City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church
| Decision Date | 04 November 1969 |
| Citation | 82 Cal.Rptr. 1,1 Cal.App.3d 384 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF PLEASANT HILL, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF PLEASANT HILL, a Corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 25236. |
Charles J. Williams, Martinez, for appellant.
Cox & Cummins, James E. Cox, Bernard F. Cummins, Martinez, for defendant.
Plaintiff city has appealed from a condemnation judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding the defendant church $86,000, consisting of $39,000 for property condemned for a city street, and $47,000 for damages to the remainder of the property. The city contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in its rulings upon the admissibility of certain evidence; that the trial court erred in refusing the city's offer of proof for the purpose of impeachment upon the issue of severance damage; that the severance damage award is excessive and not supported by any evidence; that the city was denied a fair trial and due process of law because of jury misconduct and irregularity in the jury proceedings; and that the city was denied a fair trial because of the misconduct of the church's counsel. An examination of these contentions reveals no prejudicial error. The judgment must be affirmed.
In its before condition the property consisted of 70,809 square feet. It may be visualized as the letter 'L' with the horizontal base running 422.20 feet from south (left) to north (right), where it abutted upon an established thoroughfare. The vertical part of the 'L' rested on the southerly 270 feet of the base and extended westerly (upward) approximately 225 or 226 feet to form almost a square. The horizontal part of the 'L' had a frontage from east (bottom) to west (top) of 65 feet on the established thoroughfare, and on the east (top) ran southerly, at a uniform width of 65 feet, 150.34 feet to a point where it joined the main part of the property.
The property condemned consisted of the entire northerly (right) extension of the 'L' approximately 65 feet by 150 feet, and a 60-foot strip off the easterly side (bottom) of the remainder of the property, for a total of 26,068 square feet as computed by the city's witness. This property included a graveled driveway which led in from the thoroughfare on the north to a parking area on property not condemned, and also a driveway from the parking area to the end of a street which abutted on the base of the property before the take, about 35 feet easterly of the southeast corner.
After the condemnation the church was left with 44,847 square feet with a frontage of 270 feet on the newly constructed street, which was designed and constructed as a north-south thoroughfare. The property had been first improved with one structure in 1954, and additions to this structure were constructed in 1956. At the time of the condemnation these improvements, consisting of approximately 2,400 square feet of enclosed space and 580 square feet of porch, housed a kitchen, nursery and Sunday School rooms. Immediately adjacent was a chapel, Sanctuary or auditorium with office and extra rooms which had been constructed in 1963, and enclosed an additional approximately 2,625 square feet. These improvements, together with landscaping and paving for the parking area and walkways, remained after the condemnation.
The principal issue at the trial was whether the church had suffered any severance damages. All witnesses who testified, whether concerning suitable use, or value or both, agreed that before the taking the highest and best use of the property was for church purposes. All those appraising the property approached the question of value by appraising the land on the basis of comparable sales, and the improvements on the basis of reconstruction cost, some with, and some without an allowance for depreciation. 1
The pastor of the church, two members of its congregation who were active in affairs of the church, and two independent clergymen, a rabbi and a Presbyterian minister, testified to the effect that after the making the property was valueless for church purposes, and that the congregation would have to find a new site. Two appraisers echoed these views and, with the pastor and the minister, gave estimates of severance damage predicated upon the loss of the value of the improvements.
For the city, three ministers, including a former pastor of the defendant church, and two architects, one of whom had laid out a plan of development for the entire property which the church claimed represented its needs, testified that the remaining property was still suitable for church purposes after the taking and could be adopted to the needs contemplated by the church. Two appraisers agreed with this conclusion and testified there was no severance damages. A third, who had originally appraised the property for the church, was called by the city as a witness and testified that the buildings would be useful for church purposes after the taking. Nevertheless, he opined that the remaining property had suffered severance damages of $22,500. Neither party explored the basis on which this witness predicated his estimate of severance damage.
The foregoing testimony is reviewed in more detail below. It, together with testimony as to land values, is summarized in Appendix A annexed hereto and made a part of this opinion. Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, 11 jurors and the trial court in denying a motion for new trial, approved the theory inherent in the testimony of the witnesses produced by the church. With the foregoing background the city's contentions can be examined in the light of the relevant evidence.
The church produced a plan proposed in 1957, and a large scale model which portrayed graphically and in three dimensions the utilization of the whole of the original property for the development of improvements for church purposes.
At the outset the city indicated its objection to the use of this evidence. It moved the court to exclude the model from the view of the jury. This motion was denied on the theory that the model, without removable structures which represented proposed as distinguished from existing structures, correctly depicted the appearance of the property before the taking, and showed the portion condemned.
Subsequently, Mr. Norried, the head usher and former member of the trustee's board and board of deacons of the church, testified that the graphic plan represented a master plan prepared by Architect Dennis and accepted by the board of trustees of the church in 1957; that because of lack of money the sanctuary was not built according to the master plan. (It is smaller and was located more easterly to abut on and furnish convenient access and joint use with the previously constructed assembly hall.) This witness identified the removable structures which accompanied the model in relation to proposed structures on the graphic plan, and placed them on the model. The city's objection to the introduction in evidence of the graphic plan and the three dimensional model with the proposed structures was overruled.
The proposition upon which the city relies for the exclusion of the foregoing evidence, and the grounds the church asserted for its admission are both found in the following passage from Sacramento, etc., R.R. Co. v. Heilbron (1909) 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979: '* * * this court by its latest utterances has definitively aligned itself with the great majority of the courts in holding that damages must be measured by the market value of the land at the time it is taken, that the test is not the value for a special purpose, but the fair market value of the land in view of all the purposes to which it is naturally adapted; that, therefore, while evidence that it is 'valuable' for this or that or another purpose may always be given and should be freely received, the value in terms of money, the price, which one or another witness may think the land would bring for this or that or the other specific purpose is not admissible as an element in determining that market value, for such evidence opens wide the door to unlimited vagaries and speculations concerning problematical prices which might under possible contingencies be paid for the land, and distracts the mind of the jury from the single question--that of market value--the highest sum which the property is worth to persons generally, purchasing in the open market in consideration of the land's adaptability for any proven use.'
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