City of Rahway v. Cleary, 248.

• Citation: 159 A. 813
• Decision Date: 13 April 1932
• Docket Number: No. 248.,248.
• Parties: CITY OF RAHWAY et al. v. CLEARY, Circuit Judge, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

159 A. 813

CITY OF RAHWAY et al.

v. CLEARY, Circuit Judge, et al.

No. 248.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

April 13, 1932.

Certiorari by the City of Rahway and others, organized in joint meeting and known as the "Rahway Valley" Joint Meeting, to review the judgments of the Union. County Circuit Court, Frank L. Cleary, Judge thereof.

Judgments under review affirmed.

Argued October term, 1931, before TRENCHARD, DALY, and DONGES, JJ.

Francis V. Dobbins, of Rahway, for prosecutor.

John Milton, of Jersey City, and Forlenza & Harrington, of Newark, for defendants.

PER CURIAM.

This certiorari seeks a review of the action of Circuit Court Judge Cleary, sitting in the Union circuit court, in a certain proceeding under "An Act concerning arbitration and awards," P. L. 1923, p. 291 (Comp. St. Supp. § 9—21 et seq.).

On September 15, 1930, a group of municipalities, which had organized in joint meeting as the "Rahway Valley" joint meeting, entered into an agreement with the defendant contractors to submit all claims of the contractors growing out of the construction of the Rahway Valley trunk sewer to the award and determination of certain arbitrators. The arbitrators met on various days and took testimony, and on November 20, 1930, submitted their award to the joint meeting.

Subsequently, notice was given by the contractors of an application to Judge Cleary, to be made on February 10, 1931, to confirm the award and to enter judgment. The joint meeting gave notice of an application to Judge Cleary to vacate the award, alleging generally partiality of the arbitrators, improper conduct in the admission of evidence, and lack of authority to determine all of the questions passed upon in the award. Later an additional reason was served, namely, that the agreement did not contain any provision for entering judgment, and therefore none could be entered on the award, and that the arbitrators were not sworn, and that the award was irregular in form.

The circuit court judge declined to vacate the awards, confirmed the same, and ordered judgments to be entered in favor of the parties entitled thereto for the sums awarded.

The first point raised is that the court was without jurisdiction because the parties had not agreed that the award should be made a judgment of court, as provided by section 2 of the act of 1923 (Comp. St. Supp. § 9— 22).

Section 8 of said act (Comp. St. Supp. § 9—28) provides that at any time within three months any party may apply to any justice or judge to confirm the award, and section 12 (Comp. St. Supp. § 9—32) provides that, upon confirmation, the judge may order judgment entered in the court in which such judge sits. This proceeding is quite separate from the procedure laid down in the second section. There seems no room for doubt that the circuit court judge had jurisdiction to deal with the matter as provided in the several sections of the act.

Point 2 is that there was evident partiality in the arbitrators or some of them. We find no evidence to support the charge that F. J. Colosey was partial, and that he failed to faithfully perform his duties. The judge found to the contrary, and we think he was justified in so finding.

Prosecutor urges that the failure of the arbitrators to be sworn before entering upon the performance of their duties voids the award, and relies upon section 6 of "An Act for regulating references and determining controversies by arbitration," 1 Comp. St. 1910, pp. 103, 106. However, the act of 1923 Is a complete scheme covering the subject-matter, and in section 16 (Comp. St. Supp. § 9—36) provides that all acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith are...