City of San Diego v. California Coastal Com.

• Citation: 119 Cal.App.3d 228,174 Cal.Rptr. 5
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 12 May 1981
• Parties: , 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,957 CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 22741.

Page 5

174 Cal.Rptr. 5

119 Cal.App.3d 228, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,957

CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 22741.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

May 12, 1981.

As Modified May 22 and June 5, 1981.

John W. Witt, City Atty., San Diego, Ronald L. Johnson, Chief Deputy City Atty., and Kenneth So, Deputy City Atty., for plaintiff and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., N. Gregory Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anthony M. Summers and Timothy R. Patterson, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Diego, for defendant and respondent.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

The City of San Diego (City) applied for a permit from the San Diego Coast Regional Commission to realign and widen a portion of Carmel Valley Road adjacent to the Los Penasquitos Lagoon. ¹ The Regional Commission approved the permit subject to conditions that limited the improvement of the road to two lanes and a bike path and required restoration of wetlands in an amount equal to two times the amount of wetlands filled by realignment of the road. The Regional Commission's decision to the California Coastal Commission (Commission) for a de novo hearing. (Pub.Resources Code, § 30621.) ² The Commission denied the permit application as conditioned by the Regional Commission because

"the development would not be in conformity with the provisions of Chapter 3 of the California Coastal Act of 1976, would prejudice the ability of the local government having jurisdiction over the area to prepare a Local Coastal Program conforming to the provisions of Chapter 3 of the California Coastal Act of 1976 and would have a significant adverse impact on the environment within the meaning of the California Environmental Quality Act and feasible alternatives exist which would substantially reduce these adverse impacts."

The City's petition for writ of mandate in the superior court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 was denied. This appeal ensued.

The issue presented is whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.

Applicable Law

The parties agree this matter is governed by the substantial evidence test. Generally,

"If the trial court was limited to the substantial evidence test ..., 'the trial and appellate courts occupy identical positions with regard to the administrative record, and the function of the appellate court, like that of the trial court, is to determine whether that record is free from legal error.' (Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 71 Cal.2d 907, 915-916, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.) Thus, ... the appellate court itself reviews the administrative record to determine whether the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence. (Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10, 149, 93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242.)" (Patterson v. Central Coast Regional Com. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 833, 842, 130 Cal.Rptr. 169.)

Further, we are mindful that

"... every presumption in favor of the administrative findings which may ordinarily be accorded to such determinations of the trier of fact should be indulged to support the administrative findings on these factual matters. Up to the point where the court cannot, in good conscience, say that the administrative evidence supporting those findings and inferences of fact is substantial, in that there is no reasonable relation between the facts and the findings, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even though, had the court heard the case de novo it would not have reached the same findings of fact itself. (Citations.)" (Pranger v. Break (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 551, 559-560, 9 Cal.Rptr. 293.)

Finally, the opinion evidence of experts in the discipline of environmental planning, often included within environmental impact reports, may constitute substantial evidence upon which the Commission may have based its decision. (Coastal Southwest Dev. Corp. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 525, 532, 127 Cal.Rptr. 775.) Discussion

I

The City first urges the record is devoid of substantial evidence supporting the finding the project would not be in conformity with Chapter 3 of the California Coastal Act of 1976. Relying on section 30001.5, the City stresses the goals of the Act include the assurance of the "... orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account the social and economic needs of the ... state" (subd. (b)) and the maximization of "... public access to and along the coast...." (subd. (c).) Stressing further that public safety needs must be considered (§ 30210), the City argues there is substantial evidence that Carmel Valley Road is dangerous, while there is not substantial evidence in support of the findings a design speed of 35 m.p.h. would be consistent with the safe speed of the remainder of the road and that any improvements to the road must be accomplished without filling the wetlands.

A coastal development permit shall not be approved by the Commission on appeal if the proposed development is not in conformity with the provisions of the Act. (§ 30604, subd. (a).) The declared policy of the Act is predicated upon the legislative finding the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource characterized as "a delicately balanced ecosystem" (§ 30001, subd. (a)), the permanent protection of which is "a paramount concern to present and future residents of the state and nation" (§ 30001, subd. (b); Stanson v. San Diego Coast Regional Com. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 38, 46, 161 Cal.Rptr. 392). The stated goals of the Act are to:

"(a) Protect, maintain, and, where feasible, enhance and restore the overall quality of the coastal zone environment and its natural and manmade resources.

"(b) Assure orderly, balanced utilization and conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account the social and economic needs of the people of the state.

"(c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation principles and constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.

"(d) Assure priority for coastal-dependent and coastal-related development over other development on the coast.

"(e) Encourage state and local initiatives and cooperation in preparing procedures to implement coordinated planning and development for mutually beneficial uses, including educational uses, in the coastal zone." (§ 30001.5.)

In reviewing an application for a permit, the Commission must "... undertake a delicate balancing of the effect of each proposed development upon the environment of the coast" (State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 248, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281) and the often conflicting goals noted above. When conflicts between the cited goals and policies of the Act occur, they must "... be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources." (§ 30007.5; Billings v. California Coastal Com. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 729, 739, 163 Cal.Rptr. 288.)

There is substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings establishing that it delicately balanced the competing interests of the protection of a significant natural resource and the resolution of a road safety problem it determined could be mitigated without alteration of Los Penasquitos Lagoon.

Los Penasquitos Lagoon is one of the last natural coastal wetlands in San Diego County, constituting one of the 19 highest priority wetlands identified under section 30233, subd. (c). In pertinent part, that statutory provision states:

"Any alteration of coastal wetlands identified by the Department of Fish and Game, ... shall be limited to very minor incidental public facilities, restorative measures, nature study ...."

In fact, the Department of Fish and Game analyzed the City's project, concluding it conflicted with section 30233, subd. (c), and the Wetland Preservation Policy of the State Resource Agency. The Department urged the Commission not to allow any fill material to be placed in the lagoon. Moreover, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service reviewed the matter and objected to any filling of the lagoon because of its unique and "especially sensitive" nature due to the presence of federally controlled endangered species, the light-footed clapper rail and the California least tern. Finally, the City itself in an adopted environmental impact report (EIR) pertaining to Carmel Valley Estates, a proposed 102-unit subdivision immediately north of the project in controversy, stated the lagoon "... is composed of salt water wetlands, a rare habitat resource greatly depleted in California ... (and is) part of the critical habitat for (three endangered species) ...."

Further, there was substantial evidence establishing that although the curve in controversy posed safety problems, it did not constitute a major hazard. The City's EIR on the Carmel Valley Estates Project notes that "the traffic accident problem is minor at the present time (Federhard and Associates, 1978)." The Appendix to the EIR, entitled "Traffic Impact Analysis for Carmel Valley Estates," reiterates this proposition. Finally, in 1979, the City's Senior Traffic Engineer reviewed the number of accidents on the particular stretch of the roadway, concluding the overall accident frequency was "relatively low," but that the problem should not be minimized because of "the concentration and pattern" of the accidents.

Upon reviewing the number of accidents during the previous years, the Commission's staff report, which was adopted by the Commission on August 15, 1979, explains:

"(A)ccidents are deplorable, and fatal accidents, of course, tragic; accordingly, the Commission believes that the City of San Diego should not be prevented from improving the unsafe situation caused by...