City of Platte City to Use of Prior v. Paxton
| Decision Date | 10 January 1910 |
| Citation | 124 S.W. 531,141 Mo.App. 175 |
| Parties | THE CITY OF PLATTE CITY to the use of W. A. PRIOR, Respondent, v. WILLIAM M. PAXTON, Appellant |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Platte Circuit Court.--Hon. A. D. Burnes, Judge.
Judgment affirmed.
Wm. M Paxton, pro se, Jno. W. Coots and Chas. H. Winston for appellant.
(1) No city can enter into any contract except in writing. R. S 1899, sec. 6759. And the entire work must be done after, and not before, the making of the contract. Prior's bid does not specify thirty days in which to complete the work, nor any time at all; nor does the advertisement for bids specify any time. On October 2, 1907, the board of aldermen accepted Prior's bid, but added that the work should be completed in thirty days. On November 7, 1907, the street commissioner reported to the board that he had closed the contract with Prior for the construction of the sidewalk and on the same day the board passed an ordinance ratifying and approving the commissioner's act in closing the contract with Prior after the completion of the work. No time for the completion of the work having been specified in the notice to bidders, all prospective bidders and the public had a right to assume that the time would be fifteen days, as provided in the general ordinances of the city, and not thirty days, as afterwards provided by the order of the board in accepting Prior's bid on October 2, 1907. This condition of affairs very materially affected the competition of bidders, and had a tendency to deter bidders, for many contractors might have been able to do the work in thirty days, but not in fifteen days. The alleged contract as let was not such as was advertised, and hence was illegal and void. Galbraith v. Newton, 30 Mo.App. 393; Springfield v. Davis, 80 Mo.App. 574; Turner v. Springfield, 117 Mo.App. 418; Excelsior Springs v. Ettenson, 120 Mo.App. 224.
James H. Hull for respondent.
(1) The city passed an ordinance condemning appellant's walk and authorizing the construction of a new walk in lieu thereof, directed in said ordinance, that the street commissioner make an estimate of the cost of same and to draft plans and specifications for the same, to advertise for bids all of which was properly done. Respondent Prior, in due time put in a written bid stating he would do the work as per plans and specifications on file as per published notice for twenty cents per square foot, which bid was accepted by order of the board, duly entered on the journal and the street commissioner was directed by order of the board, entered of record on the journal directing him to notify said Prior of the acceptance of his bid, which was accordingly done, walk was built according to contract and street commissioner made report to the board of aldermen which report was duly accepted and an ordinance passed ratifying and accepting the report and all that the street commissioner had done. This ordinance with the subsequent proceedings thereunder, constitute a sufficient writing and acceptance by the party to be charged to fulfill all requirements of the statute. California v. Telephone Co., 112 Mo.App. 722; Lancaster v. Briggs & Nelvin, 118 Mo.App. 576; Water Co. v. Aurora, 129 Mo. 540; Saleno v. Neosho, 127 Mo. 627; Fayette ex rel. v. Rich, 123 Mo.App. 145. (2) No time having been specified in the ordinance for the completion of the work, all prospective bidders and the public were compelled to assume, as the law provides, that the work must be completed within a reasonable time and to put in their bids accordingly. The contract as let by the board to respondent was exactly the same as if no reference to the time of completion of the work had been made in the acceptance of respondent's bid. Ayers v. Schmohl, 86 Mo.App. 349; Carlin v. Cavender, 56 Mo. 286; Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258; Strassheim v. Jerman, 56 Mo. 104; Allen v. La Force, 95 Mo.App. 324; Hilgert v. Paving Co., 107 Mo.App. 396; Montague v. Kolkmeyer, 120 S.W. 637; Excelsior Springs v. Ettenson, 120 Mo.App. 215.
This suit is to enforce the lien of a special taxbill issued by Platte City, a city of the fourth class, in payment of the cost of laying a granitoid sidewalk in front of premises of defendant. The answer interposes a number of defenses. The cause was tried to the court without the aid of a jury and judgment was entered for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.
On May 1, 1907, an ordinance was passed entitled "An Ordinance to condemn wooden and brick and defective sidewalks in the city of Platte City and for the removal of all walks so condemned and to provide for the construction of new sidewalks so condemned and removed." A wooden sidewalk in front of defendant's property was condemned in this ordinance and was ordered to be removed and replaced by a granitoid sidewalk. Defendant failed to comply with the ordinance and on August 7th of the same year another ordinance was passed in which, after reciting the enactment of the first ordinance and defendant's refusal to comply with its requirements, it was provided that the wooden walk be removed and replaced by a granitoid walk. Full specifications for the improvement were embodied in the ordinance. The specifications included the work of excavating and provided that the cost of such work should be treated as a part of the cost of the improvement. The street commissioner was ordered to prepare specifications and an estimate of the cost of the improvement, to file them with the city clerk, and then to advertise for bids.
In obedience to this ordinance, the street commissioner prepared and filed plans and specifications which were the same as those embraced in the ordinance, with the exception that they failed to mention the work of making the necessary excavation for the sidewalk. An estimate was filed at the same time and, in further compliance with the ordinance, an advertisement was made for bids and in response thereto plaintiff filed the following bid on October 2nd:
At a regular meeting of the board of aldermen held October 2nd, a motion was carried that the bid of plaintiff being the only bid and, consequently, the lowest and best bid, be accepted and
No written contract was executed by the parties, the ordinance bid and acceptance by motion being treated as the contract. It is conceded the work was done in accordance with the specifications except in one particular. The ordinance required the walk to be laid on the established grade. Defendant contends this was not done, while plaintiff contends that this requirement was substantially met. After...
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