City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 13 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10–0666.,10–0666.
• Citation: 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 435,399 S.W.3d 130
• Parties: The CITY OF ROUND ROCK, Texas and Round Rock Fire Chief Larry Hodge, Petitioners, v. Jaime RODRIGUEZ and Round Rock Fire Fighters Association, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

399 S.W.3d 130

56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 435

The CITY OF ROUND ROCK, Texas and Round Rock Fire Chief Larry Hodge, Petitioners,

v.Jaime RODRIGUEZ and Round Rock Fire Fighters Association, Respondents.

No. 10–0666.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Dec. 8, 2011.

Decided April 5, 2013.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 2013.

Douglas W. Alexander, Anna Meredith Baker, Amy Warr, Alexander Dubose Jones & Townsend, LLP, Austin, TX, Julia J. Gannaway, Bettye Lynn, Lynn Pham & Ross, LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Stephan L. Sheets, Sheets & Crossfield PC, Round Rock, TX, for The City of Round Rock, Texas.

B. Craig Deats, Philip Durst, Deats Durst Owen & Levy, P.L.L.C., Austin, TX, for Jaime Rodriguez.

Elizabeth T. Dierdorf, Sr. Asst. City Attorney, for Amicus Curiae City of Fort Worth, Texas.

David R. Richards, Richards Rodriguez & Skeith LLC, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas AFL–CIO, Texas State Association of Fire Fighters.

Laura F. Mueller, Texas Municipal League, Austin, TX, for Amicus Curiae Texas Municipal League.

Justice GREEN delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice JOHNSON, Justice WILLETT, Justice GUZMAN, Justice BOYD, and Justice DEVINE joined.

In this statutory construction case, we are asked to decide whether section 101.001 of the Texas Labor Code grants unionized public-sector employees in Texas the right to, upon request, have union representation during an internal investigatory interview when the employee reasonably believes the interview may result in disciplinary action. The court of appeals held that section 101.001 confers such a right. 317 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex.App.–Austin 2010, pet. granted). Although private-sector employees and federal public-sector employees both possess such a representation right, we hold that the Texas Legislature has not granted that right to public-sector employees in Texas. Cf.5 U.S.C. § 7101(b); NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260, 95 S.Ct. 959, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 157). We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that section 101.001 of the Labor Code does not confer on public-sector employees in Texas the right to union representation at an investigatory interview that the employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action.

I. Factual Background

In July 2008, Round Rock Fire Chief Larry Hodge called fire fighter Jaime Rodriguez into a meeting in Chief Hodge's office. In the room, Chief Hodge was joined by the assistant fire chief and Rodriguez's battalion chief. Chief Hodge told Rodriguez that the purpose of the meeting was to conduct an internal interview of Rodriguez regarding a personnel complaint that Chief Hodge had filed against him. Chief Hodge alleged that Rodriguez had misused his sick leave earlier that month to get a physical examination to pursue employment with the Austin Fire Department. The complaint stated, “Since this is an Internal Interview you may not be represented during our meeting; however, if a pre-disciplinary meeting is set following our meeting you would be eligible for representation at that time.” The complaint also prohibited Rodriguez from discussing the complaint with anyone other than Rodriguez's attorney, including union leadership and other union members.

Before the interview began, Rodriguez asserted the right to union representation, requesting to have a representative from the Round Rock Fire Fighters Association (the Association) present during the interview. Chief Hodge denied Rodriguez's request and interviewed him without Association representation. In October 2008, Chief Hodge again met with Rodriguez to discuss potential discipline for the conduct alleged in the personnel complaint. Rodriguez did not ask for a union representative at that meeting. Chief Hodge allowed Rodriguez to choose between being discharged and accepting a five-day suspension without right of appeal. A few days later, Rodriguez executed an agreement that opted for the five-day suspension.

Three months later, Rodriguez and the Association filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that Chief Hodge and the City of Round Rock violated Rodriguez's right to union representation, and asserting that such a right is conferred by section 101.001 of the Texas Labor Code. Rodriguez and the Association also sought to enjoin Chief Hodge and the City from denying Rodriguez and other fire fighters their right to representation at future investigatory interviews. The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Chief Hodge and the City, and granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Rodriguez and the Association. In its final judgment, the trial court declared that Rodriguez was denied his right to union representation under section 101.001 of the Labor Code, and enjoined Chief Hodge and the City from further denying fire fighters the right to, upon request, be represented by the Association at investigatory interviews they reasonably believe might result in discipline. The court of appeals affirmed the decision. 317 S.W.3d at 875.

II. The Weingarten Decision

The right to union representation in an investigatory interview derives from the United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 95 S.Ct. 959 (1975), the seminal case regarding private-sector employee representation rights. In that case, an employer challenged the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) determination that Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) granted private-sector employees the right to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview when the employee reasonably believes that the interview could result in disciplinary action. Id. at 260, 95 S.Ct. 959. The NLRB determined that this right inhered in Section 7's guarantee of the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection.” Id. at 252, 95 S.Ct. 959;see29 U.S.C. § 157. The Supreme Court held that the NLRB permissibly construed Section 7 to confer the representation right, noting that the NLRB's construction may not be required by the statute's text. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266–67, 95 S.Ct. 959. In doing so, the Supreme Court explained that the NLRB's decisions are “subject to limited judicial review” because of the NLRB's “special function” in interpreting Section 7 and its “special competence” in the field of labor-management relations. Id. at 267, 95 S.Ct. 959. Following Weingarten, Congress extended the representation right to federal public-sector employees. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b). Thus, the right to union representation during investigatory interviews currently applies nationally to all private-sector employees and federal public-sector employees.

III. Statutory Construction

Statutory construction is a question of law, and review is conducted de novo. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex.2009). Our ultimate purpose when construing a statute is to discover the Legislature's intent. Id. We examine the statute's text, as it provides the best indication of legislative intent. Id.

A. The Plain Language of Section 101.001 Does Not Confer the Representation Right Asserted by Rodriguez

Section 101.001, captioned “Right to Organize,” provides: “All persons engaged in any kind of labor may associate and form trade unions and other organizations to protect themselves in their personal labor in their respective employment.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 101.001; see also Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 809 (Tex.2010) (“[T]he title of [a statute] carries no weight, as a heading does not limit or expand the meaning of a statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While the statute is broad, we do not read it as conferring, by its plain language, the specific right to have a union representative present at an investigatory interview that an employee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action. In fact, on its face, the statute confers only one explicit right: the right to organize into a trade union or other organization. By its plain terms, the statute makes it lawful for employees to form labor unions or other organizations, and specifically, those organizations created to protect them in their employment. It says nothing about any rights that may attach once such unions are formed.

Indeed, this Court has previously recognized this construction of section 101.001 when discussing the joint purpose of a former codification of section 101.001 and section 101.002 of the Labor Code, which addresses the rights of individuals to influence others in employment matters. See Best Motor Lines v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Local No. 745, 150 Tex. 95, 237 S.W.2d 589, 598 (1951). We stated that these statutes are “the very statutes which give the unions life” and that, “[u]nder these statutes, labor unions are permitted to organize and work for the betterment of their members.” Id. We clearly delineated the specific roles of each statute: Section 101.001 confers the right to organize into a union, and section 101.002 then provides substance to that right by allowing employees to influence other employees to enter, refuse, or quit employment. Id.; see alsoTex. Lab.Code §§ 101.001, .002; Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 636 n. 18, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975) (noting that a former codification of sections 101.001 and 101.002 “declare that it is lawful for workers to associate in unions and to induce other persons to accept or reject employment”); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 386 n. 1, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922) (describing a former codification of section 101.001 as being enacted for the purpose of “[l]egalization of labor unions and labor combinations”); Webb v. Cooks', Waiters' & Waitresses' Union, No. 748, 205 S.W. 465, 469 (Tex.Civ.App.–Fort Worth 1918, writ ref'd) (stating that a former...