City of Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School
| Citation | 54 A. 463,204 Pa. 635 |
| Decision Date | 05 January 1903 |
| Docket Number | 148 |
| Parties | Pittsburg, Appellant, v. Sterrett Subdistrict School |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Argued November 6, 1902
Appeal, No. 148, Oct. T., 1902, by plaintiff, from judgment of C.P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., Nov. T., 1893, M.L.D. No. 19 for defendant non obstante veredicto in case of City of Pittsburg v. Sterrett Subdistrict School. Affirmed.
Scire facias sur municipal lien. Before EVANS, J.
At the trial the jury returned the following verdict:
And now, to wit: March 17, 1902, we, the jurors empaneled in the above entitled case, find for plaintiff for $2,048.41 subject to question of law reserved, to wit: Whether real estate, the property of the subdistrict schools in the city of Pittsburg, is liable to assessment for municipal improvements.
Judgment was subsequently entered for the defendant non obstante veredicto.
Error assigned was the judgment of the court.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
William W. Smith, assistant city solicitor, with him T. D. Carnahan, city solicitor, for appellants. -- Why should the city at large be taxed to pay for the improvement of the property of this particular subdistrict? Residents of the city at large are not entitled to any use whatever of this school, but only residents of the Sterrett subdistrict have the right to attend this school. This case is, therefore, entirely different from Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 32, relied upon in the court below, because in that case the city and school district were coterminous, and the enforcement of the lien would be only a transfer of public funds from one public pocket to another public pocket.
It is settled in Broad Street, Sewickley M. E. Church's Appeal, 165 Pa. 475, that an assessment for municipal improvements is not taxation, in its general form, but is a special assessment upon property specially benefited. To the same effect are New Castle v. Jackson, 172 Pa. 86, and Philadelphia v. Union Burial Ground Society, 178 Pa. 533, in both of which cases the Broad Street case, supra, is cited and approved.
Jesse T. Lazear, with him Thomas C. Lazear, and Charles P. Orr, for appellee. -- The subdistrict public school property is public property. It is a public institution, although under the control of a quasi corporation, and is subject to visitation by the legislature. A subdistrict school is therefore but an agent of the commonwealth, and a quasi corporation for the sole purpose of carrying out the madates of the constitution: Ford v. Kendall Borough School District, 121 Pa. 543; O'Donnell v. Cass Twp. School District, 133 Pa. 162; Chalfant v. Edwards, 173 Pa. 246; Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 33.
Public property is never subject to any manner of taxation in the absence of express legislative authority. No exemption is required: Cooley on Taxation, 130; Elliott on Roads, 403; Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 33; County of Erie v. City of Erie, 113 Pa. 360; Poor Directors v. School Directors, 42 Pa. 21; Mayor, etc., of New York v. Brooklyn, 2 L.R.A. 148.
An assessment of this nature is an exercise of the taxing power: McKeesport v. Fidler, 147 Pa. 532; Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 33; Sewickley M. E. Church's App., 165 Pa. 475 (478).
This action is a sci. fa. sur municipal lien against a public subdistrict school of the city, and the land described in the writ, together with the school building thereon erected, is used exclusively for public school purposes. Such property is not liable to a lien for a municipal improvement. The action is in rem. The land could not be sold to enforce payment of the judgment and the children deprived of school privileges. Where there can be no execution there can be no judgment: Erie v. School District, 23 Pa. C.C. Rep. 428; Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 33; William v. Controllers, 18 Pa. 275; Patterson v. Pa. Reform School, 92 Pa. 229; Ford v. Kendall Boro. School Dist., 121 Pa. 543; Briegel v. Philadelphia, 135 Pa. 451.
In the case of Erie v. School District, 17 Pa.Super. 33, the proceedings were by lien and sci. fa. thereon, which being unsuccessful, assumpsit was resorted to as a last resort: Erie v. School District, 23 Pa. C.C. Rep. 428.
Before MITCHELL, DEAN, FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.
There is but a single question in this case and that is whether real estate, purchased and held by the board of directors of subschool districts in the city of Pittsburg, is liable to assessment for grading, paving and curbing a street on which said real estate abuts. The learned trial judge answered the question in the negative and denied the right of the city to recover from a subdistrict the cost of the improvement.
By the Act of February 12, 1869, P.L. 150, the city of Pittsburg was created an independent school district. A central board of education was established having corporate capacity, with certain powers over, and duties relative to, the schools and subdistrict schools of the city. The board is composed of one member elected by the board of directors of each of the subdistricts. It is required among other things to maintain one high school and one or more separate schools for children of color, and authorized to take and hold real estate for these purposes; to assess and, through the city treasurer, collect sufficient taxes to establish and maintain the high school and schools for children of color and for the payment of the teachers of the several subdistrict schools. Each ward is made a subdistrict and two school directors are to be elected annually therein for a term of three years. The board of directors of a subdistrict is authorized, inter alia, to purchase and hold such real estate and personal property as may be necessary for the establishment and support of the schools within their respective districts, and to dispose of the same; to cause suitable lots of ground to be purchased or rented, and suitable buildings to be erected or rented for schoolhouses, and to supply the same with the proper conveniences and fuel, and are given general supervision over the schools; to levy a special tax to be applied solely to the purchasing or paying for the ground, the building or erection of schoolhouses thereon, the repairing of said houses, and furniture, apparatus and all necessary books and stationery and fuel therefor, and janitor service; to appoint the teachers of the subdistrict schools and to dismiss them at any time for cause, and to suspend or expel from the schools all persons found guilty of incorrigible conduct. The board is required to admit to the school of the subdistrict all persons between the ages of six and twenty-one years, residents of the subdistrict, except persons of color.
In 1891 the Sterrett subdistrict, the appellee, purchased a lot of ground within the subdistrict and erected a school building thereon, which, since its erection, has been used exclusively for school purposes. This property abuts on Linden avenue, a public street of the city, which in 1893 was graded, paved and curbed by the city. Viewers were appointed by the court of common pleas who assessed the property of the subdistrict with $1,336.65, as special benefits, which assessment was reported to, and duly confirmed by, the court. A municipal lien was filed by the city against the property under the Act of May 16, 1891, P.L. 75, and a scire facias thereon was issued to enforce payment of the claim against the premises. An affidavit of defense and plea were filed and no further proceedings were taken on the scire facias. About five years thereafter, the city issued a scire facias to revive and continue the lien and on the trial thereof the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the question "whether real estate, the property of the subdistrict schools in the city of Pittsburg, is liable to assessment for municipal improvements." Subsequently, on motion of appellee's counsel, the court entered judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto, on the ground that the real estate of the subdistrict was not liable for a municipal claim for a street improvement, because the property was used exclusively for school purposes; and held further that this proceeding is an action in rem and as "it is not pretended that this land could be sold to satisfy this lien," judgment should not be entered on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The provisions of the act of 1869, as referred to and quoted above, indicate sufficiently for the purposes of this case the powers and duties of the central board of education and of the board of directors of the respective subdistricts. The system of education created by the act requires the united action of the central and subdistrict boards of directors to render it complete and effective. When organized and in operation it is an efficient means of enforcing article 10 section 1, of the constitution, which provides that "the general assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools, wherein all the children of this commonwealth, above the age of six years, may be educated." While the city is the school district, yet the title to the real estate, necessary for subdistrict school purposes, is taken and held by the directors of the subdistricts. It is also true that the real estate in each subdistrict is purchased and paid for by the money of the subdistrict in which it is located. These facts, however, do not deprive it of the character of public property used for school purposes. It is one of the necessary and indispensable means which the state through the city uses in carrying out the system of public education commanded by the constitution of...
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