City of Portland v. Meyer

• Court: Oregon Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: [32 Or. 369] BEAN, J.
• Citation: City of Portland v. Meyer, 32 Or. 368, 52 P. 21 (Or. 1898)
• Decision Date: 07 February 1898
• Parties: CITY OF PORTLAND v. MEYER.

52 P. 21

32 Or. 368

CITY OF PORTLAND v. MEYER.

Supreme Court of Oregon

February 7, 1898

Appeal from circuit court, Multnomah county.

H Meyer was convicted of violating an ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of slaughter houses in the city of Portland, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Paxton & Beach, for appellant.

Wm.M Cake, City Atty., for respondent.

BEAN, J.

By subdivision 23 of section 35 of the charter of the city of Portland (Laws 1893, p. 822) the council has power and authority "to license, tax, control, and regulate slaughter houses, *** and to provide for their exclusion from the city limits or any part thereof." In January, 1894 while this provision of the charter was in force, the defendant erected, or caused to be erected, a slaughter house within the corporate limits of the city, and in September following the council passed an ordinance making it unlawful for any person to maintain such a structure therein. For a violation of this ordinance, by the maintenance of his previously established slaughter house, the defendant was arrested in October, 1894, and, having been convicted, brings the cause here for review.

The only question for determination is whether the provisions of the charter quoted confer upon the city power to prohibit the use of slaughter houses established and in operation at and prior to the passage of an ordinance for that purpose. It is not claimed that the power to license, tax, regulate, and control slaughter houses will support such legislation, but the contention of the city is that the power is to be found in the authority "to provide for their exclusion from the city limits," while the defendant's position is that the power of exclusion so conferred was intended to enable the council to prevent the future erection of slaughter houses, and not to put an end to an existing business of that kind. And this is the point of contention between the parties to this litigation.

In construing a statute, words of common use are ordinarily to be taken in their natural, plain, and obvious signification, and, in view of this rule, we are of the opinion that the power of exclusion, as given by the charter is broad enough to authorize the city to prevent the maintenance of slaughter houses already in existence, and to punish offenders against the ordinance therefor. The word "exclusion" is defined by Webster as "the act of excluding, or shutting out, whether by thrusting out or by preventing admission; a debarring; rejection prohibition"; and by the Century as "the act of excluding or shutting out"; and, also, "the act of...