City of Sand Springs v. Kraus
| Citation | 1937 OK 517,181 Okla. 6,72 P.2d 726 |
| Decision Date | 28 September 1937 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 27311 |
| Parties | City of Sand Springs v. Kraus |
| Court | Supreme Court of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--Chater provision as to Amount and payment of Mayor's Salary Held not to Wxwmpt Same From Constitutional Limitations.
That the amount and payment of mayor's salary are directed by the charter of a city does not exempt payment thereof from the operation of section 26 of article 10 of the Constitution, limiting the indebtedness of municipalities to the amount of income and revenue provided for that year.
2. SAME--Municipal Officers Failing to include Their Salaries in Their Financial Wstimated and Request for Appropriation not Permitted to Rexover for Same in Suit Against Municipality.
Officers charged with the duty of making up and submitting the city's estimate of financial needs and request for appropriation to meet such needs for the current year have the duty of including their own salaries therein, and if they voluntarily omit such item and see the estimated income and revenue appropriated for other purposes, to the exclusion of their salaries, they cannot later recover compensation for their duties, in an action against the municipality.
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Tulsa County; Bert E. Johnson, Judge.
Action by Joe Kraus against the City of Sand Springs for recovery of unpaid portion of salary as mayor. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
F. B. White, of Sand Springs, for plaintiff in error.
M. A. Breckinridge, of Tulsa, for defendant in error.
¶1 The salary of the mayor of the city of Sand Springs was prescribed by the city charter to be $100 per month. The charter further provided that its provisions should be self-executing. The mayor is one of three city commissioners forming the governing body of the city. The salaries of the other two are set by ordinance.
¶2 The plaintiff in this action was formerly the mayor of the city, having served the term beginning in May of 1933 and ending in May of 1935. When he took office in May, 1933, he began receiving his $100 per month salary, and continued receiving it until the time hereinafter stated. The new fiscal year began on July 1, 1933, when shortly thereafter it became necessary to make up an estimate of needs for that fiscal year, for submission to the County Excise Board. The record is not clear whether such estimate was made up and actually filed with the Excise Board at or near that time. It appears that the city commissioners learned that the Excise Board would not approve an estimate the total amount of which would be sufficient to pay their own salaries in full and at the same time accomplish certain library improvements which were being demanded by the women composing the library board. In order, then, to obtain sufficient appropriations to accomplish said other improvements, the commissioners orally agreed among themselves informally, and without any official resolution to that effect, that they would suffer a reduction in their own salaries. Accordingly, an estimate was submitted to the Excise Board, which bears the date of July 3, 1933, wherein the amount named as needed for paying the mayor's salary for the ensuing year was $660, which would have been $55 per month. This estimate bears the signature of the plaintiff as mayor, and of the other two city commissioners. There is no showing that the mayor protested against the filing of such estimate, but, on the contrary, all of the evidence indicates that the salary amounts were voluntarily reduced therein for the sole reason that the commissioners, including the mayor, anticipated that the Excise Board would not approve the other items if the salary items were submitted in the fully allowable amounts. The Excise Board substantially approved the estimate as to this item, allowing $600 as the mayor's salary.
¶3 The same thing happened the next year, as to the fiscal year 1934-1935. During both years the mayor drew his salary at $100 per month until the appropriation for that purpose was exhausted, after which he drew no salary nor made any claim therefor. After his term as mayor was ended, he filed this action against the city for the difference between the total amount which he would have received at $100 per month and the total amount which he had actually received. The trial court gave the plaintiff judgment for that difference, and the defendant city appeals.
¶4 The principal contention made by the city is that recovery is prevented by section 26, art. 10 of the Constitution, forbidding municipal corporations from becoming indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, and our numerous decisions holding that recovery may not be had in the absence of an appropriation for that purpose, or where said appropriation has become exhausted prior to rendition of the services for which recovery is sought, and the qualifications...
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