City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 13943

Citation334 N.W.2d 510
Decision Date01 June 1983
Docket NumberNo. 13943,13943
PartiesCITY OF RAPID CITY, a municipal corporation, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Richard S. KAHLER; Cornerstone Rescue Mission; David Adams; and Cheryl Adams, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota

Michael G. Diedrich City Atty., Rapid City, for petitioner and appellant.

Doyle Estes of Gunderson, Farrar, Aldrich, Warder & DeMersseman, Rapid City, for defendant and appellee Richard S. Kahler.

Todd Schweiger Black Hills Legal Services, Rapid City, for defendants and appellees Cornerstone Rescue Mission, David and Cheryl Adams; Mark Falk, Black Hills Legal Services, Rapid City, on brief.

DUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for an injunction. The injunction was sought to enjoin the use of a facility which was alleged to violate a local zoning ordinance and create a public nuisance. We reverse and remand.

Richard S. Kahler owns a piece of real estate in Rapid City, South Dakota, which he has leased to a South Dakota nonprofit organization called the Cornerstone Rescue Mission. David and Cheryl Adams operate the mission and serve on its board of directors. These parties will collectively be referred to as the appellee in this case.

The mission is located in a portion of Rapid City which is zoned high-density residential by Ordinance No. 1074 of the City of Rapid City (appellant). The mission provides temporary room and board free of charge to those in need. The only requirement is that the guests must attend regularly scheduled worship services. The record indicates that occupancy averages fifteen to seventeen persons per night and that space is provided on a first come, first serve basis. Financial support for the mission's work is provided by individuals in the Rapid City community.

Guests who stay at the mission must follow certain rules. Those wishing to spend the evening must be in the mission by 10:30 p.m. each night. During the day, the mission is emptied from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. for cleaning and from 1:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. for business needs. During these times the guests must fend for themselves and it is their activities during these periods of time which have resulted in numerous complaints to the authorities. The mission does not control or supervise its guests during these periods. As noted by the trial court, "[t]here is no question but what loitering, littering, panhandling and other unsavory activities have increased in the immediate neighborhood since the Mission opened its doors."

Appellant sought to enjoin appellee from using this facility in the manner described above. Appellant asserted the location of the mission violated existing zoning ordinances and also resulted in a nuisance which should be abated by an injunction. Both theories were rejected by the trial court.

Appellant's original action seeking injunctive relief alleged the mission was not a permissible use in the district in which it was located. Appellee answered by asserting it was legally operating within appellant's zoning ordinance since it was operating a boardinghouse as defined in the ordinance. The pleadings, the trial and the briefs to the trial court were limited to whether the mission came within the boardinghouse exception to the zoning ordinance. The trial court's memorandum opinion rejected the boardinghouse exception defense but found for appellee by concluding the mission was a religious use. The trial court subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to that effect. The trial court did not allow counsel for either side to present evidence, legal arguments or briefs on the issue of religious use.

The trial court's conclusion that the mission constitutes a religious use must be supported by findings of fact. Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 325 N.W.2d 292 (S.D.1982). Our review of the record leaves us with the firm conviction that the trial court made its decision based on insufficient evidence. We are, for example, unable to determine whether the mission is directly affiliated or supported by an organized religion, whether the religious leaders referred to are actually ordained ministers of recognized denominations, and we cannot determine from the record the nature, frequency and content of religious services said to be held in the mission. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further findings. On remand, we believe the trial court should consider the following overview of the law in the religious use area in making its decision.

The First Amendment forbids the enactment of any law "respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This language is also applicable to the several states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Together, these provisions require a separation of church and state, and guarantee religious freedom.

Municipal regulation of land use is capable of offending the principle of governmental neutrality. As one commentator noted, however, "[c]hurches, synagogues, and other institutions dedicated to religious objectives are in some degree protected from the full impact of zoning restrictions. These uses are favored for reasons ranging from their unique contribution to the public welfare to constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship." 2 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning, Sec. 12.18 (2nd ed. 1976).

What is "religious," however, is not easily defined. For free exercise purposes, "religion" cannot be neatly packaged by simply limiting its application to organized religious activities associated with mainstream religious organizations. Rather, as one commentator recently noted:

In an area as...

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3 cases
  • Great Lakes Soc. v. Georgetown Twp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 30 Octubre 2008
    ...ranging from their unique contribution to the public welfare to constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship.'" Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D., 1983) (deletion added), quoting 2 Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 12.18 (2nd ed). Thus, for example, it is an "almost unive......
  • Daughters of St. Paul, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Trumbull
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 21 Octubre 1988
    ..."Whether a use is a religious one is a question of fact." 2 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning (3d Ed.) § 12.29; Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D.1983). When a building is used for more than one purpose, "[t]he main, principal and dominant use of [the] building determines its......
  • Lutherans Outdoors in South Dakota, Inc. v. South Dakota State Bd. of Equalization, s. 17045
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 2 Octubre 1991
    ...Moreover, a primary or dominant religious purpose need not be defined "solely in terms of religious worship." City of Rapid City v. Kahler, 334 N.W.2d 510, 512 (S.D.1983). Some jurisdictions come close to making "religious use" and "worship service" equivalent terms. See, e.g., Diocese of B......

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