City of Rapid City v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 14 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 21095.,21095.
• Citation: 2000 SD 77,612 N.W.2d 289
• Parties: CITY OF RAPID CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William ANDERSON, Stanley W. Scheurer, Individually, and Marlys Faber, in her capacity as Register of Deeds, Pennington County, South Dakota, Defendants and Appellees, Marlys Faber, in her capacity as Register of Deeds, Pennington County, Third Party Plaintiff and Appellee, v. City of Box Elder, a municipal corporation of the State of South Dakota, Third Party Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

612 N.W.2d 289

2000 SD 77

CITY OF RAPID CITY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. William ANDERSON, Stanley W. Scheurer, Individually, and Marlys Faber, in her capacity as Register of Deeds, Pennington County, South Dakota, Defendants and Appellees, Marlys Faber, in her capacity as Register of Deeds, Pennington County, Third Party Plaintiff and Appellee, v. City of Box Elder, a municipal corporation of the State of South Dakota, Third Party Defendant and Appellee.

No. 21095.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs February 14, 2000.

Decided June 14, 2000.

Robert R. Jackson, City Attorney, Rapid City, for appellant.

Robert M. Nash of Wilson, Olson, Nash & Becker, Rapid City, for appellees Anderson and Scheurer.

Glenn A. Brenner and Ronald D. Buskerud, Pennington County States Attorney, Rapid City, for appellee Faber.

Rexford A. Hagg of Whiting, Hagg & Hagg, Rapid City, for appellee City of Box Elder.

AMUNDSON, Justice.

[¶ 1.] City of Rapid City, South Dakota (Rapid City) appeals the declaratory judgment holding that the City of Box Elder, South Dakota (Box Elder) had jurisdiction to approve a subdivision plat. We affirm in part, reverse and remand in part.

FACTS

[¶ 2.] In July of 1998, William Anderson (Anderson) and Stanley Scheurer (Scheurer) filed a plat to subdivide seven acres of their real property into five lots. The property, Paradise Estates, is located approximately 2.8 miles from the city limits of Box Elder, 2.9 miles from the city limits of Rapid City, and .7 miles from the Rapid City Airport. Around July 20, 1998, Anderson and Scheurer submitted their plat to the City Council of Box Elder for approval. The approved plat was then submitted to the Pennington County Register of Deeds, who reviewed, accepted, and filed the plat on July 22, 1998.

[¶ 3.] After filing, Anderson and Scheurer applied for a building permit through Pennington County Planning and Zoning Commission. At this time, Rapid City became aware of the plat. Rapid City believed that the property was within its jurisdiction. Rapid City thereafter commenced a declaratory judgment action against Anderson, Scheurer, and the Pennington County Register of Deeds Marlys Faber (Faber), to have the plat held invalid. Rapid City claimed that under SDCL 11-6-26¹ Box Elder did not have subdivision jurisdiction over the subject property. Anderson and Scheurer counterclaimed alleging Rapid City's annexation of its airport was not valid under SDCL Chapter 9-4.² A third-party action was also initiated by Faber against Box Elder claiming it had no platting jurisdiction because Box Elder "does not have a major street plan for the subject property nor has it filed a certified copy with the Register of Deeds of Pennington County."

[¶ 4.] The trial court found that the annexation of the Rapid City airport was invalid. Further, the trial court found that, based upon the invalid annexation, under SDCL 11-6-26 Box Elder has platting jurisdiction by virtue of its one-tenth of a mile closer proximity to the subject property. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed both Rapid City's declaratory judgment action and the third-party action against Box Elder.

[¶ 5.] Rapid City appeals the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Rapid City's annexation of its airport was invalid?

2. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Box Elder could validly approve a subdivision plat within three miles of its corporate limits, but which was not covered by its major street plan as required by SDCL 11-6-26?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 6.] We have often stated that "`[i]n [reviewing] declaratory judgment actions, this Court "has an obligation to reach its legal conclusions independent from the conclusions reached by the trial court."'" Agar Sch. Dist. No. 58-1 v. McGee, 1997 SD 31, ¶ 10, 561 N.W.2d 318, 321 (quoting Reis v. Miller, 1996 SD 75, ¶ 5, 550 N.W.2d 78, 79-80 (quoting Black Hills Novelty Co. v. South Dakota Comm'n on Gaming, 520 N.W.2d 70, 72 (S.D.1994) (quotations omitted))). In addition, we review a trial court's findings of fact "under a clearly erroneous standard and its conclusions of law under a de novo standard." Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 1997 SD 50, ¶ 4, 562 N.W.2d 888, 890 (citing Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., Inc. v. Stofferahn, 461 N.W.2d 129, 134 (S.D. 1990)).

[¶ 7.] This appeal requires us to examine the statutes governing filing of subdivision plats and the extension of municipal boundaries by annexation. In discussing the rules of statutory construction, we have often stated:

"Questions of law such as statutory interpretation are reviewed by the Court de novo.... The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed. Since statutes must be construed according to their intent, the intent must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject. But, in construing statutes together it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. When the question is which of two enactments the legislature intended to apply to a particular situation, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute."

Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17 (citing U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 505 N.W.2d 115, 122-23 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted))).

DECISION

[¶ 8.] 1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that Rapid City's annexation of its airport was invalid.

[¶ 9.] Initially, it is also important to note that Rapid City fails to cite any authority to support its argument that the trial court erred in finding the annexation was invalid. Instead, Rapid City only asserts that the discussion of the validity of the airport annexation is irrelevant and the trial court improperly placed the burden upon it to prove that the annexation was valid.³ In fact, Rapid City contends in its brief that the issue of the validity of Rapid City's annexation of the Rapid City airport is a "five hundred pound red herring, entirely distracting attention from the very simple, unequivocal, and dispositive question of whether Box Elder's approval of the subject plat was valid." The trial court clearly did not find this issue a "distraction" based upon its substantial discussion about the invalidity of Rapid City's annexation. While it is true that under our de novo standard of review in a declaratory judgment action, this Court does not have to accept the trial court's conclusions of law hook, line, and sinker, we do not agree with Rapid City that this issue is a "five hundred pound red herring." A review of the record shows that a majority of the trial court's decision was devoted to the annexation issue; therefore, we will address this issue first.

[¶ 10.] The requirements for annexation by a municipality are identified in SDCL 9-4-1. The statute provides:

The governing body of a municipality, upon receipt of a written petition describing the boundaries of any territory, contiguous to that municipality sought to be annexed to that municipality, may by resolution include such territory or any part thereof within such municipality if the petition is signed by not less than three-fourths of the registered voters and by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the value of the territory sought to be annexed to the municipality.

For purposes of this section, "contiguous" includes territory separated from the municipality by reason of intervening ownership of land used as a golf course or any land owned by the State of South Dakota or any subdivisions thereof.

SDCL 9-4-1 (emphasis added). A review of SDCL 9-4-1 clearly shows that one element of a valid annexation is that the territory sought to be annexed must be contiguous to the annexing municipality. Therefore, in this case, the airport property must be contiguous to Rapid City. In discussing the importance of contiguity, this Court noted in Krebs v. City of Rapid City, 364 N.W.2d 128, 130 (S.D.1985) (citing Big Sioux Township v. Streeter, 272 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1978)), that "the territory [must] be contiguous to the annexing city and ... contiguity encompasses more than physical touching of boundaries but also encompasses the requirement of the community of interests which necessitates that the annexation be natural and reasonable."

[¶ 11.] In the present case, Rapid City annexed the Rapid City Airport, which is approximately 3.7 miles from Rapid City at Jolly Lane in a straight line or approximately 4.7 miles from Rapid City at Race Track Road. According to the annexation, Rapid City would have a 200-foot-wide right-of-way and railway frontage along Highway 44 for 4.7 miles to the airport. The trial court found that this annexation was not contiguous to Rapid City.

[¶ 12.] A review of cases in other jurisdictions reveals that the issue of "contiguity" of annexed property has arisen on numerous occasions. Contiguity has often been found to be synonymous with "adjacent" or "adjoining." See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Hastings, 241 Neb. 291, 488 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1992)

(noting that "[t]he terms `contiguous' and `adjacent' are used synonymously and interchangeably"); State v. City of Milford, 576 A.2d 618, 621 (Del.Ch.1989) (agreeing with the argument that "the boundaries of the annexed land and of the City should...