City of Providence v. Solomon, 80-396-A

• Decision Date: 30 April 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-396-A,80-396-A
• Citation: 444 A.2d 870
• Parties: CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. v. Anthony J. SOLOMON. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 870

444 A.2d 870

CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al. v. Anthony J. SOLOMON.

No. 80-396-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

April 30, 1982.

John Rotondi, Jr., City Sol., Edward R. DiPippo, Gerald G. Norigian, Asst. City Sols., Providence, for appellants.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., Eileen G. Cooney, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

At stake in this civil action is approximately $659,632 in unclaimed funds in the registry of the Probate Court of the City of Providence (the Probate Court) to which both the state and the city of Providence (the city) claim entitlement under the provisions of title 33, chapter 21, of the 1956 General Laws (1969 Reenactment) governing administration of unclaimed real and personal property. Acting in his capacity as General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island, the defendant, Anthony J. Solomon, filed a petition in the Probate Court on February 14, 1980, seeking the transfer to the General Treasurer of all funds in that court's registry which had been unclaimed for a period in excess of five years. On April 8, 1980, the Probate Court granted the petition, and the city filed its appeal therefrom in the Superior Court. After a hearing on the matter, a Superior Court justice affirmed the Probate Court decree, concluding that as a matter of law the state was entitled to the funds in question then held by the Probate Court. Judgment was entered on behalf of the state on August 8, 1980, from which the city prosecutes its appeal to this court.

It is clear from the terms of the state's petition and the statutory provision under which it was brought, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 33-21-18, as amended by P.L. 1979, ch. 118, § 1, that the funds in question are those that have been in the Probate Court's registry prior to 1975. What remains unclear is precisely how long these funds have been in that court's custody. Unfortunately, the schedule of funds attached to the report of unclaimed estates prepared by the clerk of the Probate Court does not indicate the dates on which such monies were deposited in the court's registry, and the city has failed to supply us with such pertinent data. We have been advised by the clerk of the Probate Court that prior to the filing of the state's 1980 petition, funds held in the court's registry remaining unclaimed for the requisite statutory time period have never before been transferred to the state. He also explained that since 1961 monies which had formerly been transferred to the City Treasurer have simply been retained by the Probate Court. Thus, the funds involved in the case at bar have perhaps been in the court's registry since 1961. Therein lies the root of this controversy, for the Legislature has amended the provisions of ch. 21 on four separate occasions in the last twenty-one years. We therefore find ourselves called upon for the first time to weave our way through this morass of statutory revisions to ascertain their effect and, ultimately, to resolve this dispute.

To provide some historical perspective, we turn to the common-law rule of escheat. As that rule was adopted in this country, both the real and personal property of one who died intestate without heirs or next of kin escheated to the state within which such property was situated as an incident of the state's sovereignty. Boswell v. Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc., 292 Ala. 344, 349-50, 294 So.2d 428, 432 (1974); 2 Scott, Trusts § 142.2 at 1093-94 (3d ed. 1967). Actually, in more technically correct terminology, under the English common law "escheat" referred to the reversion of real estate to the crown for lack of heirs or legal representatives and "bona vacantia" referred to the reversion of personal property to the crown because of the absence of an owner. State v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 212 Ark. 530, 534-35, 206 S.W.2d 771, 773-74 (1947).

In Rhode Island the common-law rule was abrogated in 1768 with the passage of an act granting to the towns the right to take possession of unclaimed property left by a decedent until such time as claimed by the heirs or legal representatives properly entitled to its distribution. See Public Laws 1798, "An Act for Securing the Estates of Persons dying leaving real or personal Estate within this State, and leaving no known Heir, or others entitled to Distribution, within the United States" § 1, p. 310. ¹ This provision has been interpreted as vesting in the cities and towns both the beneficial interest and the use of unclaimed realty and personalty of any person dying testate or intestate as compensation for its care and custody as long as it remains abandoned. See Attorney General v. City of Providence, 8 R.I. 8 (1862).

The beneficial interest in unclaimed estates continued to be vested in the municipalities of this state from 1768 until 1961 when the Legislature unequivocally rescinded its waiver of the right to escheat of personal property, leaving to the cities and towns only the beneficial interest and use of unclaimed real estate within their borders. See MacMurray v. Comstock, 99 R.I. 368, 374, 208 A.2d 119, 122 (1965); P.L. 1822, "An act securing the Estates of persons dying, leaving real or personal estate within this State, and leaving no known heir or others entitled to distribution within the United States" § 1, p. 241; G.L. 1909, ch. 317, §§ 1, 5 to 9; G.L. 1923, ch. 368, §§ 1, 5 to 9; G.L. 1938, ch. 582, §§ 1, 5 to 9; G.L. 1956, §§ 33-21-1, -5 to -9; P.L. 1961, ch. 195, § 6. The provisions of the 1961 amendment germane to this appeal dictated that, subject to the debts against the estate, personal property of a person who died intestate without known heirs or legal representatives escheated to the state. Section 33-21-12. Similarly, unclaimed personal property of an owner, beneficial owner, or person entitled to such property whose whereabouts were unknown for a period of seven years escheated to the state pursuant to § 33-21-13. Also included was a proviso subjecting any personalty of an absentee's estate to the state's right of escheat. Section 33-20-11.

Seven years later the General Assembly again substantially revised ch. 21, repealing the former Unclaimed Estates Act as enacted by P.L. 1961, ch. 195, and enacting new provisions relating to unclaimed personalty in the possession of various private parties as well as public officials and agencies. See P.L. 1968, ch. 256, § 1 (now codified in G.L. 1956 [1969 Reenactment] §§ 33-21-12 to -19). In general, these provisions specified the time period after which personal property would be presumed abandoned if it remained unclaimed and prescribed the procedures controlling the delivery of such abandoned property to the state General Treasurer. Id. (§§ 33-21-21 to -23, -27 to -28, and -34 to -35). For purposes of the instant case the revision with which we are specifically concerned is § 33-21-18, which reads:

"Property held by public officers and agencies.--All intangible personal property held for the owner by any public corporation, public authority, or public officer of this state, or a political subdivision thereof, that has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than seven (7) years is presumed abandoned; provided, however, that no provision of this chapter shall be construed to apply to any property held by any state or municipal court, or to any officer or employee thereof by virtue of his or her office or employment thereby." (Emphasis added.)

This section was subsequently modified in the next series of revisions to ch. 21 in 1978. A reading of the latter version readily discloses the differences between them.

"33-21-18. PROPERTY HELD BY PUBLIC OFFICERS AND AGENCIES.--All intangible personal property held for the owner by any public corporation, public authority, probate court, or public officer of this state, or a political subdivision thereof, that has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than five (5) years is presumed abandoned; provided, however, that no provision of this chapter shall be construed to apply to any property held by any state court as set forth in 8-12-1 or to any officer or employee thereof by virtue of his or her office or employment thereby." Public Laws 1978, ch. 351, § 1.

See also P.L. 1978, ch. 205, art. X, § 1. The 1978 enactment thus reduced the abandonment period from seven to five years and, more importantly, made this provision applicable to the Probate Courts.

The current enactment of ch. 21 deletes the "abandonment" terminology used in P.L. 1978, ch. 351, and reverts to the more direct "escheats to the state" phraseology previously found in the 1961 enactment. See title 33, chapter 21, of the 1956 General Laws (1969 Reenactment), as amended by P.L. 1979, ch. 118, §§ 1 and 3. The only specific revision we need make note of for purposes of this case is the inclusion in § 33-21-18 of the term "tangible" personal property, rendering the proviso expressly applicable to both tangible and intangible personalty. That section now reads:

"Property held by public officers and agencies and the probate court.--All tangible and intangible personal property held for the owner by any public corporation, public authority, probate court or public officer of this state, or a political subdivision thereof, that has remained unclaimed by the owner for more than five (5) years escheats to this state; provided, however, that no provision of this chapter shall be construed to apply to any property held by any state court, as set forth in § 8-12-1, or to any officer or employee thereof by virtue of his or her office or employment thereby."

Although the 1961 version of the Unclaimed Estates Act contained an expansive definition of personal property encompassing both tangible and intangible personalty, § 33-21-11, no definition of personal property, either tangible or intangible, was set forth in any of the subsequent enactments. However, intangible property generally refers to that type of property that is...