under A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5. The trial court denied the motion to quash and ordered that the Phoenix Police Department obey and implement all orders issued to them by the superior court relative to the mental health proceedings. The City appeals to this court.

On appeal the City narrows the question it raises. The City no longer argues that the Phoenix Police Department is not authorized to take allegedly mentally disordered persons into custody. The City limits itself to arguing that the Phoenix Police Department is not authorized by Arizona law to serve any process pursuant to the applicable statutes.

The order signed by Judge Myers appears to have been issued pursuant to A.R.S. § 36-529, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A. If, from the review of the petition for evaluation, the court does not determine that the proposed patient is likely to present a danger to self or others prior to his hearing on court-ordered treatment, but determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the proposed patient is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to self or others or gravely disabled, the court shall issue an order directing the proposed patient to submit to an evaluation at a designated time and place, specifying that the evaluation will take place on an inpatient or an out-patient basis. The court may also order that if the person does not or cannot so submit, that he be taken into custody by a police officer and delivered to an evaluation agency. If the court makes such a conditional order, it shall also make a conditional appointment of counsel for the person to become effective when and if the person is taken into custody pursuant to this section.

B. If, from review of the petition for evaluation, there is reasonable cause to believe that the proposed patient is, as a result of a mental disorder, a danger to self or others or gravely disabled and that the person requires immediate or continued hospitalization prior to his hearing on court-ordered treatment, the court shall order the proposed patient taken into custody and evaluated at an evaluation agency. The court shall promptly appoint counsel for the proposed patient. If an intercounty agreement authorizes the same, the court may order that the evaluation be conducted in another county, and the superior court of the county where the evaluation is conducted shall have concurrent jurisdiction to make appropriate orders concerning the proposed patient.

(Emphasis added.)

The City acknowledges that A.R.S. § 36-529(A) directs that persons be "taken into custody by a police officer." As the City points out, however, the statute does not expressly specify who is to serve orders issued by the superior court pursuant to the statute. Since the statute does not direct any specific person to serve orders, the City concludes that only the sheriff may accomplish such service pursuant to the powers given it in A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(7) which provides that the sheriff shall "[s]erve process and notices in the manner prescribed by law...." Process is defined in A.R.S. § 1-215(26) as "a citation, writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings." A.R.S. § 1-215(38) provides that a " '[w]rit' signifies an order or precept in writing issued in the name of the state or by a court or a judicial officer."

The City points out that there is no similar broad statutory authority for city police officers to serve process. Therefore, the City argues that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is dispositive. See, e.g., Pima County v. Heinfeld, 134 Ariz. 133, 654 P.2d 281 (1982); Lewis v. Industrial Commission, 93 Ariz. 324, 380 P.2d 782 (1963). The City contends that the effect of this rule in this situation would be that since A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(7) specifically mandates that the sheriff is to serve process, it implies that this task shall not be performed by others who are not mentioned.

The City acknowledges that there is nothing to preclude Phoenix Police officers from serving process if Arizona law so designates. The City points out that, in general, the duty of its police officers to serve process is limited to a duty to serve all writs and processes issued by the City Magistrate. Phoenix City Code, Chapter 2, Art. IV, § 2-119(b). However, the City does not dispute that its charter recognizes that all acts required by the laws of the state must be carried out or enforced and that the city council is to enact appropriate legislation to accomplish this. Phoenix City Charter, Chapter 4, § 2(64). Among the responsibilities of the Phoenix Police Department are the enforcement of state laws and city ordinances, protection of life and property, and preservation of law and order. Phoenix City Code, Chapter 2, Art. I, § 2-37. The City does not deny that its police officers are authorized and required to serve process, such as arrest and search warrants, issued by state and county judges in certain specific circumstances as directed by Arizona law. The City's argument is simply that A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5, does not authorize police officers to serve process for mental health proceedings and, without such specific authority, they cannot do so since the general authority for serving process lies solely within the county sheriff's office.

The County argues, and the superior court so found in ruling on the petition for special action, that the legislature intended for "peace officers," including Phoenix police officers, to perform and fulfill duties and follow orders issued by the superior court pursuant to a proceeding arising out of A.R.S. Title 36, Chapter 5, even though specific duties are not individually designated.

In deciding whether the mental health statutes, specifically A.R.S. § 36-529, may be construed to authorize service of process thereunder by the Phoenix Police Department, we must determine, if possible, the intent of the legislature. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Maricopa County, 120 Ariz. 533, 587 P.2d 252 (1978). To arrive at the intention of the legislature, the court looks to the words, context, subject matter, effects and consequences, reason and spirit of the law. Arnold Const. Co. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 109 Ariz. 495, 512 P.2d 1229 (1973). The City argues that this court...