City Of Richmond v. Va. Ry. & Power Co

• Decision Date: 14 June 1917
• Citation: 92 S.E. 898
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF RICHMOND. v. VIRGINIA RY. & POWER CO.

(120 Va. 802)

92 S.E. 898

CITY OF RICHMOND.

v.VIRGINIA RY. & POWER CO.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 14, 1917.

Error to Law and Equity Court of City of Richmond.

Action by the City of Richmond against the Virginia Railway & Power Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

H. R. Pollard, of Richmond, for plaintiff in error.

H. W. Anderson, A. B. Guigon, and T. J. Moore, all of Richmond, for defendant in error.

PRENTIS, J. The single issue involved in this case is whether, as contended by the city of Richmond, it has the right to impose a rental or toll charge upon the Virginia Railway & Power Company for the use of the new Mayo bridge across James river, recently constructed by the city, or whether, as contended by the company, such bridge is an extension of Fourteenth street, upon which the company has already been granted the right, and charged with the resulting duty of operating its cars, under the ordinance of December 23, 1899.

The pertinent facts are: That at the time of the adoption of the ordinance, the bridge, including its approach at the south end of Fourteenth street, was owned by the Mayo Land & Bridge Company. This approachto the bridge, extending from the northern margin of the canal at Dock street to the river, was 1, 000 feet in length, and the bridge proper, including that portion of it on Mayo's Island, in the stream, was 1, 748 feet in length, all of which was the property of the bridge company. This approach to the bridge, while thus owned, was open to the public and popularly known as Fourteenth street. By subsequent acts of the Legislature, the city of Richmond was authorized to construct and maintain bridges over James river, and to condemn the necessary property therefor, whether already devoted to public uses or not. Pursuant thereto and under the statutes regulating the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the city condemned the bridge and its approach, from the northern end at Fourteenth and Dock streets across the river to its south bank at the north end of Hull street, Manchester, now a part of the city of Richmond, sometimes called South Richmond.

The ordinance of December 23, 1899, granted to the predecessor in right and title of the company permission to operate a street railway within the limits of the city of Richmond, over many of its streets, subject to many conditions and provisions set forth therein. The authority to operate the route on Fourteenth street reads thus:

"(9) Beginning at Fourteenth and Main streets and connecting with the Main street tracks, and a single track southwardly on Fourteenth street to the corporate limits."

Subdivision 4 of clause 2 of that franchise provides, among other things, that:

"The said company, on all of the paved streets of the city, whenever the tracks are ordered to be changed and on such streets as may hereafter be ordered to be paved, shall pave the space between all rails,-including the space between its tracks where there are double tracks, switches or side tracks, and for a distance of two feet on the outside of the outer rails of its tracks, and, on all unpaved streets, shall put in good repair with such material as the city may use on said street, and so maintain the space between all rails, including the space between the tracks where there are double tracks, switches, or side tracks, and for a distance of two feet on the outside of the outer rails of its tracks, without reference to the condition of the residue of the street, and shall from time to time make all necessary repairs in said space, under specifications, both as to construction and materials, and as to time of commencing and completing the work as may be prescribed by the committee on streets, under the supervision of the city engineer, * * * and said company shall also construct and keep in good repair that part of the floors of all bridges or other structures owned, in whole or in part, or maintained by the city, crossed by any of its tracks, and for a distance of two feet on the outside of such outer rails, and also between the tracks where there are double tracks. * * * "

It provides also that for the privileges granted the company shall pay to the city, as compensation, for the use of the streets and alleys, a percentage of its gross receipts ranging from 3 1/2 per cent, to 10 per cent. To these rental charges for the use and occupancy of the streets, there are added other requirements as to schedules of the cars, limiting the amount of the fares to be charged, and securing extensive and valuable transfer privileges to passengers.

The ordinance is very carefully drawn, the public interests are well safeguarded therein, and the privileges granted thereby are to continue for 30 years from the 1st day of January, 1900, unless voluntarily surrendered by the company, with the consent of the city council, or sooner forfeited.

When this ordinance was accepted by the company, it constituted a binding contract, not subject to repeal, and protected against any impairment by the Constitution of the United States.

It is freely conceded by counsel for the city that as a general proposition bridges, constituting extensions of streets or connecting streets, are to all intents and purposes parts of such streets, and the authorities leave no doubt on this question. McQuillin on Mun. Corp. (1912) § 1282; Pickett County v. Green County, 171 Ala. 377, 54 South. 998; Sandpoint v. Doyle, 14 Idaho, 749, 95 Pac. 945, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497; McDonald v. City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. 434; Birmingham v. Rochester City Ry. Co.,. 137 N. Y. 13, 32 N. E. 995, 18 L. R. A. 764; Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169, 89 Am. Dec. 418; Cavender v. City of Charleston, 62 W. Va. 654, 59 S. E. 732; City of Goshen v. Myers, 119 Ind. 196, 21 N. E. 657; 4 R. C. L. 195.

It is claimed, however, that, inasmuch as at the time the ordinance here involved was adopted, the city did not own the bridge, and that it only became a part of the public street when built and completed by the city in 1914, therefore the provisions of the ordinance cannot be held to apply thereto.

We cannot accept this construction of the ordinance. It was purposely and wisely so drawn as to meet such changing conditions as...