City of Santa Clara v. Local Agency Formation Com.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1983
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant. A013236. Civ. 53409.

Page 112

189 Cal.Rptr. 112

139 Cal.App.3d 923

CITY OF SANTA CLARA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SANTA CLARA COUNTY LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellant.

A013236.

Civ. 53409.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 15, 1983.

Hearing Denied March 13, 1983.

Selby Brown, Jr., County Counsel, Santa Clara, Thomas Wm. Cain and Donald J. Fallon, Deputy County Counsels, San Jose, for defendant and appellant.

Edwin J. Moore, City Atty., Santa Clara, Michael R. Downey, Asst. City Atty., Barry F. McCarthy, Deputy City Atty., Santa Clara, for plaintiff and respondent.

BARRY-DEAL, Associate Justice.

The Santa Clara County Local Agency Formation Commission (hereafter LAFCO) ¹ appeals from a judgment granting the City of Santa Clara's (hereafter the City) petition for writ of mandate compelling LAFCO to set aside its order denying the City's petition for annexation of two parcels of undeveloped land. We reverse because LAFCO properly determined that the annexation was not exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (hereafter CEQA) and because it was within LAFCO's discretion to adopt a policy of discouraging annexation of territory prezoned for agricultural use exclusively.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF THE FACTS

On May 7, 1980, the City applied to LAFCO for annexation of two parcels of territory pursuant to the District Reorganization Act of 1965 (Gov.Code, § 56000 et seq.). The parcels, known as Agnew No. 33 and Homestead No. 47, contained 42.93 and 39.72 acres, respectively. The City proposed that the parcels be annexed to it and detached from the Central Fire Protection District, the chief reason being the City's desire to eliminate islands of unincorporated territory within its urban services area. The present use of each parcel was specified as "agricultural ... with residences." Agnew No. 33 was being used for dairy cattle and grain crops and had 10 inhabitants; Homestead No. 47 was being used for orchards and had 7 inhabitants. The City had prezoned each parcel "A--agricultural" in 1956. No development was proposed as to either. The owners of the property comprising Agnew No. 33 stated that they did not object to annexation, but with the understanding that when the property was annexed it would have the same zoning as currently existed. The owners of Homestead No. 47 consented to the proposal without apparent reservation. The applications stated that the annexations were exempt from the provisions of CEQA.

On June 2, 1980, Alan LaFleur, senior staff analyst for LAFCO, submitted his report to LAFCO recommending that the proposals be continued pending environmental studies. He reasoned as follows. Although both properties had been prezoned "agricultural," the City's current general plan indicated that Agnew No. 33 was designated for medium density residential use and Homestead No. 47 for light industrial development. Because prezoning was inconsistent with the general plan designations, the proposals were deemed not categorically exempt from CEQA. Since LAFCO is required to consider environmental impact of annexations, a continuance was necessary while environmental data were assessed.

At the LAFCO meeting of June 11, 1980, Paul Sagers, LAFCO assistant executive officer, summarized the staff position regarding the annexations. Sam Cristofano, the City's director of public works and City engineer, presented the City's position. The matter was continued to July 2, 1980, at which time Olney Smith, City director of planning and inspection, stated that the City had provided all of the environmental information that it could (namely, none), since there were no present plans to develop the property. LAFCO then denied the applications without prejudice.

On October 11, 1980, the City petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate asking the court to set aside LAFCO's denial of its applications. The City argued that the annexations were exempt from the requirements of CEQA and that LAFCO had not complied with its statutory mandates when it failed to consider appropriate factors in passing upon the application and when, as a matter of policy, it set improper limits upon annexations.

LAFCO answered the petition, and after the matter was extensively briefed and was argued, the court found that the annexations were exempt from the requirements of CEQA and that LAFCO did not have authority to adopt a policy against annexation of agricultural lands. The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 12, 1981. On the same day it entered judgment ordering that peremptory writ of mandate issue directing LAFCO to set aside its order, rehear the applications, and determine that the annexations were exempt from CEQA requirements. This appeal followed.

Other pertinent facts are developed in the discussion.

DISCUSSION

LAFCO contends that the trial court erred in issuing ² the writ of mandate ³ because in denying the proposals for annexation, LAFCO complied with its legislative mandate and because the proposals were not categorically exempt from the requirements of CEQA. We agree.

The Legislative Scheme

The legislative history and the function of LAFCOs and CEQA have been treated elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail here. (See, e.g., Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 263, 273-274, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017; Note (1976) 16 Santa Clara L.Rev. 403, 404-405; City of Santa Cruz v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 76 Cal.App.3d at pp. 385-386, 142 Cal.Rptr. 873; Review of Selected 1965 Code Legislation (Cont.Ed.Bar 1965) [139 Cal.App.3d 928] pp. 140-141.) LAFCOs as they exist today are the product of the Knox-Nisbet Act of 1965, the purposes of which include "the discouragement of urban sprawl," the "orderly formation and development of local governmental agencies," and the encouragement and planning of "well-ordered, efficient urban development patterns with appropriate consideration of preserving open-space lands within such patterns." (Gov.Code, §§ 54774, 54774.5.) To these ends, each LAFCO has the power to establish "spheres of influence" of each local governmental agency within its county ⁴ and to approve or disapprove, inter alia, proposals for annexation of territory to local governmental agencies. (Gov.Code, §§ 54774, 54790, subd. (a).)

The purpose of CEQA, which was enacted in 1970, is, generally speaking, to protect the environment. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21000, 21001.) The Legislature intended that CEQA " '... be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.' " (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 274, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017, quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049, emphasis added by Bozung court.)

CEQA requires "governmental agencies at all levels to develop standards and procedures necessary to protect environmental quality." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21001, subd. (f).) An essential provision which implements CEQA's purposes is the requirement that local agencies prepare and certify an environmental impact report (EIR) "on any project they intend to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment...." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21151; see Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21002, 21002.1.) A LAFCO is a governmental local agency, and an annexation to a city is a project within the meaning of CEQA. (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 276-279, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017.) ⁵ Therefore, before approving an annexation which may have a significant effect on the environment, a LAFCO must prepare and certify an EIR. (Id., at pp. 279-287, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017.)

The Bozung decision has been cited for the proposition that all annexation proposals require preparation of an EIR. (E.g., Note, supra, 16 Santa Clara L.Rev. at p. 412.) This is not correct. The land to be annexed in that case was slated for development in the "near future," and this fact was considered "[v]ital" by the court in reaching its decision. (Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 269-270, 118 Cal.Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017.) An EIR is only required for a project which may have a significant effect on the environment, that is, "a substantial, or potentially substantial, adverse change in the environment." (Pub. Resources Code, § 21068.)

Categorical Exemption

CEQA exempts a number of projects from the requirement that an EIR be prepared because by definition they do not have a significant effect on the environment. (E.g., Pub. Resources Code, § 21080.) The guidelines for implementation of CEQA (Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 14, § 15000 et seq.), promulgated by the state Office of Planning and Research pursuant to authority of Public Resources Code section 21083, contain the following provisions relevant to our discussion.

California Administrative Code, title 14, section 15100, provides: "Section 21084 of the Public Resources Code requires these Guidelines to include a list of classes of projects which have been determined not to have a significant effect on the environment and which shall, therefore, be exempt from the provisions of the Environmental Quality Act of 1970. [p] In response to that mandate, the Secretary for Resources has found that the following classes of projects listed in this article [article 8--categorical exemptions] do not have a significant effect on the environment and they are declared to be categorically exempt from the requirement for the preparation of environmental documents." There follows a series of provisions establishing 29 "classes" of categorical exemption. We are here concerned with subdivision (a) of class 19, provided for in California Administrative Code, title 14, section 15119: "Class 19 consists of only...