City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne
Citation | 111 S.W.3d 22 |
Decision Date | 26 June 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 01-1054.,01-1054. |
Parties | CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Petitioner, v. CITY OF BOERNE, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Randall B. Richards, Law Offices of Randall B. Richard, Boerne, for Respondent.
In this municipal annexation dispute, we consider whether a county commissioners court may petition a city to include portions of its county's roads within that city's extraterritorial jurisdiction (i) pursuant to the Legislature's grant of "general control over all roads," see Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 81.028(5),1 or (ii) as agent of the State of Texas, see id. § 42.022(b). Because we hold that the Legislature has neither expressly nor impliedly conferred such power upon a commissioners court under either section 81.028(5) or 42.022(b), we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The City of San Antonio and the City of Boerne stipulated to the relevant facts. On November 5, 1987, San Antonio's City Council passed an ordinance (the "San Antonio Ordinance") annexing certain property located in San Antonio's extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 On the December 31, 1987 effective date of this annexation, San Antonio's extraterritorial jurisdiction expanded to include property that was previously unincorporated by any city. See id. § 42.022(a).
After San Antonio passed its annexation ordinance, but before it became effective, a number of property owners in Kendall and Comal Counties petitioned Boerne to include their property within Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction. See id. § 42.022(b) (). However, the property of those petitioning owners was too dispersed to satisfy section 42.022(b)'s contiguity requirement. To overcome that obstacle, Boerne—which had agreed to coordinate the annexation process—accepted petitions from Kendall and Comal County commissioners courts to include various sections of their counties' roads within Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction. Boerne then passed a number of ordinances (the "Boerne Ordinances") extending its extraterritorial jurisdiction accordingly.
Boerne concedes that, without including county roads, much of the area is insufficiently contiguous to satisfy section 42.022(b).3 By including these county roads, however, Boerne believes it properly acquired jurisdiction over an area that absent the Boerne Ordinances, would be within the extraterritorial jurisdiction created by the San Antonio Ordinance. Thus, in contravention of Local Government Code section 42.022(c), San Antonio and Boerne effectively claimed authority over the same area. See id. § 42.022(c) ().
In 1998, Boerne sued San Antonio, seeking a declaratory judgment that the overlapping extraterritorial jurisdiction belonged to Boerne, not San Antonio. Boerne also sought a permanent injunction prohibiting San Antonio from asserting jurisdiction over the contested land area. Based on stipulated facts, the trial court ruled that the overlapping property was validly within Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction before the San Antonio Ordinance went into effect. The trial court's judgment also provided that as of December 28, 1987, the effective date of the Boerne Ordinances, Boerne had exclusive control over the overlapping extraterritorial jurisdiction. The judgment "permanently enjoined [San Antonio] from asserting any jurisdiction or authority, or attempting to enforce its ordinances, rules and/or regulations, over the area [ ] declared to be the exclusive extraterritorial jurisdiction of [Boerne]."
San Antonio appealed the trial court's judgment and argued, among other things, that the Kendall and Comal County commissioners courts lacked authority to petition Boerne to include segments of their counties' roads within Boerne's extraterritorial jurisdiction.4 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that "county commissioners, as agents for the State, were empowered to petition for inclusion in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Boerne." 61 S.W.3d 571, 579. In this Court, San Antonio challenges the commissioners courts' authority to petition a city to annex county roads pursuant to Local Government Code sections 81.028 and 42.022. We granted San Antonio's petition for review to resolve this issue. 45 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 621 (May 11, 2002).
We review matters of statutory construction de novo. See City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Tex.2000); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex.1999). In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent. State v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.2002); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 312.005; Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 92, 95 (Tex.2000). We look first to the "plain and common meaning of the statute's words." Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327. If a statute's meaning is unambiguous, we generally interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Id. We determine legislative intent from the entire act and not just its isolated portions. Id. (citing Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex.1998)). Thus, we "`read the statute as a whole and interpret it to give effect to every part.'" Id. (quoting Jones, 969 S.W.2d at 432). With these principles in mind, we now turn to the parties' arguments.
San Antonio and Boerne agree that the issue here is whether a county commissioners court may, either pursuant to powers set forth in Local Government Code section 81.028 or as the State's agent under Local Government Code section 42.022(b), petition to include portions of county roads within a given municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 42.022, 81.028. Boerne argues that the Legislature's reenactment of section 42.002—subsequent to section 81.028's enactment—establishes the Legislature's intent to give commissioners courts the authority to petition for annexation. San Antonio, on the other hand, contends that the statutes are unrelated and that our construction of one should not influence our construction of the other. Before analyzing these contentions, we briefly trace the historical background of extraterritorial jurisdiction and annexation in Texas and discuss the source of and limitations on a commissioners court's power.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to "the unincorporated area that is contiguous to the corporate boundaries of the municipality" and is located within a specified distance of those boundaries, depending upon the number of inhabitants within the municipality. Id. § 42.021. The purpose of extraterritorial jurisdiction is "to promote and protect the general health, safety, and welfare of persons residing in and adjacent to the municipalities." Id. § 42.001.
Generally, a municipality's extraterritorial jurisdiction may not expand beyond legislatively prescribed limits. See id. § 42.021. If the owners of a particular area request an expansion, however, "[t]he extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality may expand beyond the distance limitations imposed by Section 42.021 to include an area contiguous to the otherwise existing extraterritorial jurisdiction of the municipality." Id. § 42.022(b). Boerne argues that the commissioners courts' petitions bring this case within section 42.022's exception permitting expansion beyond the legislatively prescribed extraterritorial limits.
Before 1912, the Legislature created virtually all cities and municipal corporations. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 interp. commentary; see also Robert R. Ashcroft & Barbara Kyle Balfour, Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in Texas: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 519, 520 (1984). At that time, Texas permitted annexation under only two circumstances: (i) pursuant to the general law, usually by majority vote of the annexed residents, or (ii) by special act of the Legislature granting or amending a specific city's charter. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 interp. commentary; Trueman O'Quinn, Annexing New Territory: A Review of Texas Law and the Proposals for Legislative Control of Cities Extending Their Boundaries, 39 Tex. L.Rev. 172, 175 (1960). By adopting the Home Rule Amendment in 1912, Texas withdrew the Legislature's power to grant and change home rule city charters by special laws.5 Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 interp. commentary (citing State ex rel. Wayland v. Vincent, 217 S.W. 402, 405 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1919), aff'd, 235 S.W. 1084, 1088 (Tex.1921)).
With the Home Rule Amendment, home rule cities acquired the authority to annex property without the property owners' consent and without first establishing a need for the new area. Texas Legislative Council, Municipal Annexation: A Report to the 57th Legislature 4 (1960); O'Quinn, supra, at 172. The first municipality to begin annexation procedures on unclaimed territory obtained jurisdiction over that property....
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