City Of Richmond v. Sutherland

• Decision Date: 13 March 1913
• Citation: 114 Va. 688,77 S.E. 470
• Parties: CITY OF RICHMOND et al. v. SUTHERLAND.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

77 S.E. 470

114 Va. 688

CITY OF RICHMOND et al.

v.SUTHERLAND.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

March 13, 1913.

1. Municipal Corporations (§ 636^*) — Police Courts — Jurisdiction — Claims Involving Title to Real Property—"All Offenses of Whatever Nature"—"What-

ever nature "

Code 1904, ' § 4106, as amended by Act March 16, 1910 (Acts 1910, c. 284), providing that police justices shall have original jurisdiction for the trial of "all offenses of whatever nature" against the ordinances of their cities, gives police justices jurisdiction to try offenses against city ordinances, although there is involved a bona fide claim of title to real estate, the use of the words "whatever nature" making the language used comprehend and include all offenses against city ordinances, no matter what they are, of every kind whatsoever.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1402; Dec. Dig. i 636.*]

2. Statutes (§ 181*)—Construction—Intention—Mode of Finding.

The paramount inquiry in construing & statute is as to the intention of the Legislature, which primarily is to be collected from the words, except when the words are not explicit, in which case it may be gathered from the occasion and necessity for the statute and from a comparison of its several parts and other acts in pari materia, sometimes from extraneous circumstances; and it will be presumed that the Legislature in amending a statute knew the construction put on it by the courts.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 259, 263; Dec. Dig. § 181.*]

3. Municipal Corporations (§ 636*)—Police Justices—Jurisdiction—Claims Involving Title to Real Estate—"Expressly."

Code 1904, § 4106, as amended by Act March 10, 1910 (Acts 1910, c. 284), providing that police justices shall have original jurisdiction for the trial of "all offenses of whatever nature" against the ordinances of their cities, "expressly, " or in "express terms, " within the rule that a justice of the peace or police justice who is acting under a statute can only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred on him, confers jurisdiction upon police justices to try offenses against city ordinances, although there is involved a bona fide claim of title to real estate.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1402; Dec. Dig. § 630.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 3, pp. 2614, 2615.]

Error to Chancery Court of Richmond.

Petition by J. Leroy Sutherland against the City of Richmond and J. J. Crutchfield, Police Justice, for writ of prohibition. From a judgment of the chancery court granting a writ prohibiting the police justice from trying a case against petitioner for violating an ordinance, the city brings error. Reversed.

H. R. Pollard, of Richmond, for plaintiff in error.

Wallace F. Brown, of Richmond, for defendant in error.

BUCHANAN, J. [1] The question involved in this case is whether or not a police justice of the city of Richmond has jurisdic-tion of a prosecution instituted by that city against the defendant in error for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the city prohibiting encroachments upon its streets and alleys, when it is made to appear that the right to impose the penalty provided by the ordinance involves the validity of a bona fide claim of title to real estate.

That the police justice did not have such jurisdiction under the charter of the city or under the general laws as they existed in May, 1907, was determined in Martin v. City of Richmond, 108 Va. 765, 62 S. E. 800. There has been no change in the charter affecting the question involved since that decision was made, but by an act of assembly approved March 16, 1910 (Acts 1910, c. 284, p. 424), section 4106 of the Code was amended. That amendment it is claimed by the city was intended to confer, and does confer, the jurisdiction in question upon the police justices of the city.

When the case of Martin v. City of Richmond arose, the general law fixing the jurisdiction of police justices was contained in sections 1016b and 4106 of Va. Code 1904. By section 1016b it was provided, among other things, that the police justice of a city should within the corporate limits of their respective cities and within one mile beyond "have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all offenses against the ordinances of their respective cities."

Section 4106 contained, among others, the following provision, except the words in italics, which constitute the amendment to or change made in the section by the act of March 16, 1910:

"Sec. 4106. What criminal offenses police justices and justices of the peace may try.— The several police justices and justices of the peace, in addition to the jurisdiction exercised by them as conservators of the peace, shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the counties and the corporation or hustings court of the corporations of the state in all cases of violation of the revenue and election laws of the state, and of offenses arising under the provisions of chapter one hundred and eighty-seven of sections thirty-eight hundred and one, thirty-eight hundred and two, thirty-eight hundred and three, and thirty-eight hundred and four of the Code of Virginia; and except when it is otherwise specially provided, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all other misdemeanor cases occurring within their jurisdiction in their respective magisterial districts, in all of which cases the punishment may be the same as the circuit courts of the counties and the corporation or hustings courts of the corporations are authorized to impose, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all offenses of whatever nature against the ordinances of the respective cities for which they shall be appointed, except in those cities whose charter confers upon the mayor the authority to try such offenses."

The only question, therefore, we have to consider and determine is whether or not section 4106 of the Code, as amended by the act of March 16, 1910, confers upon the police justice of the city the jurisdiction in question.

In construing a statute the paramount inquiry is: What was the intention of the Legislature? That intention may be discovered from different signs. As a primary rule, it is to be collected from the words. When the words are not explicit, it may be gathered from the occasion and necessity of the statute being passed, from a comparison of its several parts and of other acts in pari materia, and sometimes from extraneous circumstances which may throw light on the subject. Fox's Adm'r v. Commonwealth, 16 Grat. (57 Va.) 1, 10; Claflin, etc., v. Steen-bock & Co., 18 Grat. (59 Va.) at pages 860, 861; Vicars v. Salyer, 111 Va. 307, 309, 68 Si 11 988; N. & P. T. Co. v. Ellington's Adm'r, 108 Va. 245, 255, 256, 61 S. E. 779, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117.

Before considering the language of the said amendment, it may be well to inquire (1) what was the law before that amendment was made; and (2) what was the mischief and defect against which the previous law did not provide.

As before stated, the law in existence prior to the amendment of section 4106 of the Code by the act of March 16, 1910, did not confer upon a police justice jurisdiction to try any case for the violation of any ordinance of the city where it was made to appear that the right to impose the penalty involved the validity of a bona fide claim of title to real estate. Neither was there any original jurisdiction in any of the courts of record in the city of Richmond to try such cases; for sections 1016b and 4106 of the Code provided that justices of the peace and police justices should have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of the counties and the corporation or hustings courts of the cities in all cases of the violation of the revenue and election laws of the state, and of offenses arising under the provisions of chapter 187 of the Code (offenses against public policy), and under sections 3801 to 3804, inclusive (offenses against Sunday laws), and should have, except as otherwise provided, exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all other misdemeanors and offenses against city ordinances occurring within their respective jurisdictions. The defect in the law, as it was prior to the said amendment, was that, while certain acts were made criminal offenses by statutes and by ordinances, no tribunal was vested with original jurisdiction to try persons charged with such offenses, where the right to impose the penalty involved the validity of a bona fide claim of title to real estate.

The only change made in section 4106the Code by the act of March 16, 1910, was to provide that the police justices and justices of the peace, in addition to the jurisdiction thereinbefore conferred upon them, "shall have exclusive original jurisdiction for the trial of all offenses of whatever nature against the ordinances of their respective cities for which they shall be appointed except in those cities whose charter confers upon the mayor authority to try such offenses." Construing the language of the amendment in the light of the law as it was when the amendment was made and the defect against which the old law did not provide (matters of which the court must assume the Legislature were fully cognizant), what was the purpose or intention of the Legislature in making the amendment? It is not suggested that the Legislature had or could have had any other object in view than remedying the defect in the law as it existed when the amendment was made. That defect might have been corrected either by conferring upon some court of record jurisdiction to try such offenses, or by conferring that jurisdiction upon justices of the peace or police justices. The amendment makes no change in the jurisdiction of cour...